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In this dissertation I argue against some popular arguments for the compatibilism of 
moral responsibility and determinism, and for a compatibilist account of moral 
responsibility and agency of my own.  In the first chapter I argue against Strawsonian 
inspired accounts of moral responsibility that would, if accurate, provide reason to 
reject incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism.  In the second 
chapter I argue that Quality of Will accounts of moral responsibility, while likely 
correct, do not provide reason to rejection incompatibilism.  In the third chapter I 
provide and argument for incomaptibilism that relies on none of the controversial 
assumptions about control and the ability to do otherwise which have presented 
problems for arguments for incompatibilism in the past.  Thus, this argument is 
immune to the criticisms of traditionally incompatibilist accounts of control and 
ability.  In the last chapter I present a compatibilist account of moral agency that I 
endorse.  This accoutn is a combination of two popular accounts of moral agency that 
I show fail, when taken on their own. 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Patrick Timothy Mayer received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy and 
Political Science from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County before doing his 
graduate study at the Sage School of Philosophy of Cornell University.
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Leah, whose sacrifices made this possible, 
Olivia, whose arrival made this worth doing, 
And Robin, Ralph, and Eric for their love, support and guidance.
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The work included here is the descendant of work I began as an undergraduate and so 
I would like to thank the faculty of the Philosophy Department of the University of 
Maryland, Baltimore County for their years of support.  I would especially like to 
thank Dr. Stephen Yalowitz, who first introduced me to the problems surrounding free 
will and moral responsibility and supervised my undergraduate thesis on the subject.  I 
want to express my gratitude to the entire faculty and graduate student body of the 
Sage School of Philosophy for years of helpful and enjoyable conversation on the 
wide range of topics that found their way into this dissertation.  Deserving of special 
thanks are Dr. Michael Fara, Dr. Terence Irwin, Dr. Scott MacDonald, Dr. Michelle 
Kosch and Dr. Derk Pereboom, who supervised the dissertation, reading hundreds of 
pages of drafts and providing insightful and challenging commentary throughout, even 
when the drafts themselves might not have merited such close attention.
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction       1 - 7 
Chapter 1:  Praise and Blame     8 - 61 
Chapter 2: The Quality of Will Account   62 - 116 
Chapter 3: The Moral Luck Argument   117 - 169 
Chapter 4: Real Selves and Reasons Responsiveness 170 - 253 
Bibliography       254 - 259 
 
  1 
Introduction: Responsibility, Luck and Identity 
 
This dissertation is about moral responsibility.  It aims to clarify the issues that 
separate compatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism, and 
incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism.  My hope is that such 
clarification will reveal the ways in which compatibilists can go about improving their 
arguments and views.  I have been a compatibilist for almost as long as I have known 
about the compatibility problems that face moral responsibility and free will.  As such 
I have always been very sensitive to claims to the effect that compatibilists have 
nothing to offer but shallow accounts of responsibility and freedom.  I feel that these 
attacks applied generally to compatibilism are inapt, but I understand why people are 
tempted to make them.  Classical compatibilists, by which I mean compatibilists 
before the 1960’s, tended to offer defenses of their view that either completely failed 
to show any significant understanding of the central concepts or seemed nothing better 
than desperate logical or semantic ploys to avoid having to deal with the real issue.  So 
some compatibilists seemed to think that freedom consisted entirely in getting what 
you wanted
1
 and that a person’s being responsible for an action consisted entirely in it 
being good social policy to punish or reward them for it.
2
  These accounts are either 
clearly wrong, or accounts of concepts that are not at issue in the free will debate.  For 
the purposes of this dissertation I will say that it is the former option that is correct.
3
 
 There are many compatibilists who avoid giving false accounts of the central 
                                                 
1
 Hobbes (1994) 
2
 Many compatibilists, notably Hobart(1934), Moore(1993), Nowell-Smith (1948) etc. 
3
 While I do not mind lush ontologies I am allergic to a set of concepts that is any larger than it 
absolutely has to be.  It is possible, by appeal to a permissive principle of concept production, to avoid 
ever giving an incorrect account of something, by dealing with any purported counter-example to the 
account as actually being about some other concept easily conflated with the concept you are providing 
an account for.  I think that this tendency to immunize our work from counter-examples just leads to 
confusions, so as far as is possible I will restrict myself to talking about a shared concept of moral 
responsibility, not different concepts had by compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
  2 
concepts.  Many of them do so by not giving any.  One way to argue for compatibilism 
is simply to argue that the central incompatibilist arguments are unsound.  Traditional 
incompatibilist arguments like the Consequence Argument rely on premises and 
inference principles that are controversial.
4
  That is hardly surprising since their 
conclusions are so startling.  These premises and inference principles have been 
subjected to sustained critique and in many cases they have been shown to fail.  What 
is more important than the fact that they fail, however, is the way they fail.  In short, 
they fail for reasons that do not seem like evidence for the claim that determinism is 
compatible with freedom or responsibility.  So we have Lewisian compatibilism which 
started out as little more than the argument that one popular incompatibilist argument, 
the Consequence Argument, is invalid.
5
  The Consequence Argument has since been 
revised so that it is valid, and there are other traditional incompatibilist arguments that 
Lewis’ argument never had a chance to be successful against.  Since that time 
Lewisian compatibilists have tried to develop an account of free action based on 
Lewis’ sparse comments on the issue.  This account of free action depends on an 
account of ability that incompatibilists have long since made clear is not the one they 
accept, and which is subject to significant counter-examples, the conditional account 
of ability.   
 That the conditional account of ability is denied by incompatibilists, and that 
some popular versions of it face significant counter-examples does not by itself mean 
that it should be abandoned, but it is worth noting that it provides the entirety of the 
Lewisian account of free action.  The fault that Lewis identified in the Consequence 
Argument does not suggest that we are free, it simply says that the Consequence 
Argument equivocates on ‘ability’.  There are clearer examples of compatibilist 
                                                 
4
 The earliest version of the Consequence Argument that I am aware of is in Ginet (1966), though he 
does not identify it by that name.  The most famous presentation of the Consequence Argument is in 
Van Inwagen (1983) 
5
 Lewis (1981) 
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responses to incompatibilist arguments that don’t really seem like they do anything to 
give evidence for compatibilism except knock down incompatibilist arguments.  And 
if one assumes that the burden of proof rests with the incompatibilist, that is a 
perfectly valid strategy.  But to rest on the fact that one does not have the burden of 
proof, without any further explication of one’s position is to simply take it for granted 
that common sense is probably getting things right.  And this is what might seem 
shallow.  After all we don’t even know what the common sense view of freedom and 
responsibility is, so how can we have reasonable confidence in it just because no one 
has managed to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is confused or inapplicable?  
Such a reliance on the common sense notion produces in some incompatibilists the 
sense that compatibilists are not truly engaging the issues that are raised by their 
arguments. 
 This is not to suggest that we ought to treat unsound arguments as though they 
were sound.  We shouldn’t, and to the extent that compatibilists have undermined 
particular incompatibilist arguments we should abandon those incompatibilist 
arguments.  But the proper response to, for example, Lewis showing that an early 
version of the Consequence Argument was unsound, is not to abandon the 
Consequence Argument.  Lewis gave no reasons to think that any future Consequence 
Argument would have to be unsound for similar reasons.  Similarly counterexamples 
to the transfer of powerlessness principle do not constitute counter-examples to related 
inference principles, such as the transfer of lack of responsibility principle.  The 
essential criticism here, which applies to much but not all compatibilist responses to 
incompatibilist arguments, is that they do not show a concern for the central point that 
incompatibilists are trying to express with their arguments.  Continually finding ways 
to poke holes in incompatibilist arguments is not enough.  What is needed is a 
compatibilist response which gives compelling reasons to think that all future 
  4 
incompatibilist arguments will also be unsound. 
 In the first part of this dissertation I will look at some compatibilist arguments 
that aim to do just that.  The general strategy that will be examined is moving from an 
account of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to an account of moral 
responsibility on which compatibilism must be true.  I will argue that none of the 
instances of this strategy that have been presented succeed.  They either present faulty 
accounts of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, or the accounts they offer do not 
imply that compatibilism must be true.  The more general problem is that these 
Strawsonian arguments fail to properly appreciate the nature of incompatibilism and 
incompatibilist arguments.  If the earlier compatibilist strategies were guilty of 
focusing too much on responding to particular arguments, the Strawsonian strategy is 
guilty of focusing too little on those arguments.  It is not clear what a Strawsonian 
could say in response to the Consequence Argument.  Perhaps she could say that 
whatever the merits of the argument it must be unsound because of the Strawsonian 
argument for the conclusion's falsity.  Or more likely she might say that to make 
theoretical arguments about the issue of moral responsibility is to commit some kind 
of category mistake.  Neither response is compelling and neither takes seriously, in the 
least, the point that the incompatibilist is trying to express, as I will show. 
 In the second part of the dissertation I address the more piecemeal responses to 
incompatibilism, and I do so by sidestepping them completely.  These piecemeal 
responses typically involve discussion of when and why people have the ability to do 
otherwise or control over their actions.  There are compatibilist-friendly accounts of 
ability and control which imply that determinism is compatible with the ability to do 
otherwise and control over one’s actions.  There are also well known compatibilist 
arguments against the claims that the ability to do otherwise and control over one’s 
actions are necessary for moral responsibility.  These arguments and accounts have 
  5 
generated massive amounts of literature and I could not hope to sort through it all in 
one dissertation.  With that in mind I offer an argument for incompatibilism that does 
not rely on any claims about ability or control.  If the argument is valid it shows that 
the incompatibilist can grant the compatibilist all her controversial claims about ability 
and control without granting anything that precludes her giving a sound argument for 
incompatibilism.  The Moral Luck Argument thus marks a significant dialectical 
advance over previous incompatibilist arguments. 
 In the first part of the paper I deal with overly general defenses of 
compatibilism.  In the second I deal with overly particular defenses of compatibilism.  
In the third section I deal with those defenses of compatibilism that I think are of the 
right kind.  These defenses consist of an appeal to a general account of what it is for an 
agent to be morally responsible for an action, just as the Strawsonian strategy did, but 
the accounts they appeal to allow them to respond in a focused way to incompatibilist 
arguments, as the piecemeal compatibilist responses do.  The two defenses I examine I 
will, following others, call the Real Self View and the Reasons Responsiveness view.
6
  
I argue that both views, while being the right kind of view to offer in a defense of 
compatibilism, fail.  Each view faces extensional and explanatory problems and it is 
not clear how, on each view’s own resources those problems could be resolved.  
Despite these problems, however, I argue that something in the ballpark of these two 
views gives compatibilists the best chance to defend their view.  In short, while neither 
view can save itself, each view has something to offer the other that bolsters it.  I will 
argue that a compatibilist account of moral responsibility and free action which 
combined the best elements of the both the Real Self view and the Reasons 
Responsiveness view is plausible.  What is more I will sketch the ways that such an 
                                                 
6
 ‘The Real Self View’ is a name provided by Susan Wolf (1993) for a view which was first put forward 
in the contemporary literature by Frankfurt (1971).  The Reasons-Responsiveness View was first put 
forward under that name by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) 
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argument can present responses to incompatibilist arguments, both the traditional ones 
and my own, that are dialectically effective and logically sound. 
 So in essence I aim to show how to be and how not to be a compatibilist.  I do 
not intend to establish that compatibilism is true, just give reasons why certain 
strategies for establishing it should be pursued and others abandoned.  Along the way I 
argue for much else.  The secondary goal of this dissertation is to show the ways that a 
proper resolution of the debate about moral responsibility depends on substantive 
issues in ethical theory, meta-ethics and moral psychology.   
This is not terribly surprising.  The problem of moral responsibility has always 
been about how it is appropriate to treat people given their behavior, and the problem 
of free will has always been linked with the problem of moral responsibility in such a 
way that inclines theorists to think that what makes someone free is in large part what 
makes her morally responsible for her actions.  So any proposed account of what 
makes someone morally responsible that did not have ethical implications would for 
that reason be an inadequate view.  And it is also very clear that issues in moral 
psychology and meta-ethics entail and are entailed by certain principles in ethics.  
Some of these implications are well known.  It is, for example, commonly accepted 
that certain accounts of how we deliberate are inconsistent with libertarian accounts of 
agency.  If we act according to our strongest desire, and our strongest desires were 
always unconscious desires, or hardwired desires, then libertarianism would be false.  
But of course few people have seriously defended such a view.  It is commonly 
acknowledged that if one denies the possibility of desert in general, perhaps because 
one accepts some very strong version of consequentialism, then one must accept some 
version or other of compatibilism.  Certainly some kinds of anti-realism about the 
normative or evaluative would force us to abandon saying things like ‘If determinism 
obtains then no one is blameworthy or praiseworthy for anything.’ 
  7 
 I think the linkages are far more common than this, and they do not consist just 
of the entailments of extremely implausible views like the ones I just mentioned.  In 
this dissertation I will show how debates in axiology matter for giving a proper 
account of moral responsibility.  I show how issues about what is and can be fair, 
matter for whether anyone actually is responsible for her actions.  And the disputes I 
bring up are live disputes.  For example, I claim that on the best account of moral 
responsibility available to us, hedonism about the good must false.  I also appeal to 
contentious moral claims in the process of presenting a new argument for 
incompatibilism.  I will not, in this dissertation, present arguments for these 
contentious moral principles that I think ought to convince ethical theorists convinced 
of their falsity.  This is not a dissertation on ethics.  What it aims to do is show the 
argumentative burden that compatibilists are under is significant and show that part of 
that argumentative burden includes arguing for contentious ethical principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8 
Chapter 1:  Praise and Blame 
 
We are all familiar with arguments purporting to show that determinism is 
incompatible with moral responsibility.  We are also familiar with arguments that 
would, if sound, show that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, but 
only when supplemented with further very plausible premises.  In the first group of 
arguments are Van Inwagen’s Direct Argument7, Galen Strawson’s Impossibility 
Argument
8, or Pereboom’s Four Case Argument9.  In the second group of arguments 
are Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument10, and Haji’s Deontic Argument.1112  Now 
I think that all these arguments are unsound, but I think that they are all unsound for 
different reasons.  Each argument advances some particular claim about moral 
responsibility, or freedom of the will, or the nature of moral obligation, that I think is 
false.  I don’t think there is some general argument for the compatibility of moral 
responsibility and determinism that can be used effectively against all these 
incompatibilist arguments.
13
 
 Not all compatibilists agree.  Some compatibilists influenced by Peter 
Strawson
14
, and probably Strawson himself
15
, think that if one really understands the 
                                                 
7
 Van Inwagen (1980) 
8
 Strawson (1994) 
9
 Pereboom (2001) 
10
 Van Inwagen (1983) 
11
 Haji (2002) 
12
 The Consequence Argument need only be supplemented with the premise that freedom of the will is a 
necessary condition of moral responsibility, while the Deontic Argument need only be supplemented 
with the premise that for a person to count as morally responsible for an action that action must meet or 
fail to meet the demands of some moral obligation. 
13
 At least not one that is not question begging.  If a compatibilist asserted a particular account of free 
action she could show, from the assumption of that account, that freedom and determinism are 
compatible, and with a little effort she could also show that moral responsibility and determinism are 
compatible.  But the incompatibilist will simply deny the proposed account of free action.  In denying it 
the incompatibilist will point to the very principles she appeals to in making the standard 
incompatibilist arguments.  So to defend the compatibilist account of free action it would be necessary 
to say why the controversial premises in the incompatibilist arguments are false. 
14
 Wallace (1994), MaGill(1997), Watson (1987), Scanlon (2008), McKenna (1998) and (2005), Arpaly 
(2006) are the authors that I discuss here, because they are explicit in the debt they owe to Strawson’s 
work.  There are very likely more Strawsonian compatibilists than this.  Many for instance cite 
  9 
nature of moral responsibility, one will see that determinism’s obtaining simply can’t 
give us reason to stop holding people morally responsible.  As I have said I do not 
think there is any such general argument for compatibilism.  I believe the best case for 
compatibilism is a piecemeal one.  It consists of good arguments against the key 
premises of the arguments mentioned above, along with any other significant 
incompatibilist arguments.
16
  The Strawsonian arguments, however, seek to do away 
with incompatibilism without telling us what is wrong with standard incompatibilist 
arguments.
17
  Strawsonians are committed to thinking there is some kind of confusion 
about the nature of moral responsibility on the part of incompatibilists which explains 
why they offer the kinds of arguments they do, and so that the elimination of this 
confusion about what we are talking about is sufficient to show that the arguments are 
no good, or pointless, or something like that. 
 In this paper I will examine three Strawsonian accounts of moral 
responsibility, the Emotion Account, the Relationships Account, and the Quality of 
Will Account.  I argue that these Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are 
either false, or do not show what Strawsonians take them to show about the coherence 
and tenability of incompatibilism.  The goal to which this paper is in service is 
showing that the correct account of what moral responsibility is will be neutral 
between compatibilist and incompatibilist positions about moral responsibility, 
determinism and indeterminism.  While the arguments in this chapter do not prove that 
                                                                                                                                            
approvingly the relationship (whatever it is) that Strawson posited between moral responsibility and the 
reactive attitudes.  Fewer authors do much more with that connection than cite it however. 
15
 Strawson (1974) 
16
 This sounds as though I am going back on what I just said in the introduction.  I am not.  What I think 
is that the best kind of strategy for establishing compatibilism is one which provides reasons to reject 
each incompatibilist argument that are specific to that argument.  What I also think is that the only way 
for such a strategy to work is to argue from a well supported account of what it is to act freely and to be 
morally responsible for one’s actions.  Such an account would serve the function of unifying the 
specific responses to incompatibilist arguments and provide the resources to respond to any future 
incompatibilist arguments.   
17
 I am not treating this as an oversight on their part, but rather as something they do not do because if 
they are correct one doesn’t need to address the particular features of incompatibilist arguments. 
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this is the case, they do give evidence for an account of moral responsibility that is 
neutral between such positions. 
 Of course a full account of moral responsibility would tell us under what 
circumstances people are morally responsible for their actions.  An account that 
complete could not be neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism.  To deal 
with this problem let me distinguish between two kinds of accounts of moral 
responsibility.  A complete account of moral responsibility tells us, when conjoined 
with some factual information, when and why people are morally responsible for their 
behavior.  It provides all the answers.  Those involved in the central debates about 
moral responsibility are all working towards having a complete account of moral 
responsibility.  As I said a complete account cannot be neutral with regards to the 
compatibility question, because it will answer the compatibility question.   
A general account of moral responsibility is different.  It is something that all 
contestants in the debates about moral responsibility can appeal to.  It is what we are 
all talking about.  Into a general account of moral responsibility can be stuffed all the 
truisms about moral responsibility, such as ‘stones cannot be morally responsible for 
anything.’  A general account of moral responsibility needs to be faithful to folk 
intuitions.  What philosophers are talking about is the same thing that jurists and 
priests and other everyday people are talking about when they talk about moral 
responsibility.  Most importantly a general account of moral responsibility is what is 
being appealed to by philosophers when they make arguments of the following kind 
‘Philosopher X’s account of moral responsibility cannot be correct, because it violates 
a fundamental principle Y which is part of the concept of moral responsibility.’  These 
kinds of arguments are common, but it is hard to see how could be convincing.  After 
all Philosopher X has just said what he thinks moral responsibility is, and if that flouts 
principle Y, then that just means X doesn’t think that Y is an essential part of moral 
  11 
responsibility.  At this point the philosophers quite often retreat into talking about their 
personal concepts of moral responsibility, and we find that what looked to be a 
disagreement wasn’t one.  This problem only comes up if we assume that in appealing 
to the nature of moral responsibility philosophers had to be referring to some complete 
account of moral responsibility.  Since philosopher X is proposing a complete account, 
or the outlines of such an account, to presuppose some different complete account 
would be to simply assume X’s view was false.   
What we need is some shared concept of moral responsibility that does not 
give us all the answers, but which can be sometimes appealed to in order to rule out 
certain answers.  A general account would be just this.  Besides truisms, what content 
would a general account have?  I do not want to take a stand on what any general 
account could or could not include, but I will be looking at some general accounts 
which consist mostly of claims about what we are doing when we hold someone 
morally responsible.  I will argue that a good account of what we are doing when we 
hold people morally responsible will be neutral between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism.  In other words, I will argue that a general account of moral 
responsibility that can be shared by all contestants in the debate is possible, and I will 
be arguing against Strawsonians who think that an account of what we are doing when 
we hold people morally responsible favors compatibilists.  
1.  Responsibility, Holding Responsible, Blame and Praise 
 One interesting thing about these Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility 
is that none of them are explicitly put forward as an account of moral responsibility.  
Most Strawsonians attempt to give an account of what it is to hold someone morally 
responsible, or what praising and blaming someone amount to.
18
  I think that in giving 
such an account, Strawsonians are giving an account of moral responsibility, or are 
                                                 
18
 See Wallace (1994) 
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coming close to giving one.  These accounts of what holding morally responsible 
amounts to all contain commitments to what can and cannot make it legitimate to hold 
someone morally responsible.  It is because of this feature of the accounts that they 
ought to be taken to be giving accounts of what it is for a person to be morally 
responsible.  The reason for this is simple.  It is very plausible that if it is legitimate to 
hold X morally responsible for Y, then X is morally responsible for Y.  Endorsing this 
conditional claim does not commit the Strawsonians to abandoning the claim many of 
them defend; that holding someone morally responsible is prior, in some sense, to that 
person being morally responsible.  What this priority claim amounts to is not always 
clear.  It might be that holding responsible is evidentially prior to being responsible, so 
that we base our judgments about the latter on our knowledge of the former.
19
  This 
evidential claim is clearly not imperiled by the claim that if it is legitimate to hold 
someone morally responsible then they are morally responsible.  Alternately, the 
priority claim might amount to the claim that the explanation of why people are 
morally responsible is because they are legitimately held to be so.  This explanatory 
priority claim is significantly stronger than the evidential priority claim, in that it 
suggests that what makes it legitimate to hold someone responsible is not some set of 
facts which includes facts about whether they are morally responsible.  But even the 
explanatory priority claim is not imperiled by the conditional claim above.  In fact it 
implies that conditional claim. 
                                                 
19
 This may sound paradoxical.  Surely when we are deciding whether to hold someone morally 
responsible we consult our judgments about whether they are morally responsible, not the other way 
around.  But it is not in the context of everyday decision making that this evidentiary claim is meant to 
hold.  It is in the context of philosophical discussion that we take cases of holding someone morally 
responsible as evidentially prior to someone’s being morally responsible.  Because when and if people 
are morally responsible is precisely what is under debate we need to appeal to some more neutral body 
of data to help us decide between competing theories.  On the assumption that people share the same 
concept of moral responsibility and are reasonably good at applying it, it makes sense to look at what 
actually prompts people to hold others morally responsible as a clue to when we think it is appropriate 
to do so.  In other words this evidential priority claim is just the claim that our intuitions about when 
people are morally responsible are evidentially prior to any theoretical account of moral responsibility. 
  13 
 So, if it is legitimate to hold someone morally responsible then they are 
morally responsible.  Is it true that if someone is responsible it is legitimate to hold 
them responsible?  The explanatory priority claim implies that it is.  The evidential 
priority claim does not.  And anyone who thinks that an agent’s status as morally 
responsible does not depend on how others may legitimately treat them or think of 
them will think that this second conditional claim is false.  After all someone could be 
morally responsible for her actions while all evidence at a judge’s disposal suggests 
they are not.  In that case it is plausible that the judge may not legitimately hold the 
person morally responsible.  So an account of the legitimacy of holding someone 
morally responsible will not, all by itself give us an account of what it is for a person 
to be morally responsible.   But if you were to imagine an omniscient judge, whose 
evidence always supports the truth, you will be able to use the account of the 
legitimacy of holding responsible to get very quickly to an account of what it is for a 
person to actually be responsible for what she does.  It is for this reason that I feel 
confident ascribing to Strawsonians various accounts of what makes a person morally 
responsible for what she does.  It should be kept in mind however that some of the 
Strawsonians I will discuss might accept one of the two priority claims mentioned 
above.   
 In talking about what makes it legitimate to hold people responsible we learn a 
great deal about what it is for a person to be morally responsible.  And to figure out 
what makes it legitimate to hold people morally responsible, we need to know what 
we are doing when we hold people morally responsible.  This is a Strawsonian insight 
that I think is beyond reproach.  So what are we talking about when we talk about our 
holding people morally responsible?  We are talking about punishment and reward and 
  14 
blame and praise, at least.
20
  I think that of those activities, it is blaming and praising, 
and not punishing and rewarding, that are central to understanding moral 
responsibility.  The reasons are fairly well known.  Punishing and rewarding, because 
they aspects of general social management, are sensitive to facts that intuitively have 
nothing to do with the person being punished or rewarded or the action for which they 
are being punished and rewarded, and presumably moral responsibility has to do with 
the relation between people and their actions.
21
  If you want to know why people are 
rewarded with millions of dollars for guessing the correct lottery numbers you will be 
told that the lottery system makes the state money that goes to fund education.  
Presumably the lottery winner is not being rewarded for her helping out schools, since 
the money she contributed by purchasing a lottery ticket is less than most other people 
contribute in property taxes, without getting the chance to be given millions.  If you 
want to know why it is that there are certain sentencing guidelines for seemingly 
trivial narcotics offenses you might be told that without the threat of such sentences 
law enforcement would not be able to secure the cooperation of small time drug 
dealers or consumers in the investigations of drug cartels.  The usefulness of a small 
                                                 
20
 When we blame and praise people we do not typically express that blame and praise, even to 
ourselves, by saying ‘I hold you X morally responsible for that event.’  But we sometimes do make 
these kinds of judgments.  In formal settings, such as court proceedings, these judgments are explicitly 
debated.  Do such attributions count as praise and blame?  Not immediately because praise and blame 
include commitments to the specific moral quality of the action, and the bare attribution of moral 
responsibility need not do so.  There is a worry about the bare attributions of moral responsibility that 
does not arise with regards to praise and blame, and it is precisely the formality of such attributions.  
Praising and blaming are unquestionably features of our ordinary thought and talk.  To the extent that 
we think features of our ordinary thought and talk, or features of pre-philosophical or pre-theoretic 
thought, are of significant evidential value these bare attributions of moral responsibility seem suspect.  
If they tend to be made only in institutional settings we have to worry that the institution is set up as it is 
because of the influence of certain philosophical theories.  This is unquestionably true of the justice 
system where philosophical theories, usually very old ones, have a significant grip on legal theorizing.  
For the purposes of this paper I will ignore these bare attributions of moral responsibility because of 
these suspicions. 
21
 I am not denying that people can be morally responsible for things, like the consequences of their 
actions or the character traits which explain their actions, that are not actions of theirs.  All I am 
claiming is that to be morally responsible for such things you must also be morally responsible for some 
action to which those consequences or character traits are related.  I am also not claiming that the 
responsibility for consequences or character traits is somehow derivative, while moral responsibility for 
actions is more central.  
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time marijuana dealer in bringing down other, more hardened, criminals doesn’t seem 
to have anything to do with the moral status of the drug dealer or the moral status of 
the action of selling marijuana. 
 A detailed account of when and why we punish and reward people is not likely 
to give us a clear picture of what is involved in holding people morally responsible.  
The legitimacy of praise and blame is not obviously sensitive to the same broad 
spectrum of public policy concerns that help determine whether and how much we 
punish or reward people.
22
  That is why punishment and reward should not be looked 
to when we are trying to figure out what is going on when we hold people 
responsible.
23
  So I am asserting an equivalence between holding someone morally 
responsible and blaming and praising them.  More interestingly I am asserting:  
 
Equivalence:  It is legitimate to hold X morally responsible for y-ing 
iff X is praiseworthy or blameworthy for y-ing. 
 
It might seem that according to Equivalence a person cannot be morally 
responsible for actions that are neither right nor wrong.  While I don't think that is true 
it is easy to see why someone might think it is.  It is natural to think that a person 
cannot be praiseworthy for an action unless the action is right and cannot be 
                                                 
22
 This is not to say that actual habits of praise and blame are not sensitive to facts which are irrelevant 
to moral responsibility.  It is probably true that people praise and blame women and racial minorities 
differently than they praise and blame men and racial majorities.  But hopefully there is little risk of 
those differences being treated as legitimate, at least in the context of academic theorizing.  The contrast 
with punishment and reward is that the legitimacy of punishment and reward is supposed to depend on 
issues that don’t seem to have anything to do with moral responsibility, and with blame and praise this 
is not true. 
23
 I want to mention one caveat, and that has to do with cases of horrendous crimes, such as war crimes 
or other crimes against humanity.  The issue is that it sounds tremendously weak to talk about blaming 
genocidal dictators.  It sounds as though we are debating about whether to slap on the wrist someone 
who butchered thousands or millions of innocent people.  This is, I think, part of the explanation for 
why some people don’t think we can actually hold the deeply evil morally responsible.  It is also, I 
think, a mistake.  The mistake lies in failing to recognize that punishment typically, though not 
universally as we have seen, involves holding someone morally responsible.  Telling Hitler that he was 
a morally bad person is not the appropriate way to express to him that you hold him morally 
responsible, but that does not mean there is no way to express the fact that we hold him morally 
responsible. 
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blameworthy for an action unless it is wrong.  While it is natural to accept both claims, 
neither is correct.  Consider the following kind of case: 
 
Inconsequential Corruption:  Tom, a functionary at the local county 
court, is offered a bribe by Rick, a well known street tough, to 
influence the judge of an upcoming case to let a friend of Rick’s get off 
easy.  Tom accepts the money and talks to the judge.  In fact Tom has 
no influence over the judge and cannot possibly succeed at what he has 
been paid to do.  Also, Rick is actually an undercover policeman who 
knows that Tom suffers from delusions of grandeur and cannot possibly 
get the criminal off the hook.  Rick is just paying Tom to make it look 
like he tried to secure the criminal’s release to other members of the 
criminal organization that Rick has infiltrated. 
 
I think that in this case what Tom does is not wrong.  He takes money from someone 
who is not aiming to do harm by giving him the money, but who is rather trying to do 
good.  Tom is not going to get the criminal off the hook, nor is he going to do 
anything that is at all likely to result in getting the criminal off the hook.  These facts 
are sufficient, I think, to show that unlike most cases of taking a bribe, Tom’s taking 
the bribe is not wrong.
24
  But the fact that Tom thinks this is a normal case of bribery, 
where he is going to get the criminal off the hook and the briber means for him to do 
just that, is sufficient for Tom being blameworthy for taking the money. 
                                                 
24
 It might be the case that Tom’s deciding to take the bribe was wrong, so that there is something in 
Inconsequential Corruption that he is both blameworthy for and that is wrong.  All I want to insist on is 
that there is one thing in the case that Tom is blameworthy for but is not wrong, and that is his taking of 
the bribe.  Even if his taking of the bribe is blameworthy only because his deciding to take the bribe is 
blameworthy, and even if that decision is only blameworthy because it is wrong it is nonetheless true 
that X can be blameworthy for Y even if Y is not morally wrong, and so true that X can be morally 
responsible for Y even if Y is not morally wrong.  Inconsequential Corruption is not a counter-example 
to the claim that X can only be morally responsible for Y in virtue of something’s being right or wrong, 
but there is little reason to be troubled by this latter principle.  Anyone who accepts the claim that 
actions have exactly the moral quality that the decisions which produced them have will of course think 
that Tom did something wrong, and so those who accept that claim will have to accept that 
Equivalence entails that we can only be morally responsible for actions that are right or wrong.  Such 
views might be right but they incur the cost of seeming to not be able to make sense of someone 
behaving correctly for the wrong reasons.  They can make sense of someone tokening an act type which 
is obligatory for the wrong reasons, but they cannot make sense of the act token being the right action 
and being done for the wrong reasons.  So even though Equivalence when coupled with certain moral 
theories has the counterintuitive consequence I am trying to avoid, I think that Equivalence when 
coupled with intuitive (but of course corrigible) ethical claims is not. 
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 A similar case can be presented to show that people can be praiseworthy for 
actions they perform that are not right actions.  Consider: 
 
Underinformed Voter:  Jane has moved to Pennsylvania in the fall.  She moved 
early enough to be eligible to vote in the upcoming congressional elections.  
She wants to support the legal right to an abortion, and so wants to support the 
candidate most likely to support such rights.  For the sake of argument suppose 
that supporting legal rights to abortion is the right thing to do.  There is 
insufficient time in Jane’s busy schedule to investigate the positions of the 
candidates in any depth.  She knows that in general Democrats are more likely 
than Republicans to support legal rights to abortion, and so she votes for the 
Democrat.  In this case however the Republican is in favor of legal abortion 
rights and the Democrat is not.  So Jane ends up voting for a congressman who 
does not support the legal right to an abortion. 
 
On the assumption that supporting the legal right to abortion is the right thing to do, 
Jane has failed to do the right thing.  But because it was her intention to vote for 
someone who supported such rights, and because the decision she made was rational 
given the information she had, and because she did not have sufficient time to get the 
information that showed that her rational decision was incorrect, it seems to me that 
she deserves praise for what she did.   
So Equivalence does not imply that we can only be praised for right actions or 
that we can only be blamed for wrong actions.  Intentions matter for praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness in a way that intentions do not always matter to the rightness or 
wrongness of actions.  The suggested equivalence does have the odd consequence that 
actions that are neither right nor wrong and that  the agent knows are neither right nor 
wrong, are actions for which the agent is not morally responsible.  This is odd because 
it means that we are not morally responsible for tying our shoes in the morning, or for 
getting a cup of coffee.  To alleviate the oddness of this suggestion let me point out 
that it is compatible with the suggested equivalence that we might still be causally 
responsible for tying our shoes or getting a cup of coffee.  We would just not be 
morally responsible.  It is also the case that we are not excused for tying our shoes or 
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getting coffee, despite the fact that saying ‘X is not morally responsible for Y’ is 
normally a way of excusing X for doing Y.  In this case there is nothing to be excused 
from.  Certainly there is an action, but it is of no moral significance, so there is no 
blame or praise to which one would be subject that one needs to get out of with an 
excuse. 
2. Obstacle Clearing 
2.1 Excuses and Exemptions 
 Strawson actually advances several different arguments, and not just the 
Emotion Account, which take claims about the nature of praise and blame as premises 
and yield conclusions about the tenability of incompatibilism.  Because some of these 
arguments remain popular, I will show why none of them work.
25
 
Strawson seeks to show that certain kinds of justification of our practice of 
holding people morally responsible are out of place.  The kinds of justification that are 
out of place are sometimes labeled as ‘rational’, ‘theoretical’, and ‘metaphysical’.26  
What was important to Strawson was to show that two views, one on which the 
propriety of our ascriptions of moral responsibility depends on their usefulness in 
controlling the behavior of others, the other on which it depends on the truth of some 
indeterministic theory of action, are confused.  They are, according to Strawson, 
attempting to provide exactly the kind of justification that is out of place and uncalled 
for.  The results of his approach are that one form of compatibilism, and all forms of 
incompatibilism are ruled out.   
                                                 
25
 Kevin Magill (1997) seems to think that these arguments work. 
26
 Strawson says that both sides of the free will debate, and those he thinks are utilitarian compatibilists 
and libertarians, “seek, in different ways, to over-intellectualize the facts.”  They are guilt of this he 
says, because the practice of moral responsibility “neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ 
justification.” See Strawson (1974) pg. 23  In a similar vein he says that “the human commitment to 
participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for 
us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might” remove it. (Strawson 
(1974)pg.11)  Strawson derides the incompatibilist for his “panicky metaphysics” (Strawson (1974) pg. 
25) and   
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Strawson presents two arguments which can be taken as straightforward 
arguments for compatibilism, and they both fail.  To present the first I will need to 
introduce some terminology.
27
  An excuse is a withholding of blame
28
, where it would 
normally be warranted, on the basis of some feature of the action which marked it as 
somehow not indicative of ill-will.  An exemption is a withholding of blame where it 
would normally be warranted, on the basis of some relatively stable, but abnormal, 
feature of the person involved, which made them an inappropriate target for the 
reactive attitudes and moral judgment.
29
 
 By way of example, if someone steps down hard on my foot that would 
normally be a reason to blame them.  But if I learn that the person who stepped down 
hard on my foot did so because they had been pushed and lost balance, not only would 
there be no reason to blame them, blame would in fact be illegitimate.  The reason is 
that they did not intend to hurt me, and so in hurting me did not express ill-will 
towards me.
30
  In this case I excuse their stepping on my foot.  Now if, after I excuse 
them for stepping on my foot, I find out that the person robbed a bank and killed two 
people in the process, I have no reason to not blame them. The facts which show that 
an excuse is warranted do not show that any future blaming is unwarranted.  
 That last feature is what makes excuses importantly different from exemptions.  
Imagine the same situation as before, where someone has stepped down hard on my 
foot.  If, instead of finding out that the person was pushed and off balance, I find out 
that they are mentally disabled, and mentally disabled enough that they do not realize 
that stepping down hard on a person’s foot hurts them, or do not realize that they have 
                                                 
27
 Originally introduced by Gary Watson (1987). 
28
 I am only talking about blame here because it is not natural to express what it is to excuse someone in 
terms of praise.  I think Watson and Strawson must have thought there was an analogous distinction to 
be made between cases of withholding praise. 
29
 This terminological distinction is based on the categories Strawson sets up in section IV of Strawson 
(1974) 
30
 This is Strawson’s account of why blame is not appropriate in these cases. 
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stepped on my foot at all, then I have reason to withhold blame.  But unlike the first 
case, this withholding extends to all the person’s actions.  If this mentally challenged 
adult goes on to kill two people, I will have reason to withhold blame, on the basis of 
the very same facts which led me to withhold moral judgment when he stepped on my 
foot.  I exempted them from blame upon learning that they were mentally challenged, 
and so long as they retain this feature they will merit such an exemption. 
2.2 The Abnormality Argument 
 In addition to the scope of the withholding being different, excuses and 
exemptions differ in the kinds of reasons which support them, according to Strawson.  
Excuses are merited because the action for which the person is excused does not 
actually express the ill-will that instances of that action type usually do.  The reasons 
for exemptions are more complicated, as will be clear after the discussion of the 
following argument: 
 
Abnormality of Exemptions
31
: 
1.  Determinism does not imply anything about the content of our 
mental states. 
2.  So it does not imply that we do or do not express good will in all 
situations. 
3.  So determinism does not give reason to excuse every action.
32
 
4.  We exempt people only because they are abnormal. 
5.  If determinism implied that we ought to exempt everyone from 
moral judgment then determinism would imply that everyone was 
abnormal. 
6.  It is logically impossible for everyone to be abnormal. 
7.  So if determinism is logically possible then determinism does not 
imply that everyone is abnormal. 
8.  So if determinism is logically possible then determinism does not 
imply that we ought to exempt everyone from moral judgment 
9.  Excuses and exemptions exhaust the ways in which one can be 
bound to withhold moral judgment. 
10.  So if determinism is logically possible then determinism does not 
                                                 
31
 See Strawson (1974) pgs. 10-11 
32
 Calling this entire argument the ‘Abnormality Argument’ is an admitted misnomer on my part, as 
premises 1-3 form a sub-argument that is both essential to the overall argument and does not mention 
abnormality.  I call the entire argument ‘Abnormality’ because it is only the claims about abnormality 
that are of interest as far as I am concerned. 
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imply that we are always bound to withhold moral judgment. 
12.  So either determinism is logically impossible or determinism does 
not imply that we are always bound to withhold moral judgment. 
 
 I do not wish to commit myself to the argument for (3).  There might be 
reasons to think that determinism does have something to say about the content of our 
mental states; specifically one might think that if determinism is true then no mental 
state could count as being morally worthy.
33
  But perhaps by ‘good will’ Strawson 
merely means something like a will that wishes you well.  If so then there is no good 
reason to reject (3).  I do think that the argument for (8) fails.  The problem is with 
premises (4) and (6).  Specifically there is no sense of ‘abnormal’ on which both (4) 
and (6) are true.  What one might normally mean by ‘abnormal’ is something like 
‘statistically unlikely’ or ‘rare’.  On this meaning (6) is true.  It is logically impossible 
for everyone to be rare, and logically impossible for it to be statistically unlikely that 
something is true which is such that if it is true it is true for all things and for all time.  
But on this meaning (4) is not true.  Abnormality in this sense is clearly not sufficient 
for the withholding of moral judgment.  We do not withhold judgment for the wise or 
the very virtuous, though they are rare.  Abnormality in this sense might be necessary 
for the withholding of moral judgment.  The cases that Strawson mentions as cases of 
exemptions include childhood, mental disorders like schizophrenia, systematic mental 
perversion and compulsive behavior.
34
  These cases are all (excluding childhood), 
hopefully, abnormal cases in the sense under consideration.  But for none of these 
cases is it true that we withhold judgment on the basis of abnormality.   
 To see this consider a possible world in which one of these characteristics is 
actually common.  In that possible world something like internal compulsion is not 
                                                 
33
 Kant seemed to think something like this, insofar as he thought the spontaneity of practical reason 
was a necessary condition of having a good will. 
34
 Strawson (1974) pg. 8 
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rare or statistically unlikely.
35
  Perhaps a plague has swept through the populace and 
affected almost everyone’s ability to resist temptation, such that they cannot rationally 
deliberate about their actions.
36
  In this world let us suppose that those not affected by 
the plague withhold judgment of those affected by the plague.  They do this because 
they realize that those affected by the plague lack rational control over their actions.  
This response is one we should approve of and recommend, and the upshot of this is 
that abnormality is not the reason why, when we withhold judgment on account of 
things like compulsion, we withhold judgment.  When abnormality and certain mental 
conditions come apart, it is the mental conditions that withholding tracks, not 
abnormality. 
 There is a second sense of ‘abnormal’ that might be meant.  ‘Abnormal’ could 
mean ‘failing to reach or meet certain normative standards.’37  In this sense it may be 
true that we withhold judgment on account of abnormality.  Some have interpreted 
Strawson to claim that there are standards of normative competence that we must meet 
if we are responsible
38
.  Whether this sense is sufficient for the truth of (4), it is clearly 
                                                 
35
 There is a potential wrinkle here.  ‘Abnormality’ might be taken to rigidly designate.  If it designates 
the set of behaviors which bear the property ‘rare’, then in this possible world, despite the fact that these 
behaviors are not rare, they are abnormal.  Now I do not think it is plausible that ‘abnormality’ rigidly 
designates, but even if it does the result of this would be that it is not logically impossible for 
everything to be what is abnormal, because what is now abnormal might at some point not be rare or 
statistically unlikely.  Not only is there some possible world where everyone is at some point abnormal, 
if it rigidly designates what is now rare, but that world might be the actual world. 
36
 Paul Russell (1992) has presented a similar objection. 
37
 I mean to deal here with claims that Strawson makes about lack of moral development.  Strawson 
cites moral underdevelopment as a reason to withhold the reactive attitudes, and so he also thinks that 
determinism cannot imply that everyone is morally underdeveloped.  This is just to beg the question 
against the incompatibilist though.  The incompatibilist is going to want to say that a person’s practical 
reason must work in a certain kind of way for them to count as a full fledged moral agent capable of 
deserving blame or praise, and that the way practical reason must work is non-deterministically.  For 
Strawson to simply rule this out by fiat is a failure to actually engage the incompatibilist’s argument.  It 
would also count as begging the question if Strawson were to say that lack of moral development has to 
consist in a condition that prevents an individual from reaching some level of mental functioning that 
most other people meet.  This is just to assume that the reasons for withholding the reactive attitudes 
includes a commitment to the claim that most people are morally responsible for what they do. 
38
 Watson has said that being responsible for Strawson requires being able to take part in a moral 
community of reason-givers, and in his he has been followed by McKenna (2005).  Wallace has also 
said that responsibility consists in the having of certain normative competencies. 
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not sufficient for the truth of (6).  It is not clear why any normative standard would be 
such that not everyone could fail it.
39
 
2.3 The Actual Judgment Argument 
 Strawson has a second straightforward argument for compatibilism, which I 
will call the Actual Judgment argument.  The idea is that if we pay attention to what 
we actually take to be reasons, in actual cases, to withhold judgment we will see that 
determinism is irrelevant to moral judgment:   
 
Actual Judgment 
 1.  There is no sense of ‘determined’ such that: 
  (a) If determinism is true, then all behavior is determined in this sense. 
 (b) Determinism might be true. 
 (c) Our withholding of moral judgment is the result of a prior 
embracing of a belief that the behavior of the human being in 
question is determined in this sense.
40
 
2.  If determinism is a threat to our ascriptions of moral responsibility, 
then it would fulfill the above three conditions. 
3.  So determinism is not a threat to our ascriptions of moral 
responsibility.  
 
 What is certainly true is that we do not actually take determinism into account 
in most deliberations about the casting of blame or deliverance of praise.  But this is 
not enough to show that determinism is irrelevant to whether we should withhold 
moral judgment.  It is possible that the reason that our withholding of moral judgment 
is never the result of a prior embracing of a belief that the behavior is determined is 
because we are confused about what agency requires.  I tend to think that the nature of 
agency is not something that philosophers know about better than non-philosophers, 
                                                 
39
 This issue should be separated from the issue of demandingness in ethics.  It may be that some system 
of duties are too demanding, and that this shows that they do not provide the correct moral standard.  
But not all normative standards are duties, and is not clear why we should be concerned that standards 
that are not duties should, under certain circumstances, fail to be met by everyone.  There is a normative 
standard of perfection, and it is likely that no one meets it.  It is not likely that the standards of 
normative competence are standards of perfection, but there is no reason to think that there cannot be 
any circumstances in which no one can meet them. 
40
 These three propositions are found on Strawson (1974) pgs. 17-18 
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though perhaps we are more articulate on the subject.  So I do not place much faith in 
the idea that I just mentioned, that people are generally confused about what agency is.  
I have no account to give of this knowledge, but I trust that most have it. 
 My trust is not enough to show that Strawson is right though.  Even if we are 
not all confused about what agency requires, it is still possible that determinism is 
relevant.  Since we do not actually take account of determinism in ordinary contexts, 
determinism is not immediately relevant to moral judgment.  The thesis of 
determinism does not immediately contradict any claims to which we appeal when we 
deliberate about making a moral judgment, or even, we may grant Strawson, when we 
justify the decision to blame and praise, in normal contexts.  It does not mean that the 
truth of the thesis of determinism does not rule out the truth of presuppositions we 
make when deliberating about whether to engage in moral judgment, or assumptions 
we generally accept when doing so. 
 It is plausible, initially at least, that we all accept a moral rule somewhat 
similar to ‘Do not blame people for what they could not avoid.’  Now the way we 
normally go about figuring out if someone could avoid what they did is by looking to 
see whether certain factors are at work.  The most likely obstacles to someone being 
able to avoid what they do are things like interference from other agents, ignorance 
about what she was doing or whether she was doing it, or being under the influence of 
some kind of drug.  Now it might be that all we do in normal cases is make sure such 
likely obstacles are not present, and then go on with blaming and praising confident 
that we have established that the person is morally responsible, or confident at least 
that we have done all we should be expected to in order to establish it.  Determinism 
does not show that any of the most likely obstacles are present, and this is what 
Strawson is pointing out.  But if we only care about the likely obstacles because of the 
aforementioned principle, ‘Do not blame people for what they could not avoid’, then 
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they cannot be all we care about.  Any way in which someone could fail to be able to 
avoid doing what they in fact did would be something that we have to take account of.  
That we only normally look for certain obstacles to doing otherwise can be accounted 
for by the beliefs that they are the most likely obstacles and that it is only rational to 
look for obstacles at least as likely to hold as the set just mentioned.   
 Now either of these beliefs could be false.  It might be that determinism is true, 
and so that every action is determined, and so, given some incompatibilist 
assumptions, that it is very likely that there is an obstacle to our avoiding what we do 
whenever we do anything.  The argument I have just given is, in rough outline, a 
version of generalization strategy.  Generalization strategies look to our normal 
reasons for withholding moral judgment, and try to infer from those reasons more 
general commitments.
41
  With those general commitments, and the principle ‘Do not 
blame people for what they cannot avoid’ is one, in hand, the relevance of 
determinism can be evaluated with regard to those commitments.  This strategy, often 
employed by incompatibilists, does not deny Strawson’s claim that we do not actually 
withhold moral judgment on the grounds of determinism being true, or give it on the 
grounds that indeterminism is true.  So incompatibilists have good reason, I take it, to 
accept (1) and reject (2). 
3. The Emotion Account 
3.1 Emotions, Cognitivism and Quasi-Realism 
On to the Emotion Account.  The general picture it suggests is this:  the 
practice of holding people morally responsible is constituted by the reactive attitudes 
or our disposition to have the reactive attitudes, and because of this constitutive 
relationship there cannot be any reason to reject or let go of the practice of praising 
                                                 
41
 More will be said about generalization arguments later. 
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and blaming people.
42
  So, in particular, determinism cannot be a reason to abandon 
the practice of blaming and praising, which it would have to do if it were incompatible 
with moral responsibility.
43
   
What are the reactive attitudes?  Strawson does not provide a strict definition 
of the reactive attitudes. He does provide an admittedly incomplete list, consisting of 
“gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love and hurt feelings.”44  He identifies the 
reactive attitudes as the attitudes characteristic of “involvement or participation in a 
human relationship.”45  In contrast with the reactive attitudes Strawson presents the 
‘objective attitude’, which is, if you adopt it towards another human being, to “see 
him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of 
sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be…managed or handled or 
cured or trained.”46 
 These characterizations do not amount to a definition, and it is exactly a 
definition which some have called for.
47
  Strawson says at one point that “It does not 
seem to me to matter if a strict definition is not to be had…given this characterization, 
                                                 
42
 This again is a very rough characterization of what various authors have said of Strawson, but again I 
think this principle captures the basic idea.  See Watson (1987) “To regard people as responsible agents 
is to be ready to treat them in certain ways.”  (Pg. 256) and “In Strawson’s view, there is no such 
independent notion of responsibility that explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes.  The 
explanatory priority is the other way around: It is not that we hold people responsible because they are 
responsible; rather, the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to be understood by the practice, which 
itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and 
demands about our treatment of one another.  These stances and responses are expressions of certain 
rudimentary needs and aversions…” (pg. 258) See also Wallace (1994) who says, “if we wish to make 
sense of the idea that there are facts about what it is to be a responsible agent, it is best not to picture 
such facts as conceptually prior to and independent of our practice of holding people responsible,” (pg. 
2) and “to hold someone responsible, I argue, is essentially to be subject to emotions of this class 
(resentment, indignation and guilt) in one’s dealings with the person.” (pg. 3) Bennett (1980) speaks of 
“the non-propositional nature of blaming and praising” (pg. 23-24)  
43
 If determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility it certainly follows that the knowledge that 
determinism obtains gives us reason to abandon the belief that people are sometimes morally 
responsible.  On the face of it this fact about what we have reason to believe implies that we have 
reason to stop blaming and praising people.   
44
 Strawson (1974)) pg. 4 
45
 Strawson (1974)) pg. 9 
46
 Strawson (1974) pg. 9 
47
 Wallace (1994) in particular, while Bennett (1980) treats it as a failing of the Strawsonian view, 
which is his view as well, that it cannot provide such a definition. 
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we can recognize that the responses which fall under it, or very similar responses, may 
also be evoked by behaviour which does not, or does not strictly, fall within its 
scope.”48  I agree and so will not try to give a strict definition.  There will be points 
where knowing more about the reactive attitudes will matter, and when these issues 
are raised, I will deal with them.  But it does not seem to me that the fact that Strawson 
cannot articulate what makes feelings like gratitude, love and resentment similar 
implies that he, or anyone else similarly unable, should be barred for talking about this 
class in a philosophy paper. 
 In addition to the initial list of attitudes, Strawson says there are “sympathetic, 
vicarious, impersonal, disinterested, or generalized analogues,” of the reactive 
attitudes.
49
  Unlike the reactive attitudes, which are responses to the presence or 
absence of goodwill other people have towards us, the analogs of the reactive attitudes 
are responses to the presence or absence of goodwill directed towards third parties.  
This includes both the way that other people treat third parties and the way that we 
ourselves treat third parties.  As will be important later, Strawson, in talking about this 
set of reactive attitudes, is attempting to give an account of morality in general. 
There are two things to get clear on.  First, we need to know what exactly is 
being constituted by the disposition to have the reactive attitudes.  To answer with ‘the 
practice of moral responsibility’ is rather vague, and I will offer two more precise 
formulations.  The first formulation amounts to the claim that each instance of blame 
and praise is constituted by some reactive attitude.
50
  The second formulation makes 
no claims about the status of instances of praise and blame, but says rather that there is 
a practice of holding people morally responsible, and that the rules governing that 
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 Bennett (1980) and Wallace (1994) support the Constitution thesis on this formulation.  Whether or 
not Strawson meant the view to be taken this way I will stipulate that praising and blaming just are the 
occurrence of the relevant emotions, and that to express that one blames or praises someone is just to 
express those emotions. 
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practice is determined by our actual disposition to have the reactive attitudes.  On this 
picture there is a practice, within which beliefs are formed and rejected and 
justifications accepted and debated, which at base is constituted by certain social 
habits of ours.  These social habits do not provide reasons for the practice, but do 
figure in explanations for why the nature of the practice is as it is.  While these social 
habits, the habits associated with reacting to people in certain emotionally toned ways, 
do not provide reasons, nothing else does either.  Demanding a reason for a practice is, 
on this picture, a category mistake, as reasons can only show up within a practice.
51
 
 The second thing to get clear on is the nature of the reactive attitudes.  It is 
clear that they are a species of emotion, so getting clear about their nature will involve 
getting clear, or clearer anyway, about the nature of the emotions.
52
  Theories of 
emotions can be arranged on a spectrum.  At one end of the spectrum is the view that 
emotions are cognitive
53
.  While they differ from beliefs in being presented under a 
felt mode of presentation, they are like beliefs in almost every other way.  They have 
not only intentional objects, but also propositional content, and truth-values.  At the 
other end of the spectrum is the view that emotions are completely non-cognitive
54
.  
They are not beliefs presented under a felt mode of presentation, they are just feelings.  
They have no intentional objects
55
, and certainly do not have propositional structure or 
truth values.  Most theories fit somewhere in between, and there are few, if any, 
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 The two different ways of looking at Strawson’s constitution claim are significantly different.  On the 
first the constitution claim is a semantic claim, and on the second the constitution claim is not a 
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speak to holding others morally responsible. 
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 I am assuming that what distinguishes the reactive attitudes from other emotions is just the fact that 
they are directed towards people because of their actions.  If this is right then getting clear on what 
emotions are or can be will amount to getting clear on what the reactive attitudes are. 
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 Nussbaum (2001), Neu (2000) and Solomon (2004) are examples of philosophers who take a strongly 
cognitive view of emotions 
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 It is not clear that anyone in the debate about the nature of the emotions takes this view.  Others have, 
and it was probably the dominant view until the last 30 years. 
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 Those who subscribe to this extreme form of non-cognitivism would say that while emotions like 
anger are caused by certain circumstances, they are not directed at any set of circumstances.  The only 
sense to be given to the claim that ‘I am angry at him’ is that he caused you to be angry. 
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contemporary theories occupying the fully non-cognitive extreme of the spectrum. 
 This way of getting clear about things seems to have yielded a glut of 
interpretations of what Strawson’s position is.  There are two ways to understand what 
is being constituted, and as many ways to understand what is doing the constituting as 
there are interestingly different positions on the spectrum of theories of emotions.  
Because of the multiplicity of ways of understanding the Constitution Thesis, and 
because no Strawsonian has said very clearly where they stand with regard to these 
questions, my arguments will have at best tentative conclusions.  I cannot deal even 
with all current theories of emotions, and of course cannot deal with the new theories 
which are bound to pop up in a lively area of research.  I hope, however, to cover the 
major theories, and hope that doing this will be sufficient grounding to make the 
following claims: 
 
1.  The view on which each instance of praise and blame is just the expression 
of a reactive attitude is either, depending on the account of the emotions that is 
correct, neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism or simply 
implausible. 
2.  The view on which the practice of blaming and praising does not stand in 
need of any justifying reasons is one which, even if it can be made coherent 
and plausible, need not worry the incompatibilist, for their criticisms are best 
conceived of as internal to the practice, not as external criticisms which seek to 
undermine the justification of the practice as a whole. 
 
I will start by looking at different theories of the emotions and what they 
imply.  What would follow from the claim that instances of blaming and praising are 
just expressions of emotions, also assuming that emotions are basically just like 
beliefs?  It does not seem to imply much of anything, or at any rate it does not imply 
anything that would be controversial to anyone in the debate about moral 
responsibility.  After all, incompatibilists and compatibilists seem to be arguing about 
whether certain propositions are true or false.  On the widely accepted view that 
beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that beliefs share the truth values of the 
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propositions towards which they are directed, incompatibilist and compatibilists are 
just arguing about whether the beliefs that in part constitute the reactive attitudes are 
true.  Strawson’s claim about the relationship between blaming and praising and the 
reactive attitudes, when conjoined with a cognitivist account of the emotions, seems as 
though it could only have the interesting implications Strawson takes his view to have 
if the beliefs that in part constitute the reactive attitudes can only be directed at 
propositions whose content is insensitive to facts about determinism.   
 That the beliefs or judgments that constitute emotions have distinctive content 
is actually the dominant view among cognitivists about emotion.  That content is 
almost always thought to be evaluative
56
.  Is there any reason to think that if moral 
judgments were expressions of beliefs that have evaluative content, that this would 
show that incompatibilism is false?  The only reason that this could be true is if the 
propositions under debate between incompatibilists and compatibilist are all both not 
evaluative propositions themselves and do not imply any evaluative propositions.  
This is not plausible.  Take, for example, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
(PAP).  According to PAP, if X is morally responsible for y-ing, then X had some real 
alternative to y-ing.  Now if PAP is true then what would be true of a situation in 
which X was punished for y-ing, when X had not alternative to y-ing?  This would 
amount to punishing X for y-ing when X was not morally responsible for y-ing.  What 
is clear is the justificatory role played by moral responsibility.  Typically X’s moral 
responsibility would be a necessary condition of legitimately punishing X.  Perhaps 
sometimes consequentialist considerations can, all by themselves, justify punishment.  
Even in such cases, however, it is still going to be the case that X was treated unfairly.  
After all X was punished for something that X was not morally responsible for, and 
that is unfair.  So, no matter whether the punishment is all things considered justified, 
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there is a pro tanto reason not to punish X.  And, it seems to me, if there is a pro tanto 
reason not to punish X and we do, then there is something regrettable about the fact 
that X was punished.  So propositions with evaluative content are implied by standard 
incompatibilist principles.  
 I move now to the non-cognitivist extreme.  Currently there are few, if any, 
philosophers working on the emotions who take the extreme non-cognitivist view of 
emotions, and so this might seem like a useless enterprise.  It is not.  While it is not 
common today to take this view of the emotions, it was at Strawson’s time, and at 
least one major interpreter has explicitly endorsed the non-cognitivist view that the 
reactive attitudes are just feelings.
57
 
 A radical non-cognitivist about the emotions will want to deny all the key 
claims of cognitivism about the emotions.  So they will certainly want to deny that an 
emotion just is a belief.  They will also want to deny that an emotion is an attitude 
directed at a proposition in such a way that if the proposition is false, then the emotion 
is inappropriate.  They might also want to deny that emotions have intentional objects 
at all. What a given non-cognitivist will deny will likely depend on what that non-
cognitivist takes to be the central commitment of cognitivism.  I think that at the very 
least, any non-cognitivist account of the emotions will deny that any emotion has 
propositional content.  If this were the case then if the proposition were false, the 
natural conclusion to draw would be that the emotion is unjustified.  The whole point, 
I take it, of the Strawsonian move towards thinking of blame and praise as expressions 
of emotions is to make it impossible for the truth of determinism to imply that blame 
and praise are inappropriate.  Making the acceptability of the emotions insensitive to 
the truth of propositions generally would do that job, and the best way to do that is to 
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make it the case that they are not attitudes directed at a proposition, in the way that a 
belief is.
58
  
 I think such a non-cognitivist view about the emotions is extremely 
implausible.  One clue that it is implausible is that almost no one accepts it.  In fact, 
despite the view that is sometimes attributed to him, Strawson almost certainly could 
not have accepted this view.  To see why remember that Strawson endorses conditions 
of acceptability on the reactive attitudes.  These conditions have to do with whether 
the action being reacted to expresses good or ill will on the part of the agent, or 
whether the agent being reacted to was capable of having a will that was good.  So, if 
it is the case that X in y-ing does not express ill will towards some other agent, Z, then 
it would be inappropriate for Z to resent X, for example.  But this just means that 
resentment depends for its appropriateness on the truth of propositions about the 
content of a person’s will and the relations that content bears to her actions.59  So I 
don’t think that Strawson did or could have endorsed the radical non-cognitivist view 
about the emotions.  And that is a good thing for Strawson, because this radical non-
cognitivism is extremely implausible.  To see why consider the following exchange: 
 Husband: I am angry at you for cheating on me! 
 Wife:  But I didn’t cheat on you! 
                                                 
58
 Emotions would still depend for their acceptability and appropriateness on the truth of some 
propositions.  Consider the proposition that some emotions are acceptable and appropriate, or that none 
are.   Outside of these propositions which are about the appropriateness of emotions it is hard to see 
what propositions could entail that emotions are or are not appropriate or acceptable.  
59
 It might be that the emotions are appropriate iff certain propositions are true, but that these 
propositions are not part of the content of the emotions.  After all some actions are appropriate iff 
certain propositions are true, but those propositions are not part of the action.  It is only appropriate to 
skip the meeting if I have been told that I don’t need to go.  Skipping the meeting doesn’t have content 
at all, much less propositional content.  Why not treat emotions the same way?  This would be for 
inappropriate emotions to be unjustified in the same way actions can be.  But this doesn’t capture the 
phenomenon correctly.  It is not just that emotions are unjustified on occasion, which of course they 
sometimes are, but that they are in an important sense incorrect.  It is not just wrong for the husband to 
be angry, he is making a mistake.  Either he is ignorant or he is being irrational (in some less robust 
sense of ‘rational’ than the Kantians have in mind), not just being unfair or inconsiderate.  This is not a 
decisive consideration of course, but I think the burden of proof should be on the person who thinks that 
the truth of propositions determine the appropriateness of emotions without propositions being part of 
the content of those emotions. 
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 Husband:  I never thought you did! 
 Wife:  Then you shouldn’t be mad at me! 
 Husband:  Don’t tell me how to feel, I can feel anyway I like! 
 
The problem here is that it is obvious that the husband’s anger is inappropriate, 
irrational and unfair if what he is angry about, his wife’s infidelity, never happened.  
But it is hard to see how, on the radical non-cognitivist account of the emotions, facts 
like ‘she never committed adultery’ could entail that his anger is inappropriate, 
irrational or unfair.   
 The challenge for the Strawsonian who thinks that blame and praise are 
expressions of emotion and who also thinks this fact shows that determinism cannot be 
incompatible with moral responsibility, is to find an account of the emotions which 
both allows what Strawson allows, that facts about the good or ill will of others can 
make the reactive attitudes appropriate or inappropriate, but disallow what the 
incompatibilist asserts, that determinism’s being true makes the reactive attitudes 
inappropriate.  We have already that seen that a simple cognitivist view, a cognitivist 
view on which the propositional content of emotions is limited to evaluative content, 
and a radical non-cognitivist view won’t meet this challenge.  Are there other views of 
the emotions that can do better? 
 Such a view would have to admit that emotions have intentional objects, and 
perhaps propositional content, but also show that those objects and that content are not 
connected to the issue of determinism in any way that would let incompatibilist 
concerns get a foothold.  One might think that the somatic theory of the emotions, 
according to which emotions provide information about our own bodily states, is a 
good place to look
60
  On the classical expression of this view, it is awareness of facts 
about our body like the fact that our heart is racing, that we are trembling, that we are 
crying, that our breathing has quickened, etc. that prompts emotional responses.  How 
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is this not just a version of the radical non-cognitivist view?  Well, for one thing, on 
the better versions of the somatic theory emotions are essentially perceptions of bodily 
change.  Perceptions stand in relations to propositions that non-cognitivists about 
emotion deny emotions stand in.  For example, if you have a perception of a stick 
being bent in water, and it is false that the stick is bent, then your perception is not 
veridical.  Further, any judgments you base on that perception, the judgment that the 
stick would break with but a little pressure for example, would be unjustified.  So on 
the somatic theory emotions can be veridical or non-veridical, just as other perceptions 
can be.  And emotions can provide evidence for other judgments, just as perceptions 
do.   
 On this description of the somatic theory of the emotions the proposition that 
determinism obtains does not seem like it could be such as to entail that any emotion 
was veridical or nonveridical.  After all that proposition is not a proposition about 
states of the a person’s body.  The problem for Strawsonians is that facts about X’s 
will are also not facts that Z’s emotions could be sensitive to.  It might be objected 
here that facts about another person’s will, while not themselves about our physiology, 
can easily cause the kinds of physiological change to which the emotions can be 
sensitive.  This is certainly true.  That someone is insulting me makes the color of my 
face change, as well as raising my heart rate and the temperature of the skin in my 
cheeks.  If we were to alter the somatic theory ever so slightly so that emotions are 
parts of perceptions, but that the bodily changes to which they are reactions are also 
parts of those perceptions, then it would be the case that in being resentful or grateful 
we might be responding the ill or good will of others.  Does this slightly altered 
somatic view help the Strawsonians? 
 No, because there is no reason to think that facts about the psychology of other 
people are any more likely to cause physiological changes in us than more theoretical, 
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metaphysical facts might.  For example, if you are a Wall Street trader and you look 
up from your papers to see that the New York Stock Market has plunged 600 points in 
an hour, this fact will produce immediate physiological changes.  You will perspire, 
you will get dizzy, you will experience, in short, all the physiological changes 
standardly associated with fear.  But it will only have this effect because of some 
pretty advanced theoretical knowledge you have.  Similarly, if you have been a theist 
your whole life, and also been committed to theism precisely because you accepted 
something like the Design Argument for God, becoming convinced of the Theory of 
Evolution is going to produce some pretty strong physiological changes in you.  There 
is no reason, in principle, to think that knowing that determinism is true could not 
produce similar reactions, and so no reason to think that determinism cannot be 
relevant to whether or not certain emotions are veridical or not.
61
  Abstract theoretical 
facts can have important consequences for matters of everyday life which can prompt 
certain physiological responses.  If, as some have suggested, determinism is 
incompatible with our having a special metaphysical status as agents, then learning 
that determinism is true could prompt us to feel sorrowful, in the same way that 
learning that the love of our life no longer enjoys our company could.  The somatic 
theory, in short, does not give any reason to think that the truth of determinism cannot 
make having the reactive attitudes irrational or incorrect. All that could do that job 
would be to show that determinism is not relevant to anything we care about, because 
if it is relevant to something we care about, then knowing that determinism is true 
would and should prompt certain emotional reactions.  But to successfully argue that 
determinism is not relevant to anything we care about one would have to establish that 
compatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility is correct, along with some 
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 Of course if determinism was true, but one didn’t know that it could not produce the emotional 
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either be irrational or ignorant in continuing to have the reactive attitudes in such a case.  This is not a 
conclusion unfriendly to incompatibilists. 
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other controversial doctrines.  So appealing to a somatic theory of the emotions cannot 
establish that compatibilism is true. 
This does not exhaust the potential views of the emotions though.  I earlier 
ruled out radical non-cognitivism about the emotions as implausible and unusable for 
Strawsonians.  What about a less radical non-cognitivism though?  For example many 
philosophers have thought that simple emotivism about moral expressions is 
implausible.  But emotivism is not the only form of non-cognitivism about moral 
expressions, and radical non-cognitivism is not the only kind of non-cognitivism about 
the emotions.  Strawsonians might make appeal to varieties of non-cognitivism that 
are more plausible than the simple variety I have discussed.  I am speaking of the 
general project of making emotivism about moral expressions compatible with as 
many features of ordinary moral discourse as possible, and I will take as example of 
this project the quasi-realist project of Simon Blackburn’s.  Essentially quasi-realism 
starts from a rather rigid distinction between the propriety of the intellectual or 
linguistic operations characteristic of a discourse, and the theories about those 
intellectual or linguistic operations.  Anti-realism, Blackburn says, is a theory about 
the nature of those operations, and, in virtue of the distinction just mentioned, it tells 
us nothing at all about the propriety of the operations.  The quasi-realist is just the 
anti-realist whose project it is to maintain anti-realism while figuring out a way to 
imitate or mimic the intellectual or linguistic operations of a discourse that the realist 
endorses.  If this project is completely successful, such that the quasi-realist 
successfully finds a way to mimic the realist, then, Blackburn says, there is no 
important difference between realism and anti-realism.  They are two theories that 
have the same upshot or cash value, differing only in the size of the ontology that they 
demand. 
 There are three conditions for the success of the quasi-realists project with 
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regards to discourse X.  The first is that the following proposition is true; ‘The only 
way for realism about area of discourse X, to be theoretically superior to anti-realism 
would be if realism implied or was consistent with the propriety of some intellectual 
or linguistic operation characteristic of X that anti-realism is inconsistent with.’  The 
second is that the following proposition, expressing the rigid division, is true; ‘It is not 
analytic that discourse X presupposes any realist or anti-realist ontology, or realist or 
anti-realist semantics.’  The third is that the quasi-realist actually be able to say and 
think all the things that the realist can with regards to discourse X. 
 It is not my purpose here to argue against Blackburn, anymore than it is my 
task to argue for or against a non-cognitive account of the emotions.  What I am 
interested in is what the implications of Strawson’s view with regard to the tenability 
of incompatibilism would be, if we imputed some form of quasi-realism to him.  What 
quasi-realism allows is that individual ethical judgments can be true and false, that 
they can stand in implication relationships with other ethical judgments, and so that 
they can justify actions and beliefs.  If successful, quasi-realism does this while 
showing that there is no need for justification of the discourse by claiming that it 
represents the world or tracks real objective properties in it.  The discourse itself is at 
base constituted by the having of certain attitudes and certain relations among those 
attitudes. 
 What is interesting is that if you impute a quasi realist account of blaming and 
praising to Strawson the view would look a great deal like the view he merely hinted 
at in “Freedom and Resentment”, and endorsed explicitly in “Skepticism and 
Naturalism”.  The significant differences are that Strawson is talking about standpoints 
and practices and not discourses, and that Strawson is not primarily interested in 
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offering a semantic theory.
62
  It is to this view that I now want to turn.  What gives the 
view a chance of achieving Strawson’s purpose is that he posits a relativism of 
practices, or standpoints that a person can occupy.
63
  The first standpoint Strawson 
consistently describes as the participant or interpersonal standpoint.  It is the 
standpoint we occupy because we are social beings, and when we are engaged in 
genuine interaction with other people.  It is only when we are looking at the world 
from this standpoint that we are prone to the reactive attitudes.  The second standpoint 
he describes as the ‘objective’ viewpoint.  This is not supposed to signify that it is the 
second standpoint rather than the first from which we are able to see things as they are, 
in fact he denies this.  ‘Objective’ here refers to the way we look at other people, as 
natural objects to be investigated and manipulated.
64
  The objective attitude is 
supposed to the attitude we take when we consider the world as scientists do.
65
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 Though Strawson’s view in Skepticism and Naturalism would if it were fully worked out, require 
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 Strawson (1985)says “I have spoken of two different standpoints from which human behavior may be 
viewed: for short, the ‘participant’ versus the ‘objective’, the ‘involved’ versus the ‘detached’.  One 
standpoint is associated with a certain range of attitudes and reactions, the other with a different range 
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really are?’…What I want now to suggest is that error lies not [on] one side or the other of these two 
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contradiction arises only if we assume the existence of some metaphysically absolute standpoint from 
which we can judge between the two standpoints I have been contrasting.  But there is no such superior 
standpoint – or none that we know of; it is the idea of such a standpoint that is the illusion…We can 
recognize, in our conception of the real, a reasonable relativity to standpoints that we do know and can 
occupy.” (pg. 38) 
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 Bennett says that the objective attitude is marked by teleological investigation (pgs. 36-40)  Strawson 
(1974) says of the utilitarian account of moral judgment, which is just that of judgments as 
manipulations guided by scientific investigations of human nature, that it is “is painted in a style 
appropriate to a situation envisaged as wholly dominated by objectivity of attitude.” Pg. 21 
65
 Strawson (1985) from time to time refers to this standpoint as that of ‘scientific realism’ or ‘reductive 
naturalism’, and seems to think that the objective viewpoint is the viewpoint of a person who takes 
everything there is to be reducible to something physical or something describable in the vocabulary of 
physics.  What has become clear since Strawson wrote, and to some extent before, is that one can be a 
naturalist without being a reductive naturalist, and one can certainly be a scientific realist without 
thinking that all scientific disciplines reduce to physics.  It is not clear to me to what extent these false 
equivalences actually affect Strawson’s argument.  It may be that the reason he thought that from the 
scientific realist standpoint moral notions so clearly did not apply was that we limited himself to only 
the kinds of descriptions of actions and events which are licensed by physics. 
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Importantly the objective attitude is the only attitude which is warranted when we 
view the world that way, according to Strawson. 
 How does the relativizing move work?  It is hard to say.  I cannot make sense 
of the notion that a tendency to feel certain things could constitute a way of seeing the 
world.  If anything our feelings would be caused by the way we see the situation, and 
would be dependent on that way of seeing.  If emotions are beliefs then it would make 
more sense to say that they stand as the foundation of a way of seeing the world, 
especially if they are a kind of perceptual belief.
66
  If we interpret the reactive attitudes 
as some kind of belief, perceptual or otherwise, then Strawson’s standpoint relativism 
says that what it is to be in those standpoints is to accept certain beliefs.  That he then 
goes on to say that these beliefs, despite being mutually exclusive, do not contradict 
each other raises a problem.  It is hard to imagine how beliefs, one of which says ‘X 
can bear moral properties’ and the other which says ‘X does not bear moral properties’ 
do not conflict, and it seems that Strawson is saying something close to that.  Just 
saying that there is no metaphysically favored standpoint from which to evaluate these 
beliefs seems, at best, to show that we cannot know which is true, not that they do not 
conflict. 
 I wish to put aside this issue and proceed on, because while I do not understand 
how proneness to certain feelings could constitute a standpoint, I do not have an 
argument that it could not.
67
  Supposing Strawson is entitled to claim that the 
standpoint and practice of moral responsibility is constituted by our proneness to the 
reactive attitudes, it remains to be seen whether metaphysical considerations are 
irrelevant to moral responsibility.   The way that Strawson’s relativizing move works, 
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 It is likely that the answer is that emotions would have to be something short of beliefs, and 
something more than feelings.  For more on this see Zimmerman (2001).  Zimmerman is concerned 
with how particular attitudes could displace with disqualifying, but the conception of emotion he 
employs seems as though it might go a long way towards making sense of the role of the reactive 
attitudes in constituting or grounding standpoints. 
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I am claiming, is that it allows that particular attributions of moral responsibility are 
the kinds of things which can justify and be justified.  They can be justified because 
they have propositional content, and they can be justified in the same way that other 
claims can be, by looking to see whether the world is the way they say it is.  Strawson, 
as discussed earlier, laid out the reasons one could have to excuse or exempt someone 
from moral judgment, and so correct attributions of moral responsibility require that 
the case in question is one where neither excuses nor exemptions are appropriate.  
They can justify for the same reason that attributions of moral responsibility justify 
actions in any theory of moral responsibility, because if someone is morally 
responsible it is appropriate to blame, praise, reward and punish.  That is just what the 
concept is. 
 However, if what I said before is right, then the normal excuses and 
exemptions can be taken to generate broader reasons than those typically given to 
exempt and excuse people.  In particular if incompatibilists are right then our normal 
practices of moral judgment generate reasons to excuse or exempt everyone if 
determinism is true.  The reasons that incompatibilists give are best thought of not as 
external criticisms of the practice or standpoint of morality, but as reasons which are 
internal to that practice.  They are after all moral reasons.
68
  What reason can Strawson 
give to resist such an argument?
69
  I take that it is at this point that Strawson’s 
practical arguments comes into play.  Generalization strategies should be rejected 
because there are practical limits to how much we could or should alter our normal 
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 Kevin MaGill (1997) has claimed that any internal challenge to Strawson’s arguments fail, because 
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incompatibilist principle. 
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practice. 
3.2 The Idleness Argument 
Strawson offers two pragmatic arguments, one of which he thinks is far more 
important than the other.
70
  That argument, the idleness argument, essentially says that 
the role the reactive attitudes play in our social life makes it the case that we cannot 
stop adopting the reactive attitudes, and so cannot stop holding people morally 
responsible.
71
  There are two ways to interpret this argument that I will suggest.  The 
first point claims essentially that we are hardwired to take the reactive attitudes, and 
that any attempt to change our habits in this area will fail.
72
  The second points to the 
role the reactive attitudes play in our conceptual scheme, and says that the collapse of 
the one brings with it the collapse of the other.
73
  
 Against the first position it is worth pointing out that there is a gap between 
something being natural and something being justified.  It certainly does not follow 
from something’s being such that we are naturally prone to it that it is justified74, and 
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 Strawson (1985) says that ‘What I was above all concerned to stress [in Freedom and Resentment] 
was that our proneness to reactive attitudes is a natural fact, woven into the fabric of our lives, given 
with the fact of human society as we know it, neither calling for nor permitting a general ‘rational’ 
justification.” Pg. 265 
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 Strawson (Strawson (1974)) pg. 13 
72
 In Strawson (1985)he treats this argument as descended from Hume’s positions with regard to 
skepticism about the external world.  I will call this version of the argument the Humean version. 
73
 Strawson (1985) hints at this argument (pg. 13) and discusses Wittgenstein, who adopted a similar 
position with regard to skepticism about the external world.  Strawson treats Wittgenstein’s position as 
essentially the same as Hume’s, though the difference is I think clear.  I include this Wittgensteinian 
argument in the section about practical arguments, even though it is not clearly a practical argument at 
all, because Strawson treats it as a variant of his own idleness argument.  I will not discuss it much 
because I do not see how it could be made to work.  Wittgenstein’s argument is that certain propositions 
are such that they make possible rational thought about anything, and so that there is no non-self-
undermining argument against those propositions.  But the claim that we are justified in holding people 
responsible for what they do is not such a proposition.  We can still use logical arguments and engage in 
empirical inquiry even if we reject that claim. 
74
 Kevin MaGill (1996) has attributed a different argument to Strawson than the one I have.  According 
to MaGill what Strawson is assuming that to think that X stands in need of justification is to think that 
we could stop X if it turned out that it is not justifiable.  So the naturalness of X is not meant to imply 
that X is justified, but rather that X need not be justified.  I see little to recommend the assumption that 
to think that X stands in need of justification is to think that we could suspend X.  The goal of the 
search for justification is in the first place to determine whether something is justified, not to change 
behavior.  Typically that determination will be employed in changing the behavior, and will be taken as 
a reason to change the behavior, but this is not a necessary condition of deciding that X is unjustified. 
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it is not clear, without some extra assumptions, that something’s being such that we 
are naturally prone to it gives any reason at all to think it is justified.
75
  Given this, the 
argument sounds as though it is suggesting that because we cannot stop ourselves from 
adopting the reactive attitudes, it is not worth looking into whether we should stop it.
76
 
 A brief argument for this position would be that it is irrational to try to do 
something that we know to be impossible.  If it is impossible to do anything about our 
commitment to the reactive attitudes then it is irrational to try to do anything about it.  
A further necessary assumption is that inquiries into the justification of a practice are, 
or are when they have a point at all, directed at either changing a practice or protecting 
it from being altered by skeptical considerations.  Since there is no change to be had 
either way, inquiries into justification are pointless. 
 This argument has been accused of anti-intellectualism.  A way to see why this 
is true is to see that this argument leaves a crucial effect of inquiries into justification 
out of the function of such inquiries.  Finding out that something is unjustified might 
not be enough to alter our commitment to it, but it is certainly enough to change our 
beliefs about it.  There is no good argument for the claim that our belief that holding 
people is responsible is a justified practice is itself unalterable.  There are after all, 
some people who actually believe that we are unjustified in holding people morally 
responsible.
77
  The only move left here, that I can see, is to claim that changes in such 
beliefs are unimportant, and this does seem to express an anti-intellectualism.  If it is 
true that our practice is unjustified, presumably it is better to know that, or at least it 
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 Some have suggested that men are naturally prone to rape.  No one seriously thinks that in offering 
this claim that evolutionary socio-biologists are, or take themselves to be, giving reasons why rape is 
justified, or reasons why rape does not fail some legitimate demand for justification. 
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 From Strawson (1974) “…it is useless to ask whether it would not be rational for us to do what it is 
not in our nature to (be able to) do.” Pg. 18 
77
 There is an important dissimilarity here between skepticism about the external world and skepticism 
about moral responsibility.  With regards to skepticism about moral responsibility what is plausibly 
unavoidable is suspending the practice which is in question, while with regards to skepticism about all 
knowledge what is plausibly unavoidable is both changing our beliefs and the practices which are only 
rational given the truth of those beliefs.   
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could be.  By way of example, consider the notion of human depravity.  Some people 
believe that human beings are unalterably depraved, while most disagree.  A 
Strawsonian position with regard to this controversy would be that if we are 
unalterably depraved, then we could do nothing about it, so there is no sense asking 
about whether we are so depraved.  But presumably it is worth knowing that there is 
such a thing as human goodness, or that there is not, even if we cannot improve people 
if they are depraved.  I cannot imagine taken such a blasé attitude towards this subject, 
and I cannot see the difference between that attitude with regards to depravity, and 
Strawson’s suggestion about how to think about the problem of moral responsibility. 
3.3 The Pragmatic Argument 
 While he never admits that the Idleness argument does not work, Strawson 
does present an alternate practical argument, which I will call the Pragmatic 
Argument.
78
  According to the Pragmatic Argument, the only way to decide whether it 
would be rational to give up the reactive attitudes would be if it made people’s lives 
better.
79
  Given that the reactive attitudes are an essential part of interpersonal 
relationships,
80
 it is hard to see how rejecting them could improve our lives, if they 
carry along with it all the joys of interacting with other people. 
Strawson says that the rationality of the practice of holding people responsible 
can only be judged according to the gains and losses of human life.  He then only 
mentions the fact that without interpersonal involvement, life would be much poorer. 
Now, while incompatibilists do not always present their views this way, the 
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 Strawson presents Carnap’s response to skepticism in Strawson (1985), in such a way that the 
affinities between that view and his come through.  Carnap’s position is essentially that since there is no 
way to verify the existence or nature of the kinds of facts commonly taken to ground our practices, then 
any claims about them are meaningless, and so they cannot be said to exist.  If we cannot cite facts to 
the effect that people are X, to justify our attributing X to them, then all that is left are practical reasons. 
79
 Strawson (1974) pg. 13 
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 Something that Wallace (1994) questions.  There is a sticky point here about the proper definition of 
the reactive attitudes, which I will not deal with because Wallace’s criticism would simply be another 
way of showing that the Pragmatic argument doesn’t work. 
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incompatibilist arguments can be seen as moral arguments.  The argument is that it is 
not fair to hold people morally responsible, and thus open them up to punishment and 
blame, if they could not avoid what they did.  That moral claim conjoined with the 
non-moral claim that determinism precludes anyone avoiding anything they do is 
enough to generate the incompatibilist claim that if the thesis of determinism is true 
then we should abandon our practice of making the kind of moral judgments involved 
in blaming and praising.
81
  Because moral reasons are practical reasons, Strawson’s 
argument, when the moral nature of incompatibilism is made clear, amounts to the 
claim that utility outweighs concerns of fairness.
82
 
 A second reason to reject the Pragmatic argument is that according to 
Strawson’s Idleness argument, we cannot actually abandon the practice of moral 
judgment anyway.  So the extreme costs that Strawson points to would not be incurred 
if we were to come to the judgment that the practice was not justifiable.  If we came to 
that conclusion we could not actually abandon the practice anyway.  What we could 
do is tinker with it, perhaps removing any punishments which could only be justified 
by appeal to notions of desert, and not rehabilitation or public safety.  The rest of our 
lives we would be forced to maintain our commitment to an unjustifiable practice, and 
that would surely bring negative consequences along with it.  No doubt we would feel 
guilty for blaming people, despite being unable to stop doing it completely.  Strawson 
could claim that this cost was sufficient to give us good practical reason to not 
seriously entertain the question, and to proceed along with the assumption that our 
practice was justified.  This is in essence the position that we should assume that the 
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 Strawson thinks that this subclass of moral judgments stands or falls with the practice of moral 
judgment generally.  This is not essential to his view, and I don’t know of a place where he offers an 
argument for it. 
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 I take it that this is a problem for any view.  Many of the reasons people give for rejecting act 
utilitarianism is that it seems to have just this consequence (though of course many utilitarians would 
claim that they are simply giving a different account of fairness, rather than claiming that utility trumps 
fairness), for example. 
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answer to any potentially troubling question is the answer which would trouble us the 
least.  There is nothing to be said for such a position. 
4.  The Relationship Account 
4.1 Watson’s Moral Community 
 It might be that I have been uncharitable to Strawson.  While it is certainly true 
that he offered the Practical Arguments I have presented, and it is certainly true he 
offered the Abnormality and Actual Judgment arguments, it might be that he never 
meant to endorse what I call the Emotion Account.  Gary Watson has presented an 
account of moral responsibility that I call the Relationship View which he takes to be 
the view that Strawson accepted, made more precise.  I am prepared to leave it an 
open question whether Strawson accepted the Relationship View.  What interests me 
more are the merits of the view itself as it has been presented by Watson and more 
recently by Tim Scanlon.  These views, like the Emotion Account, look like they have 
direct compatibilist implications.  I will argue, however that the Relationship Account 
is very likely false, and that the only way to revise it in such a way as to make it 
plausible is to revise it in such a way as to make it neutral between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism. 
 I am going to discuss Watson first, in part because his view is closer to 
Strawson’s, as it is a development of Strawson’s view in the face of some of the very 
problems I raised.
83
  Watson seeks to give a unified account of exemptions.  About 
exemptions Strawson says that they come in two kinds “of which the first is far less 
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 Watson says “It would seem that many of the exemption conditions involve explanations of why the 
individuals display qualities to which the reactive attitudes are otherwise sensitive.  So on the face of it, 
the reactive attitudes are also affected by these explanations.  Strawson’s essay does not provide an 
account of how this works or what kinds of explanations exempt.” (Watson pg. 228)  This is very close 
to my criticism of Strawson that there is no account of the emotions that makes it the case that we can 
be expected to withhold praise and blame because of some explanations of action and that we cannot be 
expected to withhold praise and blame because determinism is true.  Watson fears that without an 
explanation of what unifies the class of exemptions, it will be impossible to resist the incompatibilist 
offering her favored explanation, whether it is the lack of ultimate sourcehood or the lack of alternative 
possibilities. 
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important than the second.  In connection with the first sub-group we may think of 
such statements as ‘He wasn’t himself’, ‘He has been under very great strain recently’, 
‘He was acting under post-hypnotic suggestion’, in connection with the second, we 
may think of ‘He’s only a child’, ‘He’s a hopeless schizophrenic’, ‘His mind has been 
systematically perverted’, ‘That’s purely compulsive behavior on his part.’”84  What 
could connect such a variety of reasons to exempt someone from being held 
responsible for her actions?   
 Watson seeks to answer this question by reference to what he calls the 
conditions of moral address.  This immediately ought to suggest two questions.  The 
first is ‘conditions of what for moral address?’  Watson might mean ‘conditions for the 
possibility of moral address’ or perhaps ‘conditions for the rationality of moral 
address’ or more minimally ‘conditions in which moral address actually tends to 
occur’.  Conditions of the first kind seem to be exhausted by the same conditions 
which make it possible to use a language and which make it possible to refer to moral 
properties.
85
   If by ‘moral address’ Watson literally means ‘addressing moral claims 
to people’ then the conditions of the possibility of moral address are just the 
conditions of intelligibly articulating moral claims.
86
  It involves sufficient mastery of 
the use of moral terms and would be exhausted by the conditions for mastery of a 
natural language. It is not clear at all how those conditions could explain the categories 
of exemption that Strawson lists.    
 What is much more in the Strawsonian spirit is to take the conditions of moral 
address to be the conditions in which we actually tend to morally address people.  The 
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 On the assumption, of course, that in making moral judgments we are referring to moral properties.  
This assumes cognitivism, something that Watson has always been at pains not to do.  Keeping open the 
possibility of some kind of expressivism the set of conditions of the first kind are just the same as those 
required to express one’s emotions, commands, or whatever else one thinks is being expressed in the 
making of moral judgments. 
86
 If he doesn’t mean this then I am not sure what he could mean by the ‘possibility of moral address’. 
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problem with this approach is that it is not clear how we could get an explanation of 
what unifies the set of reasons that we give to exempt people that Strawson has 
offered.  One way of looking at this is that, as holding someone responsible is a form 
of moral address, when done publicly, Strawson has already provided us with his 
account of the conditions under which we actually do address people morally, and 
what we need is some explanation of why it is that we do that.  The project is to search 
for what justifies our exempting people as we do.
87
  So it seems that the only 
conditions which matter are the conditions under which it is rational or reasonable to 
morally address people. 
 The justifying account that Watson offers is that the conditions under which it 
makes sense to address someone morally are not met in the cases of exemptions, 
though they fail to be met in different ways.  Watson mentions two conditions; “One 
condition is that…the other must possess sufficient moral understanding; another is 
that the conduct in question be seen as reflecting the moral self.”88  The condition of 
moral understanding is meant to explain why we do not hold children or the 
schizophrenic responsible for their actions, while the condition of reflection of self 
explains why we do not hold people responsible for uncharacteristic actions or actions 
performed under hypnosis. 
 Why do I call Watson’s view a Relationship Account?  The reason stems from 
the condition of moral understanding.  “It is tempting,” Watson says, “to think that 
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 It is possible of course that what justifies such a pattern of exemptions, if anything, will not be the 
same thing which actually causes us to so exempt people.  Perhaps we are led to exempt people because 
of the internalization of social standards of behavior which we only internalized because of fear of 
social sanction, and which only have the content they do because of accidental historical facts.  Now if 
we do find a justifying account of exemptions then there is no reason to think that such a justification 
could not become part of the causal explanation of why we exempt as do, going forward at least.  If we 
do not find a justifying account then it would seem that the moral consequences of our practice of 
holding people responsible would decide whether or not we should abandon the practice.  The actual 
causal story in either case would be irrelevant. 
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 Watson (1987) pg. 232  
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understanding requires a shared framework of values.”89  This very quickly leads 
Watson to the conclusion that a requirement on reasonable moral address is 
membership in a shared moral community, where that community is itself defined by a 
shared framework of values.  So to hold someone responsible requires believing that 
they stand in a certain relationship with you, that of member of a shared moral 
community.  There are many interesting questions of detail that could be taken up at 
this point, but what I want to take up is the second question that I said was suggested 
by the phrase ‘conditions of moral address.’  What is moral address?  Does Watson 
mean to be giving us a general account of all moral utterances, or just those which are 
expressions of praise and blame?  Does Watson even mean to be giving us an account 
of all blame or praise expressing utterances? 
 It is hard to see how he could be.  After all not all cases of blame and praise 
involve addressing anyone at all.  We can blame people without saying anything to 
them or demanding anything of them, whether implicitly or explicitly.  I can as I write 
this in the early morning hours in Ithaca, NY blame George W. Bush for the second 
Iraq War, or Joe Lieberman for the failure of health care reform.  Of course I am, in 
some very loose sense, in a moral community with George W. Bush and Joe 
Lieberman,
90
 so what Watson can say is that I have the disposition to blame Bush and 
Lieberman and when I take myself to be blaming them I am simply aware of all the 
cognitive and conative elements that go into my being so disposed.  This strikes me as 
a strained way to accommodate the intuition that we blame people privately, and it is 
important to notice that it relies on the fact of shared moral community, and that this 
fact does not always obtain when it is appropriate to blame or praise someone.  I am 
not entirely certain that I share many moral values with Bush and Lieberman.  I am 
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 After all, Watson says, “Obviously we do not want to make compliance with the basic [moral] 
demand a condition of moral understanding” Watson (1987) pg. 234 
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entirely sure that there would be no point to me actually telling them what moral 
horrors I took them to be.  Whether or not they care about the prospect of their being 
moral horrors, they aren’t going to agree with me about what goes into making 
someone a moral horror, and wouldn’t care about my opinion anyway.  So I accept 
that telling them what I feel about them will not change their behavior, but I don’t take 
that to have anything to do with whether they are blameworthy or whether I can blame 
them. 
 Watson’s Relationship Account is in some ways underdescribed.  It is not clear 
how many evaluative commitments, or what kind of evaluative commitments, need to 
be shared between two people for it to be rational for them to blame one another.  It is 
not altogether surprising that this is the case, because the article in which Watson 
presents this view is one where he is attempting only to explain one way to develop 
the Strawsonian position.  That the proposal remains merely suggestive does not 
present a problem for Watson as he never goes farther by way of endorsing the view 
than saying the view is attractive.  It would be helpful, then, to have a version of the 
Relationship Account that is wholeheartedly defended.  Here Thomas Scanlon is of 
help. 
4.2 Scanlon’s Relationship Account of Blame 
Scanlon’s view is and always has been a species of the Quality of Will 
Account, a view that I will discuss later.  That is, he accepts that people are 
blameworthy and praiseworthy when their actions express some morally relevant 
quality of will.  What is distinctive about the latest presentation of his view are the 
conditions he attaches to something’s being a morally relevant quality of will.  
According to Scanlon a person X is blameworthy for her action z iff
91
 it is appropriate 
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 At certain points Scanlon sounds as though he is making a claim about the meaning of blame 
expressions, but in the interests of charity I do not think he should be so interpreted.  It is obvious that 
he is not giving an account of what we mean when we say ‘I blame X’.  To see that it is enough to 
notice that Scanlon is giving a substantive account of blame that can be coherently denied. 
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for some other person Y to take the fact that X did z to show something about X’s 
attitudes that can appropriately impair the relationship Y bears to X.
9293
  To blame 
someone is to actually revise one’s attitudes in a way that reflects the impairment of 
the relationship.  So Scanlon’s account is at once a version of the Quality of Will 
Account and the Relationship Account.  Most importantly though, blameworthiness 
depends on a pre-existing relationship between the agent and the judge.
94
 
While Scanlon’s discussion of blame is perceptive and interesting in many 
ways, what concerns me is whether he provides the correct account.  The problem 
with Watson’s view is that it implausibly restricted the range of people who we could 
rationally blame to those with whom we shared and evaluative framework.  A similar 
problem is going to face any relationship account.  It certainly seems as though we can 
rationally blame anyone who has performed a wrong action, or if we can’t it has 
nothing to do with that person’s relation to us, but with her action.  How does Scanlon 
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 This formula is asserted in several places. “Briefly put, my proposal is this: to claim that a person is 
blameworthy for an action is to claim that the actions shows something about the agent’s attitudes 
towards others that impairs the relations that other can have with him or her.  To blame a person is to 
judge him or her to be blameworthy and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a 
way to this judgment of impaired relations holds to be appropriate.” Scanlon (2008)Pgs. 128-9 
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 This is the official position at least.  It looks as though Scanlon at times wants to say that X is 
blameworthy for z when it is the case that X’s doing z is itself what makes it appropriate for the 
relationship to be impaired.  At various points Scanlon takes the fact that rival conceptions of blame 
cannot make sense of what he calls moral outcome luck, luck what the consequences of one’s actions 
are, to be reason to reject the view.  His official position does no better.  Moral outcome luck reveals 
nothing of our attitudes.  If Scanlon said that it was the action itself and not the attitudes it reveals 
which impairs the relationship then this would be closer to giving an account of blame that could handle 
the problem of moral luck. 
94
 Scanlon does not provide an account of praise.  He certainly does not think that the account he has 
sketched of blame works for praise.  Is this a problem?  I think it is, but it is not a serious problem.  It 
seems plausible that in praising we are doing the same kind of thing as we are in blaming, but simply in 
a different way, or with regard to different objects.  Strawson for example thinks blaming and praising 
are both emotional reactions people have towards actions.  What differentiates them is the emotion that 
one has and the kind of actions to which one responds, in the case of praising the emotional reaction 
would be some positive or approving emotional reaction to an action one thinks is ethically good, while 
blaming would be some negative or disapproving emotional reaction an action one thinks is ethically 
bad.  Praise and blame, while different, have a similar structure.  Again this seems like the immediately 
intuitive view, one that Scanlon denies.  Is Scanlon alone in this?  No.  Asymmetry theorists such as 
Wolf and Nelkin also think that praise differs significantly from blame.  Given that the view that praise 
and blame are symmetrical is not universally intuitive apart from Scanlon, I think this is a small 
theoretical cost for him to pay. 
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deal with this problem?  The obvious way to deal with the problem is to claim that the 
relationship in virtue of which we can blame anyone is a relationship we stand in with 
everyone.  Scanlon makes exactly this move, citing the default moral relationship as 
the one in virtue of which we can blame strangers for their actions.
95
  So it is because 
we stand in the moral relationship to everyone that we can blame anyone.  This looks 
like it takes care of the problem of extensional inadequacy as well as can be done.  It 
also looks like determinism couldn’t be relevant to the question of whether or not we 
have certain relationships or whether those relationships have been impaired. 
In this case, however, looks are significantly deceiving.  I will present four 
problems with Scanlon’s position.  One is that it is not clear that the moral relationship 
is a relationship in any significant sense.  I don’t think I have relationships with 
anyone in Tibet, but according to Scanlon I do.  Another problem is that even if we 
could be persuaded to deal with the oddness of our being in a relationship with 
someone we have never met, communicated with, or even learned of, there is the 
problem that any understanding of what it is to be in a relationship that is thin enough 
to cover the moral relationship that Scanlon has in mind, is an understanding on which 
determinism might very well imply that we fail to be in that relationship with anyone.  
A separate problem is that even with the positing of this odd moral relationship, 
Scanlon’s account is still not extensionally adequate.  Scanlon’s view implies, despite 
his attempts to avoid the implication, that we cannot rationally blame the long dead for 
their sins.  While this extensional inadequacy is not as serious as Watson’s, the 
discussion of the issue that Scanlon provides reveals some extremely counter-intuitive 
implications of his view.  The final and most serious problem however, is that even if 
there is a moral relationship, and even if we stand in that relationship everyone that we 
can rationally blame, Scanlon’s view does not allow for moral blame at all.  The basic 
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problem is that the constituent elements of the moral relationship are such that they 
cannot be revised.  Nor can it be appropriate to revise them.  So no one is ever, 
according to Scanlon, morally blameworthy for what they do. 
4.2.1 Is the Moral Relationship a Relationship? 
Is the moral relationship an actual relationship in the ordinary sense of that 
word?  Before being forced to answer Scanlon should ask, why does that matter?  If 
there is only a moral relationship given some stipulated sense of ‘relationship’ why 
should this be a problem?  Philosophers introduce terms of art by stipulation all the 
time.  Even if we do not recognize a moral relationship in normal discourse, that does 
not mean there are not significant similarities between the moral relationship and 
actual relationships.  Those similarities are presumably what Scanlon means to capture 
in talking about a moral relationship we have with every other person now alive.  The 
question is whether there is an important enough similarity to justify extending the 
normal meaning of the term.  I don’t think there is.  According to Scanlon 
relationships are “constituted by certain attitudes and dispositions.  Central among 
these are intentions and expectations about how the parties will act toward one 
another.  But relationships also include intentions and expectations about the feelings 
that the parties have for one another, and the considerations that they are disposed to 
respond to and see as reasons.”96   
What is conspicuously absent from this list is some kind of interaction between 
the people with the relationship.  You cannot be friends with someone you have never 
met nor communicated with.  In response to objections like this Scanlon offers the 
counter-example of the parent-child relationship.  Fathers might never know of or 
interact with their children, but they are nonetheless fathers of those children.  So, 
Scanlon might say, relationships do not require interaction between the people that are 
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in the relationship.  Does parenthood constitute an interpersonal relationship?  It seems 
to, and very often it does, but it does not always do so.  It is instructive here to 
consider the case of absent parents.  Typically parents interact with their children, or at 
least know about them and think about them.  In some cases this not true of course.  
What should we say about such cases?  Suppose that someone had never met her 
father, and when asked about how strong her relationship with her father was she said 
‘I never had a relationship with my father.’  Would this response be wrong or 
confused somehow?  According to Scanlon this claim must be false, and might be a 
contradiction. 
Of course what we ought to say here is that there are different kinds of 
relationships.  Parenthood is a kind of relationship, but it is not the same kind of 
relationship as friendship, romantic love, citizenship or anything like that.  The 
problem that this raises for Scanlon is that he defends his account of the moral 
relationship by reference to the properties of the one kind of relationship, the kind 
including friendship, and he defends the claim that the moral relationship exists by 
pointing to its similarities to another.  But whether or not X is the parent of Y doesn’t 
necessarily have anything to do with the attitudes or expectations of either.  It is 
sufficient for X to be the parent of Y that X have a certain biological relationship with 
Y.
97
  Perhaps there are accounts of the moral relationship which make it clearly of the 
same kind as parenthood.  An account of the moral relationship on which we stand in 
the moral relationship to all the members of our species would do the trick.  But this is 
not the account of the moral relationship Scanlon has offered us, and it is not clear that 
any relationship like friendship could possibly exist between people who had never 
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 I do not mean to deny that there is more to parenthood than a biological relationship.  There are other 
ways to be a parent, such as adoption.  The biological relationship is not a necessary condition, nor does 
it provide an exhaustive account of the relations that obtain between parent and child.  Parents have 
special duties to their children.  What I am claiming is that the biological relationship is a sufficient 
condition for the parent having those duties towards the child. 
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met one another. 
4.2.2  Is the Moral Relationship compatible with Determinism? 
Why is this seeming quibble about what kind of relationship the moral 
relationship is matter?  Because without a clear idea of what kind of relationship is, we 
have no reason in particular to think that our being in this relationship is compatible 
with determinism.  If the moral relationship were of a kind with friendship or romantic 
love the suggestion that its holding being incompatible with determinism would not be 
plausible enough to worth investigating.  Friendship and romantic love are not 
plausibly incompatible with determinism.
98
  Friendship and romantic love are 
relationships we stand in with other people precisely because of particular facts about 
them
99
, and determinism, to borrow an argument from Strawson, does not imply 
anything of one person that it does not imply of everyone else.  As long as we think it 
is rational to be friends and lovers with only some people and not others it is going to 
look quite odd to argue that determinism or indeterminism could have anything to do 
with.  But of course what makes the moral relationship unlike friendship and romantic 
love is precisely the fact that we stand in the moral relationship with everyone, 
regardless of the properties which distinguish them from other people.  So the easy 
argument that gets friendship and romantic love off the hook, as it were, is not 
available for the moral relationship. 
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 I do not here mean to be denying the doctrine, so important to free will theodicies, that the love God 
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 Velleman (1999) disagrees, arguing that when we love others it is their rational agency that we love, 
and rational agency is something had by every rational agent in exactly the same way.  This view is 
interesting but I have to confess I find it less plausible than just about any philosophical theory of 
anything that I have ever encountered. 
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This problem is particularly pressing for Scanlon because of what he does tell 
us about the moral relationship.  According to Scanlon being in the moral relationship 
with others consists of it being the case that one ought to show a certain regard to 
them.
100
  The basis for this duty of regard is the fact that other people “are capable of 
understanding and responding to reasons.”101  So if determinism is incompatible either 
with duties of regard holding between people, or with people being able to understand 
and responding to reasons, then determinism is incompatible with the moral 
relationship. 
Both challenges have been raised of course.  Kant famously argued that one 
could only have an obligation to do something if it was the case that one had the 
ability to do it.  If Kant was right then if determinism obtains then no one can violate 
an obligation.  Ishitayque Haji has more recently argued that if determinism obtains 
then no one can have any obligations at all.
102
  Given that the moral relationship 
consists of default obligations we have to the people we stand in that relationship to, 
the moral relationship is compatible with determinism only if these arguments from 
Kant and Haji are unsound.  That means that blame can only be appropriate, given 
determinism, if these arguments are unsound.  What Scanlon’s account of blame does, 
far from showing that determinism is compatible with blame, is open up a new avenue 
of argument that incompatibilists can take to show that blame is incompatible with 
determinism. 
4.2.3  Scanlon and Blaming the Dead 
Another, separate, worry about the moral relationship is that we do not stand in 
the moral relationship with everyone that we can rationally take to be blameworthy.  
The moral relationship requires certain kinds of regard, concern and respect from 
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those in it towards everyone else in it.
103
  Now it is pretty clear that we do not owe 
regard, concern and respect to the long dead that we owe to the living.  It is also not 
clear that we can have the same duties to the long dead that we have to the living.  So 
it does not appear that we can be in the moral relationship to the long dead, and 
neither, according to Scanlon can we blame the long dead for their actions.  But this is 
not correct.  We can rationally and often do blame the long dead for their actions.  
What Scanlon says about this is that blame of the long dead can only have “vicarious 
significance.”104  It is hard to know how to evaluative this claim.  It sounds quite 
wrong to me.  After all the Cherokee of today need not think to himself ‘It was really 
bad for my ancestors that Andrew Jackson forced them to walk the Trail of Tears, and 
he did so out of racism, so it was appropriate for them to blame him.’  She can just 
blame him, and she can do so with all the feeling and directness that that her long dead 
ancestors did.  While Scanlon does not consider this response, or any response in fact, 
to his claim about blame for the long dead being restricted to blame with vicarious 
significance, he does have something he can say to accommodate the fact that the 
contemporary Cherokee can blame Andrew Jackson.  Scanlon says that the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim is one that can stand as the ground 
relationship of blame.
105
  Plausibly a member of the Cherokee tribe can blame Jackson 
for her reduced life prospects, and for the theft of land from her people.  So what of 
the suggestion that we can blame the long dead because we are their victims, or their 
beneficiaries? 
There are significant problems with this suggestion, any of which would doom 
it as a response.  The first, which Scanlon himself points out but does not adequately 
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deal with, is that the relationship of having been harmed is not one that exists prior to 
the act for which we blame the person.  In the case of the long dead and their bad acts 
it doesn’t exist at the time the act is performed either, since we, the blamers, were not 
yet alive.  That relationship only comes into being, presumably, at the time of our birth 
or sometime after.  But then it is hard to see how this relationship could be the one in 
virtue of which we blame the dead person.  After all Scanlon says that we blame 
people for actions when those actions show something about the quality of their will 
which impairs the relationship we have with them.  But the actions of the long dead 
cannot show an impairment of an existing relationship if those actions are what create 
the relationship. 
What Scanlon has to say about this problem has no applicability in the case of 
the long dead.  He says that “the victim’s relation to the perpetrator is impaired 
relative to the standard relationship between persons generally, insofar as the 
perpetrator’s actions showed a failure to have concern for the welfare of others that is 
part of what we all owe to each other.”106  But I don’t stand in a relationship to 
Andrew Jackson.  I don’t stand in the moral relationship to him.  The moral 
relationship includes duties of care and respect that I can’t have to the long dead, 
because there is no such thing as my showing the kind of respect that is morally 
demanded, or caring for how things turn out for them.  I know of no other relationship 
that I could stand in to the long dead that could be the ground relationship for blame.  I 
might be biologically related to them, but there is little that their actions could do to 
impair that relationship.  The same goes for being in the same species as them.  It 
might be true that being in the same ethnocultural group as a long dead person might 
be the kind of relationship that could be impaired.  If one took being a member of the 
group to carry with it certain norms for behavior, the fact that a member of the group 
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had violated them might count as a betrayal, even though the action was performed 
before you were born.  But this suggestion, while it might work to get some blame for 
the long dead off the ground, does not go far enough.  We can blame people who are 
both long dead and not members of our ethnic group.  Living Jews can blame Hitler 
for the death of family members. 
Even if there was some way of accommodating blame for the long dead into 
Scanlon’s theory by appealing to relationships of victimhood, this relationship does 
not account for all the cases where one can rationally blame a long dead figure.  I am 
of mostly German ancestry.  This history of the German people was greatly affected 
by Charlemagne’s genocide of the continental Saxons.  It is likely that had this event 
not occurred the history of the eastern Frankish empire would have unfolded 
completely differently.  But would that have been to my benefit or harm?  Is it 
possible to know?  Is it even sensible to ask the question?  Is it even clear that I would 
have been born had history worked out so differently?  After all my parents being 
where they were when they met was the result of particular historical factors (in my 
case the political fallout of the Soviet Union and the United States conquering the 
closest continuer of the eastern Frankish empire), and without those factors they might 
never have met. So one problem is that often we cannot actually figure out whether we 
have been helped or hurt by a bad action, but nonetheless we feel fully comfortable 
blaming the person for their bad action.  Another problem is that the farther back we 
go in history the less likely it is that it even makes sense to ask whether the action 
helped or hurt me, since the action’s occurring was likely a pre-condition of my 
existing.
107
 
I know of no way that Scanlon can account for the blame of the long dead.  But 
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perhaps this is not too significant a problem.  While we do blame the dead for their 
actions, we typically only blame the living.  Watson was right to an extent; most of the 
time we blame people to get them to understand the wrongness of what they did with 
an eye towards their not doing it again.  The inability to account for non-central cases 
of blame is a strike against Scanlon’s theory, but just one, not three. 
4.2.4  The Possibility of Moral Blame on Scanlon’s account. 
The other two strikes come from the fact that it looks like moral blame is never 
warranted, according to Scanlon’s own theory.  The basic reason is that the moral 
relationship is not one that it is morally permissible to alter.  But the judgment that X 
is blameworthy just is the judgment that it is appropriate or obligatory to change one’s 
relationship with X in light of the attitudes expressed in X’s action.  So if it is never 
appropriate to alter the moral relationship, then no one is ever morally to blame for 
their actions.  And this is surely a significant thing to lose in one’s account of blame.  
The constituent elements of the moral relationship that Scanlon mentions are things 
like intentions “to take care not to behave in ways that will harm those to whom we 
stand in this relation, to help them when we can easily do so, not to lie to them or 
mislead them, and so on.”108  These are intentions we ought to have to every other 
person in the world because they are our “fellow rational beings”109 and “beings of a 
kind that are capable of understanding and responding to reasons.”110  So there is 
nothing a person could do, short of making themselves not a rational being that could 
make it acceptable to cease to have the constitutive intentions that make up the moral 
relationship.  So what could blaming someone consist in then? 
This is a problem that Scanlon is aware of 
111
 but his response is puzzling.  He 
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 “But, in contrast with the case of friendship, the basic forms of moral concern are not conditional on 
this kind of reciprocation.  Even those who have no regard for the justifiability of their actions toward 
others retain their basic moral rights – they still have claims on us not to be hurt or killed, to be helped 
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says: 
 
“There is a range of interactions with others that are morally important 
but not owed unconditionally to everyone.  If a person has no regard for 
the justifiability of his or her actions to others (or, despite professing 
such a concern, constantly sees things in a way that gives weight only 
to his or her own interests), then it is quite appropriate to refuse to 
make agreements with that person or to enter into other specific 
relations that involve trust and reliance.”112   
 
and a bit later says: 
 
There is also room for modifications in our intentions to help others in 
certain ways.  Some duties to aid are unconditional.  Even murderers 
and rapists have a claim on us to be rescued when they are drowning or 
are in danger of bleeding to death after an accident.  But normal moral 
relations also involve a general intention to help others with their 
projects when this can be done at little cost, and we need not have this 
intention toward those who have shown a complete lack of concern for 
the interests of others.”113 
 
What makes this response puzzling is that it seems to completely go back either on the 
general theory of blame that Scanlon has offered, or on the description of the moral 
relationship.  If moral blame consists of refusing to trust or enter agreements or aid 
people in the pursuit of their projects, then the default moral relationship must contain 
intentions to do those things as a constitutive element.
114
  But if that were the case then 
it would have to be the case that we ought to intend to help people in their projects, to 
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 A potential response on Scanlon’s behalf is that the duties to trust or enter into agreements with 
people are conditional duties.  So, on this response, a duty which is in part constitutive of the moral 
relationship is one to honor agreements you have entered.  But then what revision to the moral 
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Something similar goes for trust.  Suppose the duty that is in part constitutive of the moral relationship 
is one to trust people so long as they have not proven their untrustworthiness.  How is the refusal to 
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trust them, and enter into agreements with them just because they are rational beings.  
And that is very implausible.  I do not act immorally if I wait for people to prove 
themselves trustworthy before I trust them.  And even if it were true, that would mean 
that as long as the person was a rational agent we would be obligated to have these 
intentions, so we couldn’t abandon them.  What happens if we admit the plausible 
thing, that trust, reliance and the like are not part of what we owe to everyone in the 
world just because they are fellow rational beings?  Then those intentions are not part 
of the moral relationship, and so abandoning them would not count as a revision of the 
moral relationship.  Put another way, Scanlon thinks that we stand in the moral 
relationship with others simply on account of their status as beings able to respond to 
reasons in the right sort of way.  So, as long as they continue to be such beings, then 
we stand in the moral relationship to them.  So how could any action on the part of a 
rational being make it permissible to revise or abandon the moral relationship?  To do 
so would be to stop treating them as a rational being, and it is hard to see how that 
could ever be permissible, based on an action they have performed. 
 So there is a tension at the center of Scanlon’s account.  On the one hand he 
needs the moral relationship to be one that we stand in with every living person, and 
so it must depend only on those features shared by all living people.  On the other 
hand he needs the moral relationship to be such that it can be altered.  So he needs the 
moral relationship to both depend, and not depend, on someone’s status as a person.  
This is a tension he faces because he wants to make blame an attitude that is about 
relationships.  It is this commitment that I think needs to be jettisoned. 
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Chapter 2:  The Quality of Will Account 
1. Quality of Will and Incompatibilism 
 According to Scanlon we could blame people for their actions because of what 
their actions showed us about their attitudes, and because their attitudes impaired our 
relationship with them.  We have seen why the second conjunct should be dropped, 
but what about the first?  What about the claim that we can blame people for their 
actions because their actions show us something about their attitudes?  Michael 
McKenna, and Scanlon before he advanced his relationship account, claim that 
remarks Strawson makes elsewhere in his famous paper, having to do with the central 
importance we give to having and showing good will, shows that he accepts this 
constraint on praise and blame.
115
  As McKenna puts it, ‘for Strawson, the morally 
reactive attitudes are responses to the quality of will expressed in a person’s 
conduct.,”116 and because of this Strawson accepts that questions about “being morally 
responsible and legitimately holding morally responsible are to be settled exclusively 
in terms of the moral quality of will with which the agent acts.”117  Tentatively I will 
say that the Quality of Will Thesis amounts to the following: 
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QOW Thesis
118
:  A person, P, is open to the reactive attitudes, 
blame and praise on account of some action X iff action X indicates 
that P has some morally significant quality of will.  
  
 So now we have another way to develop Strawson’s position.  It is worth 
noting that the Quality of Will thesis does not provide support for the Abnormality 
argument
119
.  It may provide some support for the Actual Judgment argument.  The 
Actual Judgment argument failed because it failed to address the possibility of 
generalization strategies. A compatibilist could employ the Quality of Will Thesis to 
block a generalization strategy.  An incompatibilist might say that our particular 
reasons for exempting and excusing are just expressions of our commitment to a 
general principle like ‘Do not blame people for what they can avoid’.  The Quality of 
Will Thesis is a competitor with such incompatibilist principles, and one which does 
not imply anything in particular when conjoined with determinism. 
 At the very least the Quality of Will Thesis, if true, makes things harder for the 
incompatibilist.  On any normal analysis of ‘avoid’, the ‘Do not blame people for what 
they cannot avoid’ principle looks like it, conjoined with the thesis of determinism, 
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implies that we are not blamable for what we do.  There is no such obvious 
implication with the Quality of Will Thesis.  But that does not mean that there is no 
such implication.    The incompatibilist can press two points.  The first starts with the 
question, ‘Are we responsible for the quality of our wills?’  If the Quality of Will 
Thesis gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, we cannot 
be responsible or for qualities of our will, but only actions.  But the incompatibilist 
will say that they have asked a sensible question, and so that it is not just a category 
mistake to ask whether we are responsible for the qualities of our will.  If it is not a 
category mistake, then we can be responsible for the qualities of our will or we can fail 
to be responsible for the moral qualities of our will, and the incompatibilist can safely 
appeal to the following principle; if X is explanatorily sufficient for Y and we are 
responsible for Y, then we are responsible for X
120
.  The best explanation of why it is 
that actions express or indicate the quality of one’s will is that one’s quality or 
qualities of will explain the action.  So, if the incompatibilist can fairly appeal to a 
transfer of non-responsibility principle, the Quality of Will Thesis is left only with the 
implausible theory that each quality of will is one we are responsible for, which means 
that it indicates some other quality of will.  The only way, it seems to me to avoid this 
conclusion is to argue either that the incompatibilist cannot appeal to a transfer of non-
responsibility principle, or argue that it is, contrary to how it seems, some kind of 
category error to ask of a quality of our will whether we are responsible for it.  
 The second point that the incompatibilist is likely to press is the more 
interesting of the two, and the more likely to express a deep problem.  Some 
incompatibilists will claim that for our wills to have a moral quality at all, that quality 
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must be one we autonomously chose to have, or at least it must be a reflection of our 
autonomy.  They will claim that autonomy is central to morality, that it is our 
autonomy that makes us moral agents, and that no morally praiseworthy quality can 
hold of us if we are not autonomous.  With these claims in hand they will then go on 
to claim that autonomy requires freedom in a strong enough sense that it is 
incompatible with determinism.  The claim here is not that the Quality of Will thesis is 
false, but that appealing to it to settle the issue between compatibilists and 
incompatibilists misses the point, because any plausible account of moral worth brings 
along with it commitments that are in tension with determinism. 
 So there are two ways in which incompatibilist can respond to the Quality of 
Will thesis, on the one hand by questioning whether qualities of will can be the 
fundamental facts about responsibility at all, and the other by claiming that the Quality 
of Will thesis, when its presuppositions are laid bare, is potentially an incompatibilist 
principle.  Now I do not think any account of blaming and praising is going to give 
compatibilists the resources to rebut the criticism that to have a will with moral 
qualities we require the kind of freedom that is incompatible with determinism.  But 
even if this route to the incompatibilism is not ruled out by the Quality of Will thesis, 
if it could rule out all the other ones, then this would be a significant achievement.  If 
it could answer the problem of the recursiveness of moral responsibility, along with 
show why it is that the ability to do otherwise and being an ultimate source of one’s 
actions are irrelevant to whether or not a person is morally responsible for her actions, 
then the view would be very significant.  So it is worth looking into whether the 
Quality of Will thesis, or something like it, is true. 
 On the Quality of Will thesis to blame someone is just to make a judgment 
about their will, and to blame someone is justified if and only if the person knows that 
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the judgment is true.
121
  What kind of judgments are these?  I take it that the paradigm 
judgments are one’s like ‘He acted cowardly’ or ‘He acted in a very caring way.’  
Such judgments explicitly relate actions to psychological features the agent might 
have.
122
  But blaming judgments could take different forms as well.  ‘That was rude’ is 
an assertion that is technically about an action, but it identifies a feature of an action 
that typically is explained by someone having a certain quality of will.    There are 
some arguments against the thesis that blaming consists entirely in a judgment that 
strike me as odd.  The first is the association of this thesis with the ‘moral ledger’ 
account of moral responsibility.  This account, put forward by Jonathan Glover
123
 says 
that when we blame someone we are doing something like record keeping.
124
  To 
blame someone is to hold something against them by marking it down in their moral 
ledger.  This account is very odd, and almost no one who writes on praise and blame 
accepts it.  It suggests that what we care about in blaming and praising is not the 
rightness or wrongness of the action for which we are blaming and praising the person, 
but how this affects the overall judgment of that person’s life.  And not only is it not 
true that we care about such an overall evaluation more than the evaluation of the 
person for a particular action, it is not clear we care about the overall evaluation at all.  
This is not to deny that we care about the character of a person.  We do.  But the moral 
ledger is not the same thing as character.  A person with a long history of lying can 
become honest, for example. 
 The moral ledger account has little to say for it, but there is no reason to think 
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that the thesis that blaming is constituted by a judgment implies the moral ledger 
account.  The moral ledger account goes beyond the thesis that blaming consists in 
making a judgment and gives an account of what type of judgment we are making and 
why we should care about that judgment.  The Quality of Will thesis need make no 
such particular commitments simply in affirming that blaming consists in a 
judgment.
125
  Another point worth making is that the Quality of Will thesis need not 
be committed to the claim that blaming does not involve an emotional aspect.
126
  As 
we saw in the discussion of the Emotion View, there are some ways of thinking about 
emotions on which they include judgments, so that one could make a judgment about 
someone’s quality of will by being resentful, for example. 
 So some common reasons to reject the Quality of Will thesis fail.  Does the 
Quality of Will thesis rule out traditional incompatibilism?  It has been argued, by 
Nomy Arpaly, that on a certain interpretation of incompatibilism it does.  I said earlier 
that the best way to understand the incompatibilist position was as a moral position, 
specifically a position concerning how it was fair to treat people given certain facts 
about how the world works.  There are more reasons to accept that incompatibilism is 
a doctrine about how it is fair to treat people than just the usefulness of this 
interpretation for responding to Strawson.  One good reason to accept incompatibilist 
principles like the principle of alternative possibilities or the principle of transfer of 
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non-responsibility, or a control principle of moral responsibility, is that these 
principles reflect basic norms governing fair treatment of persons.  So a reason to 
accept the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is that it seems to follow from an 
intuitive principle which says that it is not fair to treat someone differently on account 
of something they could not avoid.  In addition, as I said before, this way of 
interpreting incompatibilism removes any air of over-intellectualization from that 
position. 
2. Arpaly’s Challenge to Fairness Based Incompatibilism 
It might seem that if the Quality of Will thesis is correct then incompatibilism 
so interpreted just has to be false.  As Arpaly says: 
 
“Punishing a person is an action: it is something one does.  Blaming a 
person is not an action – I might blame Brutus for the death of Caesar 
without doing anything – though the verb to blame can also be used to 
refer to the act of notifying someone that you blame a person.  The 
observation is hardly new, yet philosophers tend to dismiss the 
difference between blaming and punishing or remonstrating; we discuss 
whether it is fair to blame a person as if the question were equivalent to 
the question of whether it is fair to punish the person.  This is a 
category mistake.  The primary sense in which I can be fair or unfair in 
blaming someone is the sense in which believing that Ron is an idiot 
might be fair if Ron is an idiot and unfair if Ron is not.  The primary 
sense in which I can be fair or unfair in punishing someone is the sense 
in which my calling Ron an idiot might be fair if he has just called me a 
moron and unfair if he has never been rude to me.”127 
 
There are two points made here, one of them used to argue for the other.  First Arpaly 
says that blaming is not an action, and, I take it, argues from this claim to the fact that 
different standards of fairness are at issue in blaming than are at issue in punishing.  I 
object to both points.  I do not think that making the judgments involved in blaming 
and praising differ significantly from action, and so I think it can sometimes be unfair 
to believe something that is true and that you would be epistemically justified in 
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believing is true.  So to continue Arpaly’s example, let’s say all the evidence is in 
support of Ron being an idiot, the evidence is substantial, and there is no reason to 
think that it is pointing you in the wrong direction because of peculiarities about this 
case.  It still might be unfair to Ron to think that he is an idiot.  Do we really think it is 
fair to think of Ron as an idiot when the reason Ron is an idiot is because his mother 
drank herself silly every night she was pregnant?  I don’t think so.  I think it would be 
wrong of us to think to ourselves ‘Ron is a real idiot’.   
2.1  Judgments and Actions 
Arpaly’s first point, that blaming is not an action, is just wrong I think.  
Certainly blaming is not necessarily a public action, and Arpaly is right to insist that 
notifying someone that we blame them is not the same thing as blaming them.  It is 
compatible with this that blaming is a private action.  What about the example of 
blaming Brutus for the murder of Caesar?  What action is being performed in blaming 
Brutus?  I agree with Arpaly that it is not the act of exclaiming ‘Damn you Brutus!’ or 
anything like that.  I suggest that the action is that of coming to believe something 
along the lines of ‘Brutus wrongfully killed Caesar,’ or deciding that Brutus 
wrongfully killed Caesar, or assenting to the proposition that Brutus wrongfully killed 
Caesar.
128
   
It might be thought that this is not an action, but I see no reason to think that, 
especially given that we are wondering whether it is an action for the purpose of 
deciding what standards of fairness attach to it.  After all Jane can ask Tom to not 
think ill of her for going to Europe for the summer instead of spending the last months 
before college with him, and if Tom does promise this and goes on to think ill of her, 
Tom is being unfair to Jane.  He is being unfair because he promised not to do that.  
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So believing something or thinking in certain ways can be unfair, and can be the kind 
of thing we promise to do.  What reason is there to deny that they are actions?
129
   
2.1.1.  Doxastic Voluntarism 
The most popular reason given as to why coming to believe something is not 
an action has to do with the voluntariness of beliefs.  Actions are directly under our 
control, and beliefs are not, the argument would go.
130
  The claim that beliefs are not 
under our control or are less under our control than our actions are is actually a 
problem for fairness based incompatibilism in a more direct way than just by 
suggesting that beliefs are not actions.  If our beliefs are not under our control, then 
even if coming to believe something or making a judgment might count as an action, it 
looks as though it is not the kind of thing we could be obligated to either do or refrain 
from doing.  Why?  To see consider two claims: 
 
Doxastic Involuntarism:  No one has the ability to believe X when they also 
believe that there is conclusive evidence that X is false. 
Ought Implies Can:  If X ought to Y, then X has the ability to Y. 
 
What these two principles together entail is that no one can have an obligation to 
believe something that they believe there to be conclusive evidence against.  I take the 
argument from Doxastic Involuntarism and Ought Implies Can to be unsound, 
because I think Ought Implies Can is false.  More importantly though the implication 
of this argument is perfectly acceptable to me, as my case that praise and blame can 
sometimes be unfair does not require that we have obligations to believe something 
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one believes the evidence shows conclusively is false.   
 It is not because I think that while reasons of fairness sometimes speak against 
making certain judgments there are no duties to refrain from making those judgments.  
There being reasons of fairness against X amounts to there being a pro tanto duty to 
refrain from X-ing, and so in some circumstances there will be all things considered 
duties to not make certain judgments.  So there are obligations related to beliefs.  This 
does not imply that we are obligated to believe something we believe we have good 
evidence is false.  It is important to see that one can defend fairness-based 
incompatibilism against Arpaly’s attack simply by establishing that it is sometimes 
unfair to make certain judgments about people that are well supported by the evidence.  
This conclusion is not threatened by the argument from Doxastic Involuntarism and 
Ought implies Can for two reasons.  One is that it does not require that people 
believe anything, and the other is that it does not require anything about cases where 
the evidence conclusively establishes the truth of some proposition.  Incompatibilists 
do not claim that if determinism is true then we ought to praise rather than blame, or 
vice versa.  Incompatibilists claim that we should do neither, and according to the 
Quality of Will Account refraining from praising and blaming is the same as 
refraining from making certain kinds of judgments.  The judgments in question are 
judgments concerning the quality of another person’s will, and such judgments are 
always made under uncertainty.  Often a person’s own intentions, desires and values 
are not clear even to them.  They are usually less clear to others.  So when we blame 
and praise people, according to the Quality of Will Account we are making decisions 
that are strictly speaking underdetermined by the evidence. 
 What is clear is that we need some stronger version of Doxastic 
Involuntarism.  So let me suggest: 
 
  72 
Strong Doxastic Involuntarism:  No one has the ability to believe something 
she takes to be not best supported by the evidence and no one has the ability to 
refrain from believing something she takes to be well-supported by the 
evidence. 
 
Strong Doxastic Involuntarism does, when conjoined with Ought implies Can 
entail that there can be no obligation to refrain from making a judgment that is best 
supported by the evidence.  This would mean that considerations of fairness could not 
apply to praise and blame beyond considerations of evidential fairness.  So if Strong 
Doxastic Involuntarism and Ought implies Can are both true, then the Quality of 
Will Account is not neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism. 
 I have already said that I think that Ought implies Can is false, so why don’t I 
just deny the soundness of the argument by denying Ought implies Can?  There are 
two reasons.  The first is that Ought implies Can is a widely accepted and the case 
against it relies on claims in ethics and meta-ethics which are, if anything, generally 
thought less plausible even than the denial of Ought implies Can.  The second reason 
is that even though I think Ought implies Can is false, there is a similar principle 
which is almost certainly true and would do all the work in the argument that Ought 
implies Can does.  In brief, Ought implies Can would be true if the correct analysis 
of ability was some kind of conditional analysis of ability.  Unfortunately the 
conditional analysis of ability is false
131
, but this should not stop us from appreciating 
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 As a universal account of what we mean by the word ‘can’ or the word ‘ability’ the conditional 
analysis is a failure.  There are just some occasions where people utter those words and do not mean 
what the classical compatibilist supporters of the conditional analysis said they do.  This does not 
automatically show that the conditional analysis is not the proper analysis of the words ‘can’ and 
‘ability’ in contexts in which principles like Ought implies Can is uttered.  In certain contexts the 
conditional analysis looks like the appropriate one.  When asking whether a bridge can support a large 
truck, what we are asking is whether, if you put the truck on the bridge the bridge would stay up.  I say 
confidently that the conditional analysis is false because it looks like in contexts where moral questions 
are at issue the conditional analysis is the wrong analysis.  Keith Lehrer (1968) has provided examples 
in which the conditional analysis gives the wrong answer to the question, ‘Could he have done X’, and 
these examples are of just the kinds of cases that would raise moral issues.  Is it possible that we can 
distinguish contexts in a more fine-grained way, such that there is one sense of ‘can’ in cases of Ought 
implies Can which is not operative in other moral contexts?  We could, but it is hard to see how such a 
parsing of contexts and senses could amount to an argument for a compatibilist position.  At most it 
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that everyone who is part of the free will debate seems to accept the following 
principle: 
 
Ought implies Conditional Ability:  If X ought to Y, then it must be the case 
that if X φ-ed Y-ing, then X would have Y-ed.   
In this definition φ is a placeholder for some kind of mental item, be it an event or 
state.  Different versions of the conditional analysis of ability substitute different 
mental items for φ.  Some substitute ‘choosing’, while some substitute ‘intending to’ 
and others substitute ‘have one’s strongest desire in favor of’ for φ.  The details are 
very important if one is interested in defending a conditional analysis of ability.  I am 
not.  As an account of the meaning of the English words ‘can’ and ‘ability’ I think the 
conditional analysis is hopeless.  More plausible is a view on which the truth of some 
conditional is necessary and sufficient for a person to have the ability in question, but 
on which no claims about meaning are made.  But even such a conditional account of 
ability faces problems, some of which I will talk about at the end of chapter four.  
 But for present purposes, it is not necessary to defend either a conditional 
analysis of ‘ability’ or a conditional account of the nature of ability.  It is just enough 
to point out that almost everyone is going to agree to Ought implies Conditional 
Ability and that taken together with a suitably revised version of Strong Doxastic 
Involuntarism, this weaker principle entails that it cannot be the case that we are 
obligated to not make judgments that are well supported by the evidence.  So for 
fairness based incompatibilism to be consistent with the Quality of Will Account, 
Strong Doxastic Involuntarism must be false. 
I will argue that Strong Doxastic Involuntarism is false.  Strong Doxastic 
Involuntarism says that we cannot refrain from making judgments that we think are 
well supported by the evidence.  But it is relatively obvious that this is false.  We 
                                                                                                                                            
could show how a compatibilist could talking about free will without giving up on her commitment to 
any intuitively plausible principle. 
  74 
refrain from making the judgments we take to be best supported by the evidence all 
the time.  There are more intellectual vices than just ignorance.  Intellectual laziness, 
intellectual cowardice and other forms of lacking intellectual integrity all lead to 
people not drawing conclusions that they know are well supported by the evidence.  If 
I am presented with compelling evidence that my friend has betrayed me, we do not 
need to attribute to me ignorance of the facts or some kind of logical error, if I refuse 
to make the judgment that my friend betrayed me.  Perhaps I found the thought so 
loathsome I simply start thinking of something else entirely, like what I need to get at 
the store today.  Perhaps I grew angry and immediately took my anger out on 
something that has nothing to do with issue of my friend betrayal, like the poor 
functioning of my phone.   If the doctrine of doxastic involuntarism forces us to deny 
that such events occur, then the doctrine is simply false. 
     The defender of the doctrine might rightly point out here that she makes 
exceptions for self-deception, but wrongly be tempted to say that there is self-
deception going on here, that in refusing to draw the conclusion I know to be 
warranted I am fooling myself or tricking myself.  But this is implausible.  How can I 
be deceived about the issue if all my beliefs about the issue are true?  I haven't made a 
judgment that I might have made, that would have been true, but I haven't deceived 
myself at any point.  So I think it is obvious that whether or not we make certain 
judgments can be determined by our will, in that we can simply decide to do 
something besides finish thinking the issue all the way through. 
     But is this 'stopping short' move the kind of connection between the will and 
judgment that I need?  Can it be used by someone who has good evidence that X to 
not make the judgment that X, because X is unfair?  It seems not, because in thinking 
about the unfairness of judging that X, one is still basically engaging in the same 
activity, that of considering whether one ought to judge that X.   Let us say Jack has 
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been presented with evidence that his wife is unfaithful.  Jack sees the evidence and 
knows it is substantial, but also knows that he owes his wife some trust and faith, 
because he promised to give her that trust and faith.  So he knows that it is unfair to 
judge that she is committing adultery.
132
  Perhaps at the moment he realizes that the 
evidence points towards the fact that she has committed adultery he thinks to himself 
'It would be unfair of me to think that' and to stop himself from thinking it, 
immediately starts thinking about something else.  This might work, but it is odd to 
say that Jack could think about the proposition 'My wife has cheated on me' well 
enough to realize it is unfair, but not well enough to come to believe it, given that the 
evidence is right in front of him.  It seems that a more natural way to describe what is 
going on is to say that Jack comes to believe that his wife cheated on him, and then 
represses that belief, or disavows it right afterward.
133
 
 In any case, to assimilate all cases of refraining from making a judgment to 
cases of ‘stopping short’ would be incorrect.  We do not always refrain by means of 
this kind of manipulation of what has our attention.  Sometimes we consider a thought 
and refuse to endorse it, or commit ourselves to it as true.  Think of Descartes in the 
first several Meditations.  A wide range of beliefs occur to him, and occur to him 
naturally as the explanations of the experiences he is having,  but he refuses to assent 
to them.  In Descartes’ case he refrains because he has accepted the principle that any 
proposition which might be false is one that cannot serve as the foundation of 
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 One might think that if the evidence suggests she has committed adultery, and thus broken her own 
promises, that Jack is no longer bound by his own promises.  That might be true.  But I take it that the 
promises Jack made ought to enter into the argument earlier.  Given that Jack promised trust and faith, 
he ought not think 'my wife is an adulterer' without the evidence being overwhelming, so as to lead to 
near certainty.  This standard of evidence is not the same, I take it, as the standards one ought to use in 
normal belief formation.  So let me add to the case that the evidence before Jack is good enough to meet 
the standards for normal belief justification, but fall short of the near certainty required for him to 
believe that his wife is an adulterer without at the same time treating her unfairly. 
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 It might be that the demands of fairness are such that this would be enough to count as Jack treating 
his wife fairly.  I do not think that making the judgment and then disavowing it would work for the 
issue of fairness in praising and blaming. 
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knowledge.  Descartes refrains from judgment for theoretical or epistemic reasons, and 
so it might be that his case can be accommodated by Strong Doxastic Involuntarism.  
But, in this case a thought reliably occurs to Descartes, and occurs to him as the 
proposition best supported by the evidence, and it is only on reflection that he comes 
to reject the proposition, not because it is not best supported by the evidence but 
because it is not well supported enough by the evidence.  There is a difference 
between a thought occurring to one as correct, and assenting to the proposition, or 
making the corresponding judgment.   
 I think that Strong Doxastic Involuntarism is false because it treats 
everything that can fairly be described as ‘coming to have a belief’ as similar to the 
occurrence of a thought that seems correct.  Plausibly we do not have any control over 
the occurrence of such thoughts.  But that does not mean that we have no control over 
the attitude we take to such thoughts.  We can make the judgment that the propositions 
are correct, or we can refrain from doing so.  And it seems to me that my control over 
doing so is just the same as my control over whether I pour a glass of juice in the 
morning.  I think we are all aware of cases where we refrain from making the 
judgment that seems right on the basis of theoretical reasons, and as I said this is not a 
case that need trouble the strong doxastic involuntarist.  When we refrain from 
assenting to a proposition because we have adopted higher than normal standards of 
evidence, even though our judgment is not determined entirely by our judgment about 
the balance of evidence, it is still being determined by the evidence in a way,  because 
it is being determined by principle about the evidence, in this case a very rigorous one.  
The question is whether we ever refrain from assenting to a proposition for non-
theoretical reasons.   
 That people do this is a settled fact of common sense, but of course that 
doesn’t make it obviously true.  Arguments very often end with one or both parties 
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complaining that the other is not being reasonable and just believing what he wants to 
believe.
134
  People resist conclusions of arguments for which they have no adequate 
response when the conclusion threatens a belief around which they  have structured 
their life, or which makes their life seem significant or meaningful.  If distaste with a 
belief, or a desire to continue living as one has can led a person to refrain from making 
a judgment in accordance with the evidence, why can’t moral principles do the same?  
Why couldn’t principles of fairness lead people to refrain from making judgments 
about the quality of another person’s will?  And if it would be unfair to make a certain 
judgment, then why wouldn’t it be the case that we ought to refrain from making that 
judgment?  Is there ever, in cases of decision under uncertainty, a comparable 
epistemic obligation to make a judgment?  I doubt it.  So, the hypothesis is the making 
of judgments of certain kinds is subject to standards of fairness. 
2.1.2  Doxastic Transparency 
One fact Arpaly might point to is that we do not always know what our beliefs 
are, and it is commonly thought that we are always aware of our own actions.  In fact, 
some have claimed that it is an essential feature of actions that we have direct 
unmediated knowledge of them, and that is certainly not true of beliefs.
135
  Our beliefs 
are often a mystery to us.  Often when we reconstruct our own reasoning about a 
problem we find that we cannot understand it without appealing to beliefs we did not 
at the time know we had.  We can have unconscious beliefs of course, and while we 
can come to know what those are, usually doing so requires the help of a professional.  
Perhaps the easiest way to appreciate this supposed difference is to think about 
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ability to refrain from making a judgment is in our power.  In some cases the ability to refrain might 
suffice for being able to believe what one wants.  Suppose one comes to believe something as the result 
of evidence and later on is presented with more evidence, so that the balance of evidence now supports 
changing one’s mind.  I think that people have the ability to refrain from doing so, thus leaving them 
with the original belief, with which presumably they are more comfortable. 
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dispositional beliefs.  Dispositional beliefs are beliefs which we have, but which are 
not currently occurring to us.  But even when I am not thinking about black holes, as I 
usually am not, I still have the belief that for every black hole there is a singularity.  I 
know this because of how unsurprising it is for me when, after having been prompted 
for information about black holes, I say something like ‘Well every black hole has a 
singularity.’  I did not just discover the belief all over again, I simply recalled it from 
where it was being kept.  But sometimes, when we have not had to recall a belief for a 
while, it can take some time to recall what it is.  We might think to ourselves, ‘Where 
did I come down on the question in the end?’  Sometime we even try to remember the 
very last occasion on which we confidently announced our view on the issue, so as to 
remember which view is ours.  This is not a form of direct unmediated knowledge, this 
is knowledge by inference. 
This would be a significant worry if it were true that all actions are such that 
we have direct unmediated knowledge of them, but there is reason to be suspicious of 
this claim.  Some of the same problems that faced beliefs can be brought up with 
regards to actions.  We are not, for example, conscious of all our actions.  The well 
worn example of the driver not realizing he had already taken his exit is well worn 
because it is a good one.  The driver turns the wheel exactly as much as he should in 
order to take exactly the lane he needs to in order to get where he is going, so this is no 
mere twitch.  It is also something the driver is not aware of until after it happens and 
he comes to know it happened by inference.  He looks around, realizes he is on a 
different highway than the last time he checked, and figures out that he must have 
taken the exit without being aware of it.  And what he is aware of is the fact that he 
took the correct exit, that is, he is aware of an action he performed.  If he took the exit 
because it is normal route home, but today he was making a delivery to somewhere 
that required his taking a different exit, his failure can fairly be attributed to him, 
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rather than his muscles, as with a twitch, some external force, as with non-actions like 
falling down, or to bad luck, as with accidental behaviors such as stepping on 
someone’s foot.  Now defenders of the claim that we have direct unmediated 
knowledge of our actions have responses to criticisms of this kind.  Perhaps the claim 
will be restricted from ‘All actions are such that we have direct unmediated knowledge 
of them’ to ‘All non-habitual actions are such that we have direct unmediated 
knowledge of them’.   
Such a revision would take care of the driving example, and might provide us 
with a true claim.  The question is whether this claim is any longer of interest.  The 
best argument, based on this claim, that someone like Arpaly could give is that beliefs 
are not non-habitual actions.  And one might wonder whether the implications of the 
classificatory claim are interesting.  It was certainly interesting to be told that blaming 
was not an action because to blame someone is just to believe certain things about 
them.  That something is an action is of immediate moral importance.  Certain 
standards apply to actions that do not apply to other kinds of events.  But is there any 
special significance to ‘non-habitual action’ over and above the significance of 
‘action’?  I do not think so. 
And even if there were there is every reason to meet the revision from ‘action’ 
to ‘non-habitual action’ with some similar revision about the kind of belief we are 
talking about.  Arpaly claims that blaming cannot be an action because it is a kind of 
belief.  And perhaps not all beliefs are actions, but that does not mean some aren’t.  
Perhaps having an occurrent belief is an action.  It certainly seems to be something we 
have direct access to in the same way we do our own actions. 
3.  Judgments and Fairness 
So the argument from blame’s status as a non-action to the different standards 
of fairness for blame and punishment is unsound.  We have duties of fairness 
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concerning private mental events like blaming, just as we do concerning public actions 
like punishing.  But this does not mean that the same considerations can count in favor 
of or against blaming as count in favor of or against punishment.  Whether we punish 
people, and the extent to which we punish them is determined in part by matters of 
social policy.  Truth and Reconciliation tribunals will often withhold punishment of 
those who deserve blame because it is the only way to achieve certain social goods.  
We punish negligence in ways that far outstrip worthiness of blame; if Jack slips on 
Oliver’s sidewalk because Oliver has not taken the time to shovel the snow off it, 
Oliver is open to sanctions that outstrip his blameworthiness.  Oliver did not intend to 
make Jack slip, did not think, let us suppose, that by not shoveling someone would be 
made to slip, and did not fail to think things through.  I am imagining that Oliver 
thought to himself, no one will be out in such a storm, and Oliver thought this because 
Oliver could not imagine going out in the storm himself.  I think Oliver is morally to 
blame to some extent.  The thought that it was possible that someone would be out in 
that storm ought to have occurred to him, and he ought to have, in reaction to that 
realization, shoveled the snow just in case.  But in the context of punishment there is a 
burden that has to be put on someone, the burden of paying for Jack’s medical care 
and making up for the time Jack has lost.  And it seems clear that burden should fall 
on Oliver, regardless of how blameworthy Oliver is. 
So punishment and blame are not subject to all the same standards.  But are 
they as different as Arpaly thinks them to be?  I think they are not.  Recall that 
according to Arpaly, “The primary sense in which I can be fair or unfair in blaming 
someone is the sense in which believing that Ron is an idiot might be fair if Ron is an 
idiot and unfair if Ron is not.”136  I have two criticisms to make, one which I think is 
obviously correct, and the other which is less than obviously correct.  Luckily the 
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obviously correct criticism can be used to prop up its weaker partner.  To start with it 
is certainly not fair to Ron to believe he is an idiot just because he is an idiot.  One 
might have no reason to think Ron is an idiot.  Perhaps you are Ron’s cousin and only 
see him on the holidays, and during those gatherings he never acts like an idiot.  One 
would be treating Ron unfairly to think that is he is an idiot, because one’s belief that 
he is an idiot could not have been reached by a fair evaluation of the evidence.  As I 
will put it there are reasons of evidentiary fairness that make it unfair to believe that 
Ron is an idiot in this case. 
How far do reasons of evidentiary fairness go towards restricting the 
judgments it is fair to make?  They cover cases where the evidence at your disposal 
shows that the belief in question in false.  They should also rule out making the 
judgment that X is a coward when you know that there might be information which 
shows that X is not a coward, and that you could rather easily gain access to that 
information.  Similarly obvious is that it is unfair to judge that X is a coward without 
considering certain forms of evidence that are always relevant to judgments of 
cowardice.  It would be unfair, for example, to judge that soldier was a coward for 
retreating without knowing whether he had been ordered to retreat, or without 
knowing what the costs of not retreating are.   
 There are, however, less obvious ways to violate the duty to evidentiary 
fairness.  Even if one has, relative to a particular situation, all the evidence that one 
can be reasonably expected to gather, and all that evidence supports a particular 
judgment, if you also know that there are some regular ways in which evidence fails in 
cases of this sort, evidentiary fairness would demand that one withhold judgment.  So, 
for example, if all the eyewitness testimony in a criminal case supports judgment X, 
but the judge and jury know that eyewitness testimony tends to be unreliable in cases 
of this sort, then rules of evidentiary fairness would demand that we do not endorse X, 
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even though all the available evidence is in favor of X.   
 So it is not the case that it is fair to belief p just because p is true, nor is it fair 
to believe p just because one has more evidence for p than against it, nor even is it true 
that it is fair to believe p just because one has more evidence for p than against it and 
that evidence is normally sufficient for justification.  And this all from principles of 
fairness that concern how to deal with evidence.  But what seems pretty clear to me is 
that there are principles of fairness governing belief that go beyond principles of 
evidentiary fairness.   
I think it is clear that historical considerations can alter what judgments are fair 
to make about a person.  In Ron’s case I have already said that I think it is unfair to 
Ron to think of him as stupid if his stupidity is the result of prenatal neglect.  
Something similar goes for the athletic adult who sees competitors in the Special 
Olympics and says to themselves ‘I am so much more athletic than them.’137  This 
could certainly be true.  Nonetheless it is just wrong to think that.  One should not 
think that.  And, I think, one shouldn’t think it not because it isn’t true, but because to 
evaluate those athletes in this way is unfair to them.   Ron’s idiocy and the Special 
Olympics do not involve moral judgments of the kind that Arpaly thinks are involved 
in blame.   
To remedy this problem let us consider Aunt Harriet.  Aunt Harriet has had it 
hard.  She was married early, against her will, because of pregnancy.  After she lost 
the baby she stayed married, against her will, because of Catholicism.  Her husband 
neglected her and every few months abused her until the day he died with huge debt 
hanging over the two of them, which Aunt Harriet had to spend the rest of her life 
working off.  Now in her 70s she is terribly rude to everyone.  She never sets out to 
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 Distinguish this judgment from one that says ‘I am so much more impressive than they are, because I 
am more athletic.’  This judgment simply isn’t true.  Competitors in the Special Olympics have faced 
and overcome obstacles that are far more significant than the extra minute they might take to run the 
mile. 
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hurt people, but she says very rude things and fails to be considerate of others’ 
feelings.  Is Harriet unkind?  Yes.  Is she a rude person?  Yes.  Is it fair to think to 
yourself ‘Aunt Harriet is rude hateful woman’?  No, it isn’t fair.  She is rude because 
of mistreatment.  Blaming her for her rudeness is unfair.  This is not to say that you 
should not take the evidence for her being vicious and unkind into account when 
planning, for example, whether to vacation with that side of the family with your 
sensitive young son. The judgment that she is likely to hurt his feelings is distinct from 
the judgment involved in blaming her. 
4. Praising and Blaming as Benefiting and Harming 
 What could explain its being the case that reasons of fairness tell us that we 
ought not to make certain judgments, even when those judgments are just in our head?  
In order to answer this question I will have to argue for one of the central claims of my 
dissertation, that, on the Quality of Will account of praise and blame, to praise or 
blame a person is to benefit or harm them.   
 
PBBH: If X praises Y, X benefits or does good for Y, and if X blames 
Y then X harms Y. 
This claim is central to two of the broad goals of the dissertation, that of providing a 
conception of moral responsibility that is neutral between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism about determinism and free will and moral responsibility, and that 
there is an argument for incompatibilism that does not rely on contested concepts like 
control or ability.  How claiming that praising and blaming constitutes benefiting and 
harming would help establish a neutral conception of moral responsibility is hopefully 
by now clear.   
 If the Quality of Will account of praising and blaming is correct, then praising 
and blaming involves, centrally, the making of judgments about the agent being 
praised or blamed.  As we have seen the Quality of Will account avoids the explicit 
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compatibilist commitments of the Relationship account and the Emotion account of 
praise and blame.  Arpaly has argued, however, that we are warranted in making the 
judgments involved in praising and blaming just in case those judgments are true.  
This leaves no room, as Arpaly points out, for considerations of fairness to play a role 
in determining whether we are warranted in praising or blaming people, because 
considerations of fairness do not have anything to do with whether the kinds of 
judgments involved in praise and blame are true or false.   
 This result is of significant concern for me, both because it undercuts my 
argument against the Quasi-Realist interpretation of the Emotion account, and because 
it would mean that the Quality of Will Account was ruled out by traditional 
incompatibilism.
138
  I have argued, by appeal to examples, that Arpaly is wrong and 
that considerations of fairness are relevant to the warrantability of the judgments 
involved in praising and blaming.  While I am entirely satisfied by that argument I 
anticipate that others will not be content with an argument that relies so heavily on 
suggestive examples, so I wish to present an argument from general principles.  The 
most controversial of those principles is that praising and blaming are instances of 
benefiting and harming.  It is for this reason that standard uncontroversial principles of 
fairness apply to making the moral judgments involved in praising and blaming, and 
why it is that the warrantability of those judgments depend not just on the truth of the 
judgments or even the evidence available in favor of the judgments but also the 
fairness of making the judgments. 
 The argument that praising and blaming can be unfair appeals to two 
principles, one of which is controversial, the other of which is nearly obvious.  The 
controversial principles is PBBH.  The nearly obvious principle is that it is unfair to 
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 It would still, as I said, be compatible with versions of incompatibilism which claim that 
determinism is incompatible with moral rightness or wrongness or that claim that determinism is 
incompatible with anyone having a morally worthy or unworthy will. 
  85 
harm or benefit someone that does not deserve to be harmed or benefited.   
4.1  Benefits, Harms and Fairness 
 While I think that the second principle is nearly obvious I have to admit that its 
entailments sound a bit odd.  It entails that when someone receives a benefit that they 
did not deserve, that is unfair.  This sounds harsh.  Don’t we praise, and by hypothesis 
benefit, children for things they do not deserve to be rewarded for?  Don’t we give 
people rewards all the time for things like winning the lottery or at gambling?  We 
certainly do those things.  The question is whether it is fair to do so.  What is odd 
about the principle is that it says that it is indeed unfair to benefit people in this way.  
Why should there be limits to how we ought to help people?  Isn’t it always right to 
help people?  And how could it be right to do what is unfair?  Another problem is that 
it is hard to see who we are being unfair to in cases of undeserved benefit.  It is hard to 
see how we could be acting unfairly towards the beneficiary.  He has no reason to 
complain, and being treated unfairly would provide him a reason to complain.  
Perhaps in many cases of undeserved benefit there is someone who did deserve that 
benefit but who did not receive it because some undeserving person did.  In that case 
the deserving person is being treated unfairly.  But it need not always be the case that 
there is some more deserving person being neglected when we benefit someone who 
does not deserve it.  And even when there is this seems as though it only matters when 
the benefit is scarce.  If the benefit is plentiful then to give it to the undeserving is not 
to neglect giving it to the deserving.  And praise is not a scarce resource, but one we 
can create anytime we need it. 
 I turn first to the problem of our praising children.  The problem is supposed to 
be that we praise children even though they cannot deserve it.  And in most cases I 
would question the second claim, that they do not deserve praise.  What is it about 
children that makes them improper targets for praise?  They are capable of 
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accomplishments, of succeeding where it is difficult and of overcoming obstacles.  
These are all proper occasions for praise.  They are not, however, necessarily 
occasions for moral praise, and that is what is at issue.  Do children ever deserve 
moral praise?  Sometimes they do, but sometimes they do not.  Presumably to have 
morally worthy qualities of will it has to be the case that one has some basic 
understanding of morally salient facts that children below a certain age simply don’t.  
So it is often said that children below a certain age are completely egocentric, in that 
they do not know that other people have intentional states, can suffer harm, etc.  It is 
hard to see how someone so cognitively underdeveloped could count as a moral agent, 
and so hard to see how they could deserve to be praised morally.  The question then 
becomes whether it is legitimate to praise children morally when they are in this state.  
 The answer, at least for my part, is no.  And I can’t see any reason to think it is.  
It is useful here to remember that praising and blaming, on the Quality of Will 
Account are not identified with any public actions.  Fundamentally they are the 
private actions involved in making certain kinds of judgments.  So even if we have a 
tendency to say the same thing to a child when she shares her toys that we say to the 
adult who makes a charitable donation, that does not mean we are actually praising the 
child.  We are acting as though we praise the child.  There are many benefits to doing 
so.  It is a good way to reinforce good behavior on the child’s part.  And because we 
are not actually praising her there is nothing unfair happening here. 
 What about cases where people are rewarded for victories that are matters of 
luck?  Lottery winners are rewarded for winning, and it is not clear that they deserve 
the money they are given just because they make a lucky guess.  But it isn’t unfair for 
them to be rewarded this way.  So we have an undeserved benefit that does not 
constitute an instance of unfairness and thus a counterexample.  Or so it appears.  In 
fact lottery winners very well might deserve the money they receive.  They were, after 
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all, promised that if they guessed correctly then they would receive the money.  As 
long as the promise met certain conditions, once it was made it became true that the 
winner would deserve the money.  What conditions are these?  Well the promise needs 
to have been made by a duly authorized agent of the government, or whatever 
institution is giving the money away.  Presumably the promise can’t be an instance of 
deep irrationality or evil.  If the promise was made by someone who thought that in 
making someone wealthy without having to work for it they would destroy the 
person’s character then perhaps the promise has no desert-making force.  That is why I 
commit myself to saying no more than that the lottery winner might deserve the 
money. 
 But what about the intuition that the lottery winner doesn’t deserve the money?  
Are we to think of it as simply the expressions of a confusion?  I think that the 
intuition expresses the fact that the lottery winner does not have a basic desert claim to 
the money, along with a prejudice against anyone getting anymore than they basically 
deserve.  What is it to basically deserve something?  To deserve it but not because 
some person or group decided that you deserve it.  Sometimes we do deserve things 
simply because someone else decided we deserve it.  When we are the beneficiary in a 
will we come to deserve what was willed to us just because the deceased said we did 
and certain defeating conditions are not present, such as it being the case that the 
deceased never had a right to give the bequeathed object away.  When in the midst of 
a dispute the disputants submit themselves to arbitration, the arbitrator can make it the 
case that one of the disputants deserves something by deciding that it is so.  Just like 
the case of the will, the arbitrator can only do this when certain defeating conditions 
are not present, such as the arbitrator having a conflict of interest.  Something similar 
might go for governments, assuming that their procedures and laws are just.  Basic 
desert, I am saying, cannot arise in the way that the desert in these cases arose.  X 
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cannot basically deserve Y just because someone said so, no matter who that person is.  
In what sense is basic desert basic?  Well in the cases of the arbitrator, the will, and 
the state, the desert could only be generated when certain defeating conditions were 
not present.  Those defeating conditions all had to do with whether the person 
generating the new desert themselves deserved to be making that decision.  The desert 
generated by the decision derived from the fact that the person making the decision 
deserved to be in that position.  So basic desert is to be contrasted with derived desert, 
and the desert that the lottery winner has with respect to his winnings is derived desert.  
The lottery winner deserves the money only because he was promised that money by a 
proper authority. 
 The intuition that he doesn’t deserve the money might simply come from a 
confusion.  It might be that people are confusing the lack of basic desert with the lack 
of desert.  But the roots of intuition probably go deeper.  There is, on the part of many, 
significant resistance to the idea that someone ought to be successful in life simply 
through the decisions of others.  While few people would endorse the claim that there 
is no derived desert, many people think that derived desert is very restricted, or at least 
that the more a person’s life is one they basically deserve, the more admirable or 
choiceworthy their life is.  I think this dislike of pervasive derived desert leads to 
people not wanting to acknowledge the derived desert, and so treat cases of derived 
desert as though there is no desert present at all.  While I am in agreement that derived 
desert should not pervade human affairs or even a single person’s life, I think we 
should resist the temptation to deny it altogether. 
 So while it has some prima facie odd consequences, the principle that it is 
unfair to harm or benefit someone who does not deserve to be harmed or benefited is 
plausible.  The principle that is hard to accept is PBBH.  This principle would not be 
hard to defend if I endorsed an account of praise and blame in which they were a kind 
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of public sanction or reward.  Everyone realizes that it harms people to be denounced 
in public and that it helps them to be lauded.   But praise and blame are not public 
rewards or sanctions.  Sanctions and rewards can express blame and praise, but blame 
and praise need not be expressed this way.  They need not be expressed at all.  Given 
the private nature of blame and praise, and given that we can blame and praise 
complete strangers and the long dead, how could PBBH be true? 
4.2  The Case for PBBH 
 I will start out by admitting a reason you might doubt PBBH.  It seems to grant 
perfect strangers incredible power over me.  According to PBBH if someone on the 
other side of the world that I have never met and never will meet blames me for 
something, they have managed to harm me.  This despite the difference, despite the 
fact that I could not possibly find out, and despite the fact that we have no relationship 
with one another.  How could this possibly be?  What aspect of my life is negatively 
impacted by a private mental event in the head of someone on the other side of the 
world?  How could an event which does not have any causal effect on how my life 
goes and is completely unknown to me harm me, or benefit me? 
 Let me start off by pointing out that the potential privacy of praise and blame 
does not seem to be an obstacle to it being good or bad for us.  Consider the following 
example: 
 
Insulated Father:  Jack very much wishes that his daughter would love 
and respect him.  He takes his role as a father to be the most important 
aspect of his life, and he would consider himself and his life a failure if 
his daughter did not love and respect him.  Jack’s daughter is extremely 
polite and kind, and would never, even if she did not respect or love her 
father, let him know that this was true.  Jack’s daughter is extremely 
accomplished at hiding her true emotions, and as a result Jack can 
never tell whether his daughter really loves and respects him, or 
whether she merely thinks he deserves to be treated kindly. 
 
It seems to me that Jack’s life goes better if it is the case that his daughter actually 
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loves and respects him,  but because of his daughter’s tendency to express only kind, 
polite emotional responses, whether or not she loves him is something he cannot come 
to know.  The privacy of the his daughter’s attitudes toward him do not present a 
barrier neither to her hating him being bad for him nor for her loving him being good 
for him.  If Jack were given the choice between a world where his daughter loved him 
but he never found that out and a world where his daughter despised him and he never 
found that out, does anyone doubt that Jack has good selfish reasons to prefer the 
former?  His life goes better in the world where she loves him because it means that a 
large and significant project of his, that of fatherhood, has not been in vain. 
 Privacy does not seem like it could be the reason why PBBH should be 
rejected.
139
  What about causal isolation?  Someone in Siberia who somehow hears of 
me and something I did could blame or praise me.  While I had some causal effect on 
him, there is no way for his blaming or praising me to have a causal effect on me or 
any part of my life.
140
  So how could it be that he could hurt or help me?  To see that 
causal explanation is not a problem consider the following example: 
 
Charles the Classicist Monk:  Charles is a monk in the early middle 
ages.  Charles has a deep and abiding love the classical works of 
Mediterranean civilization and sees that those works of art, science, 
literature and philosophy are under threat.  So Charles takes on the 
project of protecting as much of classical tradition as he can.  He 
spends all his time looking for classical works and finding places to 
hide them.  Charles has the ability to be this single minded because he 
is the abbot of a monastery, and so no important duties of his are being 
neglected.  Charles’ goal is to save as much as he can in a safe place 
that will only be found once the long train of uncouth barbarian 
invaders stops and the coarse Germanic hordes settle down and come to 
appreciate all that he has saved.  Charles realizes that this day will only 
occur, if it does at all, long after his death.  Charles dies with this 
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 According to some accounts of the good, privacy just has to matter.  On hedonistic and other mental 
state views the fact that Jack cannot find out means that his daughter’s private attitude towards cannot 
be good for Jack, except indirectly.  I argue against such views later. 
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 It might seem like I am begging the question against my own view, but I am not.  IF PBBH is 
correct than the Siberian blaming me just is harming me.  The relationship between the blame and the 
harm is not causal, it is logical or conceptual.   
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treasure of old books and scrolls safe, not knowing how things will turn 
out. 
 
I think that given Charles’ goals, his life was a better life if it is the case that his 
treasure trove is actually discovered by people who appreciate it, rather than being 
discovered and burned by illiterate barbarians.  The reason why it would be better is 
because on one outcome his life was lived in vain, and on the other it was not.  By 
adopting the project he did Charles brought his own good into close connection with 
something that would outlast him.  By organizing his life around the goal of making 
sure that facts in the far future obtained, he made it the case that if they did not come 
about, the actions in his life that were in service of achieving his goal were pointless.  
If this is right then for some people events that occur after they die can make a 
difference to how well their lives went.  It is hard to imagine a person being any more 
causally isolated from an event than by being deceased. 
 So the two most obvious reasons to deny PBBH, the privacy of blame and the 
potential causal isolation of blame, are not in general barriers to a state of affairs being 
good or bad for a person.  Are they problems more specifically for praise and blame 
though?  The question is pertinent because while causal isolation, for example, is not 
generally an obstacle for something being good for a person, it is an obstacle for 
certain states of affairs being good.  Food with good flavor, for example, is good for 
no one if it is causally isolated from everyone.  Words of encouragement is good for 
no one if they are kept private.  Why aren’t praising and blaming like that?  Put in 
other words, flavorful food seems good because it makes possible the experience of 
tasting flavorful food, and words of encouragement seem good because they can 
actually encourage those who hear them.  The question is whether praise can only be 
good because of how it contributes to the experience of being praised, and blame only 
bad because of how it contributes to the experience of being blamed. 
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 I do not think this is the case.  I think it is obviously not the case for praising 
and blaming done by certain people.  If those who we care about or respect blame us 
that is bad for us, and if they praise us that is good for us, whether or not we know or 
could ever know.  Of course proving that this is so is difficult.  One cannot after all 
bring someone to appreciate the fact that something they are incapable of knowing 
about is good or bad for them.  But I think there is some evidence for the claim, even 
if it is not dispositive.  Suppose you hear from a friend that a shared acquaintance, of 
whom you think very highly, believes that you live a trite meaningless life.  Certainly 
this will be distressing.  Why will it be distressing?  Those who question PBBH might 
be tempted to say that this is distressing because of how unpleasant the experience of 
finding out was.  Or they might wish to say that this knowledge now makes it 
impossible for you to interact with the shared acquaintance in anything like the way to 
which you have become accustomed.  These explanations surely explain some of why 
we would never want to face the situation of finding out that someone we respected 
did not respect us, but I do not think they explain everything.  While it is true that we 
would not want to find this out because the finding out is unpleasant, we still need to 
know why it is unpleasant.  What makes not being respected by one you respect so 
bad?  And the prudential concern one has for the smoothness of social engagements 
does not seem to explain why it is, upon finding out that someone thinks ill of you, 
that you feel as though something was wrong before finding out.  It is galling to think 
about a meeting in the past in which you now know the person you were meeting with 
thought poorly of you.  It is not always galling because you think they might be right.  
Nor is it always galling because you think they are wrong.  It is sometimes just the fact 
that they were thinking poorly of you then that you now find so galling.  It is hard to 
see why, if your concern is with future encounters with a person, finding out that they 
think poorly of you should lead to your being displeased about past encounters with 
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them. 
 The best explanation of what is going on in cases like that of the respected 
acquaintance who does not think much of you, is that you have a desire for the people 
you respect to think well of you.  When you find out that the desire has not been 
satisfied, you are upset about that fact, a fact which was true in the past and will be 
true in the future.  If I am right, that still does not provide an answer to the question of 
whether or not being blamed is bad for us in a way which allows for it to be bad for us 
even though it is private and causally isolated.  All I have shown, if I am right about 
why blame of any kind from those we care about is upsetting, is that we do not desire 
to be praised and not to be blamed in the way we desire flavorful food.  We do not 
desire praise because the experience of praise is so nice.  We just desire that we be 
praised.
141
  But that does not establish that praise is good and blame is bad, just that if 
praise is good it is good in a way that is immune to the worries of privacy and causal 
isolation, and so also with blame.  But it might be that praise is not good for people 
and blame not bad for people, because it might be that the desires I claim we have are 
desires we ought not have.  This is just the application of the well known point that 
just because you desire something does not make it good for you. 
 I think that not only are these desires not desires it is bad or wrong to have, 
they are desires that we ought to have.  In fact I think that we ought to care whether 
everyone else, not just friends and loved ones, praises or blames us.  I think this fact, 
that we ought to care about what everyone else thinks of us, morally speaking anyway, 
is strong evidence for PBBH.  There are two ways that our having such a duty would 
be evidence for PBBH.  The two ways correspond to two different relations that might 
obtain between obligations and intrinsically good states of affairs.  It might be that the 
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 To avoid sounding as though I am endorsing superficiality, let me remind the reader that praise, on 
the account I am considering is a judgment about someone’s quality. 
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explanation of why it is that we ought to care about what others think of the 
justifiability of our actions is that their praising us is intrinsically good for us and their 
blaming us is intrinsically  bad for us.  If this were the case then PBBH would not 
only be a true moral principle, it would be morally or ethically basic.  Alternately it 
might be that the fact that we ought care about what other people think of the 
justifiability of our actions is what makes it the case that praise is good for us and 
blame is bad for us. 
 There are moral theories according to which one or the other of these two 
explanations must be false.  Some extreme deontologists
142
 might be tempted to say 
that we never have a moral duty because of the intrinsic goodness of some state of 
affairs that the duty directs us to pursue.  Some extreme consequentialists might think 
that it is impossible for obligations to hold except for when they are obligations to 
promote intrinsically good state of affairs.  Those who subscribe to one or another 
extreme view can simply pick one kind of explanatory priority and not the other. I 
subscribe to neither and I can’t imagine why anyone would want to lessen the 
versatility of legitimate ethical thought by endorsing one of the extreme views.  As 
long as everyone is going to admit that one of these two relationships between 
intrinsic goodness and obligation could obtain, I am pleased to move on to objections 
to the claim that if we ought to desire to be praised and not to be blamed then we have 
good evidence that praise is good for us and blame is bad for us. 
First to why it is not wrong to desire that others praise us and not blame us.  
On the face of it such a desire appears shallow.  It is received wisdom that  people who 
attach a great deal of importance to what people think of them generally are shallow.  
So it is worth noting that PBBH is not meant as a principle covering every kind of 
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 So extreme that this characterization of deontology might be so narrow as to exclude Kant, given his 
commitment to the intrinsic goodness of rational nature and the role that goodness seems to play in 
some of the formulations of the Categorical Imperative. 
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praise or blame.  PBBH is meant only to apply to moral praise and moral blame, and 
there are other kinds.  We can praise someone for their artistic work without ever 
making any judgments as to the moral worth of her character or of her decision to 
create the artwork.  We can praise people athletically for their feats of strength or 
speed or agility.  While it might seem that we do not engage in artistic or athletic 
blame, that is, I think, only due to linguistic accident.  We do something very like 
blaming in athletic cases, when we make judgments like ‘It is Bill Buckner’s fault that 
the 1986 Red Sox lost the World Series.’  This is a judgment that assigns fault for an 
event that is significant, at least in the context of discussions of sports, or in any 
context in New England.  And it is not just the assignment of causal responsibility, 
because there are many factors that were equally causally relevant to the Red Sox 
losing the World Series that year.  So, for example, we do not think it was the general 
manager’s fault that the Red Sox lost because he signed Bill Buckner to a contract, 
even though Buckner’s mistake would not have been possible without that event.  We 
assign blame to Buckner because as the first baseman it was his task to catch 
grounders headed to first base, and had he done it the Red Sox would have won the 
World Series.   
 I am not claiming that we should care about artistic, athletic or any other form 
of praise and blame besides the moral form.  It would be shallow to care what perfect 
strangers thought of your shoes or your hair, but that does not mean it is shallow to 
care about what people think of the justifiability of your actions.
143
  And we are all 
already committed, I think, to the view that some people’s judgments about the 
justifiability of our actions are things that we ought to care about.  We ought to care 
about what our friends think of the justifiability of our actions, because not to do so 
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 I think the level of shallowness corresponds to the objective significance of the goods in question.  
Certainly there is some good involved in dressing well, perhaps even a good of an artistic or aesthetic 
kind, but it is certainly not among the more significant aesthetic goods, and there is no reason to give 
much thought to what random strangers think about it. 
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would be to treat the friend in a way that she does not deserve to be treated, given that 
she is a friend.  Most of us also think that it would be better for us if people we 
consider moral exemplars thought that our actions were justified.  These desires do not 
express any shallowness on our part.  Those we care about and respect are those 
whose moral opinions we care about.  Sometimes, as with respecting someone as a 
moral exemplar and perhaps with friendship, caring about their opinions in this way 
might be a constitutive feature of the relationship, while in others, such as that of 
family member it is simply an excellence of the relationship which is not essential to 
the relationship.  If there is a problem with desiring the praise of others and desiring 
not to be blamed, it is a problem with desiring this with regards to certain kinds of 
people, not a problem generally.  The two most problematic cases seem, to me 
anyway, to be praise and blame from strangers and praise and blame from the morally 
perverse, which I will examine soon. 
An objection related to praise and blame from strangers is that if there were a 
duty to care what everyone else thought of the justifiability of our actions, and we 
obeyed that duty, then we would make our own good far too dependent on the whims 
of others.  Imagine if some action of mine were held up for public scrutiny, such that 
everyone in the world was aware of it and able to form judgments about it.  Suppose 
that in this case all of them did form judgments and they all formed negative 
judgments.  All of the sudden according to PBBH 6 billion bad things just happened 
to me.  Shouldn’t 6 billion bad things happening to you ruin your life?  But isn’t it 
absurd to think that your life could be ruined because of 6 billion private mental 
events?  Imagine that you did not know that your action was publicized, and were just 
going about your day, when, all of the sudden, your life went from good to bad 
because 6 billion people just decided that you were a mean person.  That sounds 
perfectly absurd. 
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 I admit that if my view implied that X’s life could be ruined because a bunch 
of strangers thought ill of him, then my view would be false.  But there are ways to 
avoid that implication.  One way is to simply grab the other horn of the dilemma and 
claim that the harm involved in being blamed is infinitesimally small.  While this 
would provide a way out it would undermine the larger view, which is that principles 
of fairness can and do apply to praising and blaming.  If the harms involved in blame 
are infinitesimally small, then it is not plausible that it is unfair to inflict that harm on 
someone.  Fairness is not at issue for completely trivial benefits and harms, which is 
what praise and blame would amount to if blame were so inconsequential that no 
amount of blame could ruin someone’s life. 
 I prefer to pursue other another option, which is that there are non-trivial harms 
which are such that they cannot ruin someone’s life, no matter how often they happen.  
There are many examples of such harms.  Most of the examples share with blame and 
praise the property of being harms that a person need not be aware of to count as a 
harm.  So I take it that I am harmed to a small but not trivial extent when I miss out on 
some opportunity for fun.  Things go worse for me if I pass up a chance at an 
enjoyable party, or a relaxing day in the sunshine.  These harms are not trivial, 
because if someone else were to force me to suffer those harms when I did not deserve 
to suffer them, they would obviously be treating me unfairly.  If I am denied access to 
a party because of my race or gender, then even if there are other fun things to do, I 
have lost an opportunity and have been treated unfairly.  But presumably no amount of 
missing out on opportunities for small goods could ruin my life.  After all I miss out 
on those opportunities constantly.  There are, each day, many different ways I could 
spend my time, many of which would be good for me.  But the aggregate of these 
small losses cannot, no matter the number constitute a harm that would ruin my life.  
They cannot even make it the case, all by themselves, that my life goes significantly 
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worse.  I think that blame from strangers is such a harm.  It is non-trivial so it is 
something we should not inflict on someone when they do not deserve it, but it cannot 
lead to a person’s life going significantly worse.144 
 But why should we care about praise and blame from people we have never 
met in the first place?  It matters to us what friends, loved ones, colleagues, and 
personal moral heroes think of our actions because those people matter to us.  But 
strangers do not matter to us, at least not in a similar way.  It is not as though we bear 
the same relationship to strangers that we do to friends but to a lesser degree.  In 
arguing against Scanlon I appealed to the fact that a relationship seems to require 
interaction, and as that is absent in the case of strangers there is no reason to think that 
we stand in any relationship to them which would explain why it is that we ought to 
care what they think about the justifiability of our actions.  The reason why we ought 
to care about whether strangers praise or blame us is not a relationship they stand in to 
us, but features of theirs.  We ought to care what they think about the justifiability of 
our actions because we ought to care about their moral opinions more generally, and 
we ought to care about their moral opinions because that is part of what it is to treat 
them as moral equals. 
 It is important to distinguish between two different reasons why we ought to 
care about the moral opinions of other people.  One is that other people are a potential 
source of moral information in the same way they are potential sources of non-moral 
knowledge.  If you want to know how to do something, take care of a horse for 
example, you should listen to the opinions of those who spend a lot of time dealing 
with horses.  Similarly if you want to know what is right and what things are good, it 
is a good idea to listen to those who frequently have to deal with such questions.  
                                                 
144
 At least not in general.  If someone decides that being well thought of is her goal in life then perhaps 
blame from strangers could make her life go significantly worse.  But this is because the harm has been 
amplified by decisions she has made about her life projects, not because of the harm inherent in blame. 
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Because almost every adult human being has to deal with those questions, we have 
prima facie reason to care about what every adult human being thinks about the 
justifiability of our actions if we have reason to want to increase our moral knowledge. 
 There is a second reason, one that yields a pro tanto reason to care about what 
other people think of the justifiability of our actions rather than a prima facie reason.  
Every person might, for all we know prior to meeting them, be a source of moral 
knowledge, but every person is a creature that deserves a certain kind of regard and 
respect.  Adult persons should not be treated as something they are not, and to treat 
someone as though their moral opinions were of no relevance would be to treat them 
as something they are not.  Small children are creatures whose moral opinions we need 
not take seriously.  The reason why is that small children are cognitively and 
emotionally limited in certain ways that make it plausible that they are not our equals 
when it comes to moral reasoning.  That is why one does not treat a child unfairly 
when disregarding their opinion that a fair game would always end with them 
winning.  But if we treat adult persons this way we are acting as though they are 
similarly cognitively and emotionally limited, and to treat adult human beings as 
though they had the cognitive and emotional capabilities of child is insulting.   
 Of course there are some people whom we are permitted to not treat as moral 
equals, other than children.
145
  Sometimes people, through their actions or their 
avowed intentions and values, or both, show themselves to be so deeply morally 
mistaken that it is not longer reasonable to treat them as though they are your moral 
equals.  Or, even if they are still moral equals, their moral thinking is so perverted that 
it is no longer worth caring about.  Think here of the Neo-Nazi or the serial pederast.  
                                                 
145
 To be clear, I think the case of moral perversity is a case in which the pro tanto duty to care about the 
morally perverse person’s moral opinions is outweighed by other factors.  The fact that there is a pro 
tanto duty to care is not enough to save PBBH because it might be that the reason why the pro tanto 
duty is outweighed is because the pro tanto goodness of the praise of the morally perverse person is 
outweighed by some set of pro tanto harms involved in their praising you.  In such a case the praise of 
the morally perverse would be a harm. 
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Is there any reason, having to do with either looking for new evidence about morality 
or with showing people proper respect, to think that the opinions of such people about 
the justifiability of our claims is relevant?  There are two ways to deal with this 
problem. 
 One has to do with the nature of incompatibilism.  Incompatibilists are all 
committed to the conditional ‘If determinism obtains then no one is morally 
responsible for what they do.’  Assuming, for the sake of the argument, the Quality of 
Will Account, what the consequent amounts to is ‘none of the moral judgments 
involved in blaming and praising are appropriate.’  If all that incompatibilists are 
committed to is the claim that if determinism is true then none of the judgments 
involved in blaming and praising someone are appropriate, then it doesn’t look like the 
praising and blaming of the morally perverse needs to be treated as a benefit and harm.  
After all PBBH is needed to get from the Quality of Will Account to fairness based 
incompatibilism, by showing that for praise and blame to be legitimate the judgments 
that constitute them would have to be fair.  But when the morally perverse praise and 
blame people, the question of whether the praise and blame is appropriate can be 
answered without appeal to questions of fairness.  What is uncontroversial is that it is 
not appropriate to make a judgment on the basis of poor or no evidence, and this is 
presumably what the morally perverse person does.
146
  So why shouldn’t the 
incompatibilist say that the deeply false beliefs that the judgments of the morally 
perverse either wholly or in part express make those judgments inappropriate, and that 
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 It is not plausible that anyone is always wrong morally.  After all even Neo-Nazi’s need to get along 
with each other, and so they are going to respect rules of fair play in some contexts.  What is going to 
be true of the deeply morally perverse is that the moral principles they accept are going to be corrupted 
in such a way that even when they get the right answers, the judgments they support will not be well 
supported.  Take the Nazi who thinks that it is unfair to, for example, take a promotion within the 
organization that one has not earned.  The Nazi might even think that to do so would be unfair, but it is 
worth asking what conception of fairness this could be, which could allow the murder of millions of 
people.  Would a principle of fairness that looked something like ‘Give a pure blooded white man his 
due’ count as adequate support for a judgment of fairness?  I don’t think so.  This corruption of even 
right answers is part of what sets the morally perverse person off from the simply morally confused. 
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for other people whose moral values are not deeply corrupted, considerations of 
fairness imply that if determinism is true then none of their judgments would be 
appropriate?  This would still count as an argument for the claim that if determinism is 
true then no praise or blame is appropriate.  What this approach gives up on is the 
principle that determinism is what makes all praise and blame appropriate.  The 
position I am outlining is one on which PBBH is only meant to apply to praise and 
blame from the non-morally perverse and so that the inappropriateness of praise and 
blame would, in a deterministic world, sometimes be explained by the fact that 
determinism obtains and sometimes by the deep moral perversity of the individual 
making the judgment.   
 There is another way of dealing with the problem of the morally perverse that 
does not require a the reinterpretation of incompatibilism I just mentioned, and it is to 
treat the morally perverse as though they have praise and blame reversed.  After all, to 
find out that the Neo-Nazis approve of you would be disturbing, but their hatred for 
you and what you do is a kind of honor.  So why not think that in the case of the 
morally perverse praising is a harm and blaming is a good?  Certainly they don’t mean 
to be praising you when they say ‘You are a race-traitor’ but most of them also don’t 
mean to express false moral views, so I don’t think this is much of an obstacle.  As 
with the previous suggestion this response to the problem of moral perversity requires 
a revision to PBBH.  In the first solution the scope of PBBH was restricted to cases of 
praise and blame by the non-morally perverse, with praise and blame by the morally 
perverse being ruled out for reasons not having to do with determinism and fairness.  
This solution also revises PBBH, but not in a way that fundamentally changes the case 
for incompatibilism.  So the new version is: 
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PBBH:  If X praises Y, X always either benefits Y (the standard case) 
or harms Y (the moral perversity case) and if X blames Y, X always 
either harms Y (the standard case) or benefits Y (the moral perversity 
case).   
   
If correct this revised version of PBBH gets around the problem of moral perversity.  
The idea is that in the case of moral perversity it is not that we do not or ought not care 
what the person thinks, it is just that our caring about what the person thinks gets 
expressed in a different way.  We ought not to want to be praised by the morally 
perverse and we ought to be proud that the morally perverse blame us.   
The question is whether PBBH is true.  In answering that question it is 
important to keep in mind the account of praise and blame under consideration.  
PBBH is about the making of judgments, not the expressions of those judgments.  To 
see the importance of the contrast, consider the famous case of the Nazis marching in 
Skokie, Il.  In the course of the march a lot of expressions of disgust, hatred and blame 
were made, and it would be absurd to think that those expressions were good for the 
people at whom they were directed.  Many residents of Skokie were Holocaust 
survivors and the public expression of the ideology that was used to justify genocide 
was traumatic.  It is here that it is important to distinguish between the blame, which is 
constituted by a judgment made by the Nazis that Jews are guilty of all kinds of absurd 
conspiracies, and the expression of that blaming judgment.  The expression of the 
blame is clearly bad for residents of Skokie.  That does not imply that it is bad for 
them to be blamed, though.  Does it do them any good to be blamed by the Nazi’s 
though?  It certainly wouldn’t cause them pleasure to think about the fact that there are 
virulent anti-Semites, though perhaps this might be explained simply by the painful 
thoughts with which anti-Semitism is associated.   
Still, it does seem like the correct response that Holocaust survivors ought to 
have to the fact that some Neo-Nazi’s make negative moral judgments about them is 
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one of indifference.
147
  I have been using Neo-Nazi’s as clear cases of moral 
perversity, and treating all forms of moral perversity similarly, but in reality the 
situation is more subtle than that.  To see some of the subtlety imagine two different 
Neo-Nazi’s.  One is irrational in his racist beliefs and behavior.  He is not able to 
support his positions with arguments, and when pressed for evidence or reasons he 
responds with either ad hominem attacks or incoherent conspiracy theories.  The other 
Neo-Nazi has a coherent moral theory, which he explicitly employs to justify his 
actions.  At certain key points his moral theory is mistaken, and he is culpable for his 
ignorance in part because it seems clear that he has chosen the moral theory he has in 
part because he simply enjoys the suffering of those weaker than him.  The first Neo-
Nazi is one whose opinion we ought not care about.  I think the explanation is that his 
moral thinking doesn’t meet basic standards of rationality and more specifically that 
his blaming and praising do not qualify as rational responses to the actions of those he 
is blaming and praising. 
Does the case of the irrational blamer mean that I am forced back to the first 
strategy, in which the scope of PBBH is restricted and reasons other than determinism 
are required to show that if determinism obtains then all praise and blame are 
inappropriate?  I do not think so, because I think that for a moral judgment to count as 
blame or praise, it has to make sense as a response to the action it is about.  To make 
sense as a response to an action there has to be some rational connection between the 
action and the judgment that constitutes the blaming or praising, such that other 
rational individuals can comprehend how someone would make that judgment about 
the action.  So, for example, no rational person would conclude, from some other 
person leaving a small tip, that the bad tipper was a heartless monster to the waiter.  
                                                 
147
 I do not mean to say that Holocaust survivors, or their descendants, or any decent person really, 
ought to be indifferent to the fact that there are Neo-Nazis.  This should horrify people.  What seems not 
to deserve a second thought is what the Neo-Nazi’s think, except insofar as knowing what they think 
could help bring it about that there were no more of them.   
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Perhaps the bad tip was simply being used as an occasion to publicize one’s long 
standing feelings about a person, in which case the blame is actually about some other 
actions other than the tipping.  But if the judgment is not an expression of some 
potentially well grounded judgment than it looks like it is just the person being mean, 
not actually evaluating the justifiability of the tipper’s action.   
Another constraint on blaming and praising that you get out of this demand for 
minimal rationality is a constraint on how much the judge’s description of the non-
moral properties of the action can diverge from the description of the non-moral 
properties of the action on which the agent acted.  To see why, consider the action of 
Jon helping an old lady cross the street.  Suppose Jon thought it worth doing because 
she is an old lady and they often have trouble with their mobility, and that she 
deserves a helping hand after all that she has likely been through.  Tyler is watching 
from afar and for some reason concludes that Jon has kidnapped an old woman.  If 
Tyler were to think of himself ‘Shame on you Jon for kidnapping!’ would this be a 
response to what Jon actually did?  No, because Jon did not kidnap anyone.  You 
cannot blame someone for what they did not do.  The less divergence there is between 
the descriptions of the actions, or between the descriptions of the action and what 
actually happened, the harder it gets to tell whether or not the judgment counts as 
blame or not.  In the case of the irrational Neo-Nazi it seems clear though.  Suppose 
part of the explanation of anti-Semitism is the confusion of the insular nature of many 
Jewish communities due to rules about diet and marriage for sign of a cabal bent on 
controlling the world.  When confusions like this are present the moral judgments that 
arise from them do not count as actual blame.  No one is blaming Jews for anything 
when they say that Jews ought not keep such a tight control over the international 
banking system.  Nazis can attack Jews, insulting Jews, but try as they might the Anti-
Semite cannot actually blame Jews for that, because it is a fiction.  
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So when the Quality of Will Account is presented properly some of the 
clearest cases of where we ought to be indifferent to praise and  blame turn out not to 
be cases of praise and blame at all.  Taken together with some form of PBBH, the 
Quality of Will Account does not rule out fairness based incompatibilism.  If you 
supplement PBBH and the Quality of Will Account with, for example, some 
principle of fairness which requires that people be able to avoid harms or fail to 
receive benefits for them to be legitimately given, then you have an argument for 
incompatibilism, at least on the most widely accepted accounts of what it is to be able 
to avoid something.  The argument hinges on the truth of PBBH, a principle I have 
tried to make look plausible and intuitive.  If I could do that much I would be happy, 
but any case for PBBH that only did this would not give us good reason to think it is 
true.  PBBH is a principle about what is good, and what is not, for people.  So PBBH 
ought to be at least consistent with some plausible accounts of the good, and the more 
the better. 
4.3 PBBH and Accounts of the Good 
 The first theory of the good that I will look at is Hedonism.  Earlier, I raised as 
a potential problem for PBBH is that it says that potentially purely private events in 
the minds of other people can be good or bad for us.  Praise and blame, being private 
actions, are things that the objects of the praise and blame are not aware of, unless the 
praiser/blamer decides to express the praise and blame.  So, if it were the case that all 
harms and benefits had to be experienced by the subject of those harms and benefits, 
then PBBH could not be true.  What reason might there be to think that all harms and 
benefits have to be experienced?  One historically common reason to think it is that 
harms and benefits must be experienced is that only conscious states, or objects which 
causally produce conscious states, can constitute harms or benefits.  Hedonism is a 
theory of the good which is committed to this claim.  If pleasure is the only thing that 
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makes a person’s life better and pain is the only thing that makes a person’s life go 
worse, as hedonism says, then praise and blame just cannot count as goods and 
bads.
148
  But is hedonism an adequate account of what is good for people? 
 No, it is not.
149
  Hedonism is subject to a wide range of counterexamples to 
which no effective response has been given.  What is more these counterexamples are 
all either counterexamples to the claim that harms and benefits must be experienced, 
or can be made to stand as counterexamples with minimal revision.  The most recent 
of the classic counterexamples comes from Robert Nozick and his experience machine 
example.
150
  In this example we are asked whether it would be in our best interest to 
hook ourselves up to a machine that could flawlessly simulate all the experiences we 
want in life.  None of these experiences would be veridical.  Rather than having a 
deeply fulfilling family life, or a successful career, or deep knowledge of important 
subjects one has experiences that perfectly replicate what it would be like to have all 
those things. One is actually lying in a vat of goop that somehow facilitates the 
production of non-veridical experiences.  Nozick thinks that it is not in our best 
interest to hook up to the machine.  I agree with him.  The life spent in the vat of goop 
is almost entirely without value.  The prospect of living such a life is horrific.
151
 
 What is so bad about it?  Well for one thing one is massively deceived.  That 
by itself is enough to make the life bad.  But more importantly the life in the vat of 
goop is one devoid of accomplishment, success, friendship, love and the like.  It is 
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 I have switched from talking about benefits and harms to talking about goods and bads on the 
assumption that if X is a benefit then X will be recommended by any adequate account of the Good. 
149
 Despite the fact that disagree with him on almost every point I am following Fred Feldman’s (2004) 
organization and understanding of the objections to which hedonism is liable. 
150
 Nozick (1974) pg. 42-45 
151
 Though it ought to go without saying let me assure the reader that I am not imagining being hooked 
up to the machine but being aware of that fact as I am being fed wonderful experiences.  Fred Feldman 
(2004) seems to think that philosophers who do not share his judgment that the vat life might be good 
for the person having it might be making this very elementary mistake in thinking about the example.  I 
am not guilty of doing so and I both seriously doubt any other person trained in philosophy is and am 
quite certain that we do not need to consider such mistakes to explain the intuition that the vat life is 
bad for the person having it. 
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bereft of all of the things that would make one’s life worth living.  Far from 
guaranteeing one a good life by guaranteeing good experiences, hooking up to the 
experience machine guarantees that one will fail to have any of the really significant 
goods.
152
 
 Another classic objection to hedonism is that it treats the pleasures that a 
person experiences in the course of performing base and depraved actions as good for 
the person performing those actions.  On the face of it this seems deeply wrong.  After 
all it is bad for people to live lives that are full of morally, prudentially and 
aesthetically inferior actions.  It is bad for the drug addict to give in to their addiction, 
it is bad for people to maintain deceptive and fraudulent facades for the purpose of the 
cheating others.  Feldman, in discussing this objection, gives us the example of the 
revolting action of a human being having sex with a pig.  The point is that it is not 
only morally wrong to take pleasure in certain events or states of affairs, it is bad for 
the person taking that pleasure to take pleasure in it.   
 The final objection I will mention, although there are others, is what Feldman 
calls the ‘shape of life’ objection.  This objection, offered by Velleman and Slote, 
consists of the comparison of two lives, equal in amounts of pleasure and pain 
experienced.  Given that information we already know that hedonism, of any 
straightforward variety, is going to have to treat the lives as equally good for the 
people who lead them.  But, Velleman and Slote ask, what if those pleasures and pains 
are distributed differently within the two lives?  What if one of the two people starts 
life with a significant amount of pain and not much pleasure, but through hard work 
makes his own life more and more pleasant and less and less painful, while the other 
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 I say significant goods because clearly the person in the vat has some good things in her life.  To use 
a personal example I love the feeling of sunshine on my back on a very still day.  It is not particularly 
important to me that the day be clear or even that it be sunshine.  This is just typically how I get that 
feeling.  If that feeling could be recreated it would be just as good for me, to feel the artificial sunlight 
as the real sunlight.  This is a good and it is a good available to me in the vat.  But I would not trade one 
day with my daughter for a lifetime of sunny days, and so I think the good is not very significant. 
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starts out life with a great deal of pleasure and through inattentiveness or laziness feels 
less and less pleasure and more and more pain as life goes on?  Isn’t the first life better 
than the second life?  Wouldn’t anyone interested in living a good life rather live the 
first rather than the second life?  Wouldn’t you wish the first life rather than the 
second for your child?
153
  As far as hedonism is concerned these lives are of equal 
value, because they contain the same amounts of pleasure and pain.  But here, as with 
issues of social justice, distribution matters. 
 Do hedonist’s have any responses to these objections?  Yes.  In fact responses 
are relatively easy to come by if the hedonist is willing to tolerate ad hoc additions to 
this theory which strip it of all the explanatory power and simplicity it started with.  
Feldman for instance has suggested maintaining a commitment to the claim that 
pleasure and pain are the only things that can make a person’s life go better, but 
simply saying that only certain kinds of pleasures and pains can do that.  So if a 
hedonist were willing to say that only pleasures taken in worthy objects and pleasures 
taken in things that really happen can make a person’s life better.154  These additions 
to the theory easily take care of the objections having to do with unworthy pleasures 
and with the objection concerning Nozick’s experience machine.  How could they not, 
they were added to the theory precisely to get around them.
155
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 I present the objection simply, but it is not at all clear to me that the choice is clear given these 
simple descriptions.  Assuming that it is reasonable to test theories of well being by asking one’s self 
‘What would I want for my child?’ I find that I am hard pressed to choose the life in which my child 
feels a great deal of pain early in life.  That is, after all, when she will be least able to handle the pain.  
But this concern is not relevant to the debate.  I am not contesting the claim that distribution of 
pleasures and pains matter.  In fact I affirm that claim in expressing my concern with giving my 
daughter the life with the upward trajectory.  All I am doing is objecting to the particular distribution at 
issue.  If we were comparing two lives that contained blissful childhoods, and only start to diverge at 
adulthood with one life suddenly filled with a great deal of pain that is slowly but surely eliminated, 
while another life begins an inexorable downward path, I would choose the first over the second for my 
daughter. 
154
 Feldman (2204) endorses attitudinal hedonism in which the pleasures which are the source of well-
being are not sensations but attitudes directed at states of affairs.  So when the relevant pleasure in the 
case of the drug addict is the attitude expressed by ‘I take pleasure in the fact that I am shooting up 
now’. 
155
 Feldman (2004) simply bites the bullet when it comes to the Shape of Life example, again after 
suggesting that the intuition that one life is better than another might be the result of some very 
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 But ad hoc additions like this rarely help theories in the long run.  In this case 
Feldman’s revisions to classical hedonism156strip hedonism about the good of any 
significant explanatory power.  After all when we want to explain why a person’s life 
goes well we have to mention not just the pleasure and pain she experiences, but the 
objective worthiness of the objects of her pleasure and the veridicality of the 
experiences in which she took pleasure.  So part of what makes pleasures good for a 
person are facts that are not themselves facts about pleasure (or pain), on Feldman’s 
view.  Is there reason, once we admit that part of what explains why a person’s life is 
good are facts like objective worthiness of objects of enjoyment or pleasure, to reject 
the claim that a person’s life could be made better by events of which she has no 
knowledge?  If mental states are made good for a person in part because of objective 
facts which do not depend at all on those mental states, why think that only mental 
states can be good or bad for a person?  By undermining the explanatory status of 
hedonism Feldman makes it hard to see why one would accept hedonism, rather than 
some more pluralist view, in the first place. 
 Do other popular accounts of the good imply that PBBH is false, as hedonism 
does?  I do not think so.  One alternative to hedonism which appeals to many of the 
same intuitions as hedonism, the informed desire account of the good, does not.  On an 
informed desire account what is good for X is X getting what X would desire if X 
were fully informed.  Informed desire accounts face none of the problems for 
hedonism that I mentioned above, but maintain the appeal to those who think that what 
counts as good for people varies according to their tastes, desires and interests.  But 
because informed desire accounts do not claim that something’s being a benefit or a 
                                                                                                                                            
elementary mistakes in reasoning on the part of non-hedonists.  My own opinion is that if hedonism has 
to bite the bullet with regards to the Shape of Life objection then hedonism is just false. 
156
 I am not counting his endorsement of attitudinal hedonism rather than sensory hedonism as an ad 
hoc revision of classical hedonism.  For one thing I am not sure whether sensory hedonism is the 
classical form of hedonism and for another there are good reasons, other than simply finding the 
quickest way out of objections, to prefer treating pleasure as an attitude rather than a sensation. 
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harm is a matter of the subject being in a certain mental state, it does not imply, 
straight off, that praising and blaming does not count as benefiting and harming.  If a 
person would, if she were fully informed, desire not to be blamed and desire to be 
praised, then being blamed would count as a harm, for her, and being praised would 
count as a benefit. 
 What has to be true, assuming the informed desire account of the good, for 
PBBH to be true, however, is that everyone would desire to be praised and not to be 
blamed, if they were fully informed.  Either this could mean that there is a natural 
desire to be praised and not to be blamed, or it could mean that the knowledge that 
praising is desirable and blaming is not desirable is knowledge you acquire just by 
being fully informed.  The first is a contentious empirical claim, while the second 
seems as though it might go against the spirit of informed desire accounts.  After all if 
the informed desire theorist can simply build into the information people must have 
for their desiring Y to constitute Y being good for them, then the informed desire 
account seems to lose its connection to what people actually desire and the role that 
intuitively plays in making something good for them.  An informed desire account in 
which objective desirability could be part of the information could imply that the very 
same things are good for everyone. 
 So while informed desire accounts of the good are not incompatible with 
PBBH, they would lose the special plausibility they are thought to have over other 
more objective accounts of the good if they are so revised as to imply that praising and 
blaming count as benefiting and harming.  So lets move on to some of those more 
objective accounts of the good.  Objective list accounts fit the bill, that much is 
obvious from the name.  Could praise count as a benefit according to Objective list 
accounts?  Yes, of course, because just about anything can count as a benefit 
according to some objective list account or other.  It all depends on what is on the list 
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of objects that are objectively good for people.  What makes an objective list account 
and objective list account is the claim that there is no single property that unifies the 
items on the list, other than that of being objectively good.  So there is no principle 
which can tell us whether or not something is going to be on the list.   
So could I just stipulate that praise and blame are among the items on the list, 
that they are intrinsically good and bad for people, respectively, and deny that there is 
any deeper explanation of why?  That wouldn’t be plausible all by itself, but I could 
adduce in favor of this stipulation the examples I mentioned earlier, examples where it 
seemed like praising or blaming someone was unfair.  Along with the claim that the 
best explanation of that unfairness was that praise and blame were benefits and harms, 
that would give some reason to think that they should either be on the objective list, or 
be derivable from some item on the list.  But this argumentative strategy would leave 
the entire burden for supporting the claim that praising and blaming could be unfair on 
the examples above, and this is precisely what I wanted to avoid.  
 The problem with hedonism and informed desire accounts was that they did 
not provide objective enough accounts of the good.  Hedonism does not provide one at 
all, and while the informed desire account is compatible with objective goods, the case 
for that account would be undermined by admitting them.  Objective list accounts, on 
the other hand, provide no principled way of determining what things are objectively 
good, it just commits one to there being objective goods.  What is needed to provide a 
theoretical defense of PBBH is an account of the good that is objective, so that praise 
counts as a benefit for everyone and blame counts as a harm for everyone, but that 
provides a principled way to distinguish between goods that are objective and those 
that are not.  Only with such a view would it be possible to give a substantial 
theoretical defense of PBBH.  Does any such account of the good exist? 
 Yes.  One example of the kind of account I am talking about is the 
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eudaemonist account of the good.  It may be optimistic of me to talk about the 
eudaemonistic account of the good, since so many different formulations of that 
account have been presented.  In speaking of the eudaemonist account of the good I do 
not mean to be saying something about all philosophers who are said to have 
eudaemonist theories.  I do not intend to make any claims about the entirety of ancient 
ethical thought, and pretty much every ancient philosopher who wrote on ethics seems 
to takes the eudaimon life to be the good life.  I mean to present an account what is 
good that some, but not necessarily all, ancient, medieval and contemporary ethicists 
accepted.  A brief version of the eudaemonist account of the good is that X is good for 
Y iff Y is related in the proper way to the ends, functions, or activities that X has in 
virtue of the kind of thing it is.  As stated the account is deeply vague.  That is just so 
that it captures the full diversity of views which get called eudaemonist.   
To eliminate the vagueness we would need to know what kinds matter in the 
definition.  I am, for example, a member of many, possibly an infinite number of, 
kinds.  I am a human being, a man, an American, a socialist, a weak-kneed agnostic, a 
student, a AAA member, a St. Louis Cardinals fan, and a Luddite.  We need to know 
which of those kinds matter for figuring out what counts as good for me.  By far the 
most common answer is that it is the biological kinds that matter, specifically my 
species.  But other things might matter.  Suppose that God exists, and that I am a 
creation of his.  This seems like exactly like one of the kind memberships that would 
matter.  Many people seem to think that being an American is among the relevant 
kinds.  I think that is almost certainly wrong, but I need not argue for it here.  All that 
matters is that it is clear that any adequate eudaemonist account is going to have to 
pick a kind or some set of kinds that are similar in a relevant way.  Otherwise too 
many things are going to come out as objectively good and bad for people, and then 
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the recourse to eudaimonism will have done nothing in the way of justifying PBBH.
157
  
 I am not going to present a fully worked out eudaemonist theory of the good 
here.  All I want to do is show how it would be possible to derive PBBH from an 
account of that kind.  If I can show that on one plausibly theory of the good this claim 
comes out as true, I will have done what I wanted, show how the intuitions I appealed 
to earlier about Aunt Harriet and others, could fit in an acceptable theory of the good.  
I am rather in luck, because one of the oldest versions of eudaimonism, Aristotle’s 
version, seems like it has just the implication I am looking for.  Aristotle certainly 
thinks that events completely outside an agent’s knowledge can count as harming or 
benefiting her.  He goes so far as to say that events that happen after you die count as 
helping or hurting you.
158
  He also explicitly mentions honor as something that is good 
for a person.
159
 
 How does one get from eudaimonism to treating things like praise and honor as 
goods?  By way of answering let me start with the near truism that man is a social 
animal.  To be well functioning a human being, like members of many other species, 
has to function well in a group.  What it means for a human being to function well in a 
group depends on other features that human beings have qua human beings.  In 
addition to the truism that human beings are social, there is also the Aristotelian truism 
that human beings are rational.  One feature of human rationality is a concern for 
justification, and that this concern, along with the social nature of human beings, 
explains, on a eudaemonist account of the good, why PBBH is true. 
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 The definition needs to be made precise in other ways too of course.  Most importantly is how X has 
to be related to the ends, activities and functions to count as being properly related.   
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 This comment appears in the context of a discussion aimed at showing that the claim that 
eudaimonia cannot be gained or lost after someone has died, which is a consequence of Aristotle’s 
account of eudaimonia, can be made compatible with what Aristotle seems to have taken to be an 
obvious truth, that the fate of one’s ancestors affects how good one’s life was.  Aristotle essentially says 
that some things can be goods even though acquiring them cannot lead someone who was not happy 
during life becoming so afterwards. 
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  See Nicomachean Ethics Book IV. 
  114 
 It is only with this last step that things start to get controversial.  Why does a 
concern with justification lead to praise and blame counting as benefiting and 
harming?  If we are concerned with justification and we live in community with 
others, then we ought to be concerned with what others in that community think about 
what we are doing.  To see why this is true consider what would have to be the case if 
we, while living in a community with other rational beings, did not have a concern 
with what they thought of us and our actions.  In fact this is best thought about by 
thinking about examples where people have done so.  Imagine the theorist who 
proposes a grand explanation that none of his colleagues can make sense of.  Imagine 
the political activist who is so committed that he doesn’t care what evidence people 
adduce or what arguments they offer against his position.  These people either fail to 
be rational, fail to be properly respectful of their fellow citizens and colleagues, or 
both.  The theorist fails to recognize that his colleagues are in as good an epistemic 
situation as he is, and the activist fails to realize that being in a political community 
requires treating fellow citizens as people worth listening to.   
 If we would care about what other people think of the justifiability of our 
actions and the reasons why we performed them if we were properly functioning, then 
that just makes their thinking well of our actions and our reasons a good or benefit for 
us, on a eudaemonist account of the good of the kind I presented.  Presumably others 
thinking poorly of us would count as a harm because of this.  But on the Quality of 
Will account praising and blaming just are judgments about the moral qualities of 
actions and the reasons for which agents acted.  So on a eudaemonist account of the 
good of this kind, praise and blame would count as benefiting and harming.  Now are 
there other kinds of eudaemonist accounts?  I admitted as much earlier.  Would any of 
them fail to have this implication about praise and blame?  Some might, but I see no 
reason to assume that any would.  Those uncomfortable with grounding moral and 
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evaluative facts in purely natural facts like species membership could find some less 
natural set of facts to ground their account in, but it would be implausible to deny that 
to count as well-functioning a human being has to function well socially and meet 
certain minimum standards of rationality.   
 Now I have only presented a sketch of a eudaemonist account of the good, 
because that is all I needed.  All I wanted to show was that there was some account of 
the good which would support the claim that praising and blaming count as benefiting 
and harming.  The details will certainly matter to someone who wants to develop a 
completely worked out theory of praise and blame, but that is not my goal.  I want to 
show that the Quality of Will account is not committed to compatibilism.  If there is an 
account of the good on which praising and blaming count as benefiting and harming, 
then the Quality of Will account is not committed to compatibilism.  Of course if you 
were to conjoin the Quality of Will account with a hedonistic account of the good then 
it would be implausible that praising and blaming are subject to standards of fairness 
and incompatibilism of the kind I have defended is ruled out.  But there is no reason to 
think that moral theories have no implications about what it takes to be morally 
responsible, and so there is no reason to be surprised that different moral theories have 
different implications about what it takes to be morally responsible.  
5.  Moral Responsibility and Incompatibilism 
 Now to sum up.  Of the three Strawsonian challenges to incompatibilism, one, 
the Relationship Account, clearly fails.  It mistakes certain regular goals and contexts 
of blaming and praising for the internal goal and meaning of blame.  While we often 
seek, by blaming, to encourage others to change their behavior, we can and do blame 
people in situations where it is obvious that blaming them will not have this effect.  
While blaming often has important consequences for our personal relationships, it 
need not.  Incompatibilists need not be worried by the Relationship account of blame 
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and praise. 
 Incompatibilists also need not worry about the Emotion Account and Quality 
of Will Account, not because they are untrue, but because to the extent that these 
accounts are plausible they are also neutral between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism.  In fact the neutrality of these accounts, when they are properly 
understood, points us towards a satisfactory account of moral responsibility that can be 
appealed to by all in the debate about moral responsibility.  As we saw there are 
cognitivist or quasi-cognitivist versions of the Emotion Account.  In fact these are the 
only versions of the account which are plausible.  So the Emotion Account when 
properly understood includes a commitment to blaming and praising having cognitive, 
or quasi-cognitive content.  This dovetails nicely with the Quality of Will Account, 
according to which blaming and praising is constituted by certain kinds of judgments.  
And as we saw, incompatibilist challenges enter the picture on both accounts of moral 
responsibility in the same way, by raising concerns of fairness about the judgments 
being made. 
 So what does an adequate Strawsonian account of moral responsibility that is 
neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism look like?  On this neutral account 
to praise and blame someone is to have certain emotional reactions to their action.  
Those emotional reactions are constituted in part or whole by certain judgments about 
the agent’s quality of will in acting as they did.  So to legitimately hold someone 
responsible it must be the case that her actions expressed a quality of will such that it 
is permissible, i.e. fair, for a person to bear judgment constituted reactive attitudes 
towards her.  Such an account is perfectly neutral between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism. 
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Chapter 3:  The Moral Luck Argument 
 
 In this paper I will present a new argument for the incompatibilism of moral 
responsibility and determinism.  The Moral Luck Argument is new in the sense that no 
one has ever presented an explicit argument for it, but I take the reasons expressed by 
the argument to be quite old.  They are, I think the standard incompatibilist reasons 
and intuitions which lie behind other well known incompatibilist arguments.  What 
makes the Moral Luck Argument interesting is that it gives expression to those reasons 
and intuitions without ever invoking the concepts of ‘ability’ and ‘control’ that have 
caused so much controversy in the literature on moral responsibility and free will.  
Consider some standard compatibilist goals: 
 
(A) provide an account of control according to which agents have control over 
their actions even if determinism obtains.  
(B) provide an account of ability according to which agents have the ability to 
do otherwise even if determinism obtains. 
(C) show that agents do not require control over their actions to count as free 
and responsible 
(D)  show that agents do not require the ability to do otherwise to count as free 
and responsible. 
 
What makes the Moral Luck Argument interesting is that it would remain completely 
untouched even if compatibilists had achieved one or all of A-D.  As such the Moral 
Luck Argument represents a significant dialectical advance over previous 
incompatibilist arguments.   
 Luck is becoming a popular topic of conversation in the free will and moral 
responsibility literature.
160
  While luck arguments and objections are typically directed 
at libertarians, there are some luck arguments against compatibilism.  The most 
prominent and significant example of a luck argument against compatibilism that has 
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 See Mele (2006), Greco (1995), Lackey (2008), Latus (2000), Levy (2008) (2009a) (2009b) 
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appeared in the literature belongs to Neil Levy.  I will start by looking at his luck 
argument and showing that it both does not present a compelling argument against the 
compatibilist, and that even if it did his argument would not constitute a significant 
advance over existing incompatibilist arguments. The problem with Levy’s 
argument is that it relies on an account of what luck is that is both false and strips 
Levy’s argument of any dialectical force against the compatibilist.  I will consider two 
arguments that do not rely on his account of luck, because they do not rely on any 
particular account of luck at all, rejecting one and endorsing the other. 
 By way of preparation let me give a very brief presentation of the Moral Luck 
Argument: 
 
1.  If it is legitimate to make a moral judgment about a person on the 
basis of a property they bear which holds of them by luck, then moral 
luck exists. 
2.  Moral Luck does not exist. 
3. X is morally responsible for Y iff it is legitimate to make the moral 
judgments involved in praising or blaming X for Y. 
4.  If determinism obtains, then every property that a person bears 
which might enter into the moral judgments involved in praise and 
blame holds of that person by luck. 
5. So if determinism obtains, then if anyone is morally responsible, 
then moral luck exists. 
6.  So if determinism obtains no one is a morally responsible agent. 
 
This argument makes no explicit reference to ability or control, but of course no one 
should take me at my word that it does not implicitly rely on those concepts.  In 
particular premise four needs to be spelled out in a way that makes clear that it does 
not include a commitment to controversial claims about control and ability.  Before I 
show that, however, I need to first discuss luck more generally, and another luck 
argument against compatibilism in particular. 
1.  Determinism and Luck 
1.1 Levy’s Luck Argument 
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 Neil Levy has presented luck arguments against both compatibilism and 
libertarianism.  According to Levy “luck is a function of three factors: significance, 
chance and control.”161  This general characterization of luck describes both 
constitutive luck and the various forms of  non-constitutive luck, for which Levy gives 
the following accounts: 
 
NCLuck:  E is a matter of non-constitutive luck iff E occurs in the 
actual world at time t*, but it fails to occur in a large proportion of 
possible worlds obtainable by making no more than a small change to 
the actual world at time t, where t is just prior to t*, and the agent lacks 
direct control over E’s occurrence, and E is significant. 
 
CLuck: E is a matter of constitutive luck iff E is a trait that varies in 
human experience, the agent lacks direct control over whether or not 
E’s is true of her, and E is significant.162 
 
The reason for two different accounts is that constitutive luck, or luck in “the kind of 
person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of 
your inclinations, capacities, and temperament,”163 might not count as lucky on 
NCLuck, and not just because of the name.  If it is the case that for agent X to count as 
the same person across possible worlds, that X have all the inclinations, capacities and 
temperament, then none of these things will hold of X as a matter of luck, according to 
NCLuck.  Levy’s particular worry is that to the extent that these inclinations, 
capacities and temperament are genetically determined, they will count as essential, 
for the same reasons that some have thought that one has one’s genes essentially.  So 
Levy gives us a separate account of constitutive luck that is supposed to be 
importantly similar to the primary definition of luck.  It differs only in the gloss given 
to E being chancy.  In NCLuck E is chancy because in some suitably large set of 
nearby possible worlds, E does not occur, while in CLuck E is lucky because it is a 
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 See Levy (2009a) and Levy (2009b) 
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 Nagel (1993) pg. 60 
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trait that varies widely in human experience.   
 This might seem like an ad hoc maneuver.  That ‘varying widely in human 
experience’ and ‘failing to obtain at a nearby possible world’ are both things you 
could mean by the word ‘chance’ that does not imply that the two properties are 
related in any significant way.  Perhaps ‘chance’ is not only ambiguous but ambiguous 
between meanings that have very little to do with one another.  Could Levy avoid this 
potential problem by removing the concept of chance from the account of luck?  In 
other words, would an account of luck just in terms of lack of control and significance 
be adequate?  I do not think so. 
1.1.1 Luck and Control  
As Andrew Latus has pointed out, I have no control over whether it is the case 
that the sun will rise tomorrow, but it will not be a matter of good luck when it does.
164
  
It is not a matter of luck that oppositely charged particles are attracted to one another, 
nor is it a matter of luck, for anyone, that the theory of evolution is true.  These kind of 
examples are precisely the reason that Levy gives for his hybrid account of luck rather 
than a lack of control account.  I think that Levy moves too fast here.  The lack of 
control account of luck has been too widely accepted for it to be likely that it could be 
brushed aside so easily.
165
  So let us consider some alternatives to the claim imperiled 
by the aforementioned examples.  From: 
 
B:  If X is significant for Y and outside of Y’s control, then X is a matter of 
luck for Y. 
 
One might move to: 
B’:  If X is significant for Y and outside of Y’s control, and X is the kind of 
thing that people have a capacity to do, then X is a matter of luck for Y. 
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Zimmerman (1987) and Greco (1995) among others. 
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Because causing the sun to rise is not within the capacities any human being has, it 
cannot serve as a counter-example to B’.  B’ still fails however, as seen in the 
following example: 
 
 
Tiger Woods and Me:  It is clearly within a human being’s capacities to 
hit a golf ball 400 yards.  Tiger Woods can do that sometimes.  Now I 
do not control the occurrence of the event ‘Patrick hits a ball golf ball 
400 yards’.  I can want it to happen, and yet it will not.  I can 
successfully will its non-occurrence, but that is not enough for control.  
Still it is not a matter of luck that I do not hit a ball 400 yards.  I have 
not trained for it, and I have not learned the skills necessary to do it.  
This is a matter of a lack of skill, not of luck. 
 
It is not a matter of luck that I fail to hit a golf ball 400 yards, yet it is something over 
which I have no control and something that is within the set of general human 
capabilities.  In place of B’ let me suggest: 
 
 B’’ If X is outside of Y’s control, and X is the kind of thing that Y has the 
capacity to do, then  X is a matter of luck for Y. 
 
I think B’’ falls too, but it does not fall to the Tiger Woods and Me example nor to the 
sun rising example.  That Tiger Woods has hit a ball 400 yards does not show that I 
have the capacity to hit the ball 400 yards.
166
  The following example shows that B’’ is 
false: 
 
Michael Jordan and the Casino:  Michael Jordan has the capacity to 
dunk a basketball.  But one night he plays and does not dunk once.  
Every time he tries he has to switch to the less athletically demanding 
lay-up at the last moment.  What no one but Jordan and some guys in 
Vegas know is that Jordan was up gambling all night, and was drinking 
and snacking constantly while doing so.  Because of that Jordan’s 
dunking is not responsive to Jordan’s wanting to dunk, so plausibly he 
is not in control of whether he dunks. 
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 I imagine that some might be uncomfortable talking about whether individual people have 
capacities.  I do not think the term capability sounds nearly so odd in this context, and so I encourage 
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It is not bad luck that Jordan can’t dunk.  It is his own fault he can’t.  But no one 
would question that Michael Jordan is capable of dunking.  He just can’t tonight, no 
matter how much he tries, and so, plausibly, he doesn’t control whether he dunks or 
not.  The way typically to fix such problems is to put in a tracking clause.  So: 
 
 B’’’ If X is outside of Y’s control and that lack of control was not caused by 
 some action  which was both in Y’s control and could reasonably be 
 expected to cause that lack of control,  and X something Y has a capacity 
 to do, then X is a matter of luck for Y. 
 
B’’’ is the best version of B, but I think it still fails.   It is overbroad.  Too many 
failures that are not matters of bad luck would be classified as such by B’’’.  Take, for 
instance: 
 
Prosecution and Defense:  In a trial where the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant is not obvious, both the prosecution and defense do all they 
can, within the limits of the law, to win.  Neither fails to pursue any 
legal option that can reasonably be expected to influence the outcome 
of the trial.  Because the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not 
clear, and because the judge gave firm instructions to the jury not to 
convict unless the prosecution proved their case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the prosecution loses the case. 
 
Because the prosecution lost both due to the facts of the case being as they were and 
general features of the legal system, it seems pretty clear to me that the prosecution 
did not lose as a matter of luck.  According to B’’’ they did.  It was certainly not in the 
prosecution’s control whether they won.  It was also not because of some failure on 
the prosecution’s part that they lost.  In fact the problem B’’’ has with Prosecution 
and Defense will show up in any case of fair competition.  If both competitors try their 
best, one is not going to win, her failure to win will not be under their control, and its 
not being under her control would not be attributable to some action of theirs.  But not 
every result of fair competition is a matter of luck. 
 It does not seem that an account of luck based on the lack of control is going to 
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be adequate.  As we saw if we add the presence of chance as a necessary condition the 
consequence is the seemingly ad hoc distinct accounts of constitutive and non-
constitutive luck.  Of course, the ad hoc nature of the account is only a problem if we 
assume that there must be some clearly unified and simple account of luck available.  
Should we assume that there is such an account available?  I don’t think so.  Certainly 
not every concept can be given such an account, and there does not seem to be any 
special reason to insist that luck must be.  In fact I will argue later that the real 
problem with Levy’s account of luck is not that it is ad hoc, but rather that it is too 
simplistic.  Luck is a complex phenomenon and Levy’s account fails to capture that 
complexity. 
1.1.2 From Luck to Incompatibilism 
Before presenting that criticism, let me put Levy’s argument fully on the table.  
First, while Levy’s argument itself is directed only at a subset of compatibilists, it is 
part of a larger argument that has as its target compatibilism generally.  Levy claims 
that his argument aims to show only that historical accounts of compatibilism face a 
problem of present luck.  ‘Present luck’ is a term taken from Mele167 that refers to luck 
in and just around the moment of action.  It is distinguished from remote luck, which 
is luck significantly before the moment of action.  Why do historical accounts of 
compatibilism face a present luck problem, according to Levy?  Historical accounts of 
compatibilism, as the name suggests, deny that whether or not a person is free and 
responsible depends only on the non-historical facts true of the agent at the time of 
action.  Non-historical compatibilists tend to think that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for freedom and responsibility are exhausted by facts about the agent’s 
psychological makeup at the time of action, usually whether the agent endorses her 
course of action in the right way.  Historical compatibilists demand that the 
                                                 
167
 Mele (2006) 
  124 
psychological makeup have been produced in a certain way, that it have a certain kind 
of history. 
 What kind of history is required?  Levy rightly points out that a popular answer 
to this question is that the history must be characterized by the agent taking 
responsibility for not only her actions, but also the psychological grounds of her 
actions.  The problem that Levy presents is that because taking responsibility is an 
action, it stands in need of an explanation, and in all likelihood it is going to be 
explained by the very psychological features that it is supposed to ground.  So, for 
example, if Alex has a tendency to be lazy, and he takes responsibility for that 
laziness, but only does so because of the complacency with his laziness that is itself a 
product of his laziness, it is hard to see how his taking responsibility can make him 
responsible for his laziness.  It looks as if Alex could only be responsible for taking 
responsibility in this case, if he was already responsible for his laziness.  Now, it will 
of course be rare for the trait which we are deciding about when we take responsibility 
to be the trait that explains our deciding that way.  But if all our traits and dispositions, 
all our psychological makeup in fact, are such that we cannot be responsible for them 
unless we take responsibility for them, then, it looks like, we cannot effectively take 
responsibility for them unless our taking responsibility for them is not determined by 
those traits and dispositions.   
 The problem that faces historical compatibilists is similar to one faced by 
event-causal libertarians.  According to event causal libertarians our decisions, or 
some important subset of them, are undetermined events.  The problem that this raises 
is that it seems as though the action is just a matter of luck, because there is no 
explanation of why it happens rather than some other action.  This is the problem of 
present luck that faces event-causal libertarians, and Levy’s argument is that the very 
same problem faces historical compatibilists. 
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 Now on the face of it this argument seems rather easy to get around.  One 
might just affirm non-historical compatibilism and avoid the problem of present luck 
entirely.  Alternatively, one might affirm historical compatibilism but not think that 
the relevant historical feature is one of ‘having taken responsibility’.  Gary Watson, 
for instance has affirmed a historical view on which all that is added to a standard non-
historical view are the requirements that one’s psychological makeup not have been 
determined purely by acculturation.
168
  Either by affirming non-historical 
compatibilism or by affirming a version of historical compatibilism which does not 
trace responsibility for the agent’s psychological makeup to actions the agent herself 
has performed, it looks as though one can get around Levy’s argument. 
 That appearance would be deceiving however.  What one can do is get around 
Levy’s present luck argument.  One would not thereby get around the overall luck 
argument against compatibilism that Levy has presented.  The reason why is that 
Levy’s argument essentially consists of two dilemmas, one embedded within the other.  
The dilemma we are already familiar with is the one faced by historical compatibilists 
who affirm a ‘taking responsibility’ condition on moral responsibility for traits and 
dispositions.  The dilemma there is that either these compatibilists must accept that the 
actions involved in taking responsibility are explained by the traits and dispositions 
they are about, in which case they cannot be the ground of moral responsibility, or 
they are not explained by those traits and dispositions, in which case it seems as 
though it is just a matter of luck whether the person took responsibility or not.   
The second, broader dilemma is one faced by compatibilists generally.  It is a 
dilemma on which, on the one hand you can adopt historical compatibilism and face 
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the first dilemma, or you can adopt non-historical compatibilism, in which case you 
face the problem of constitutive luck.  Why do non-historical compatibilists face a 
problem of constitutive luck?  Levy is not entirely clear on this point.  He says that 
non-historical compatibilists face the problem of manipulation, and that the problem 
of manipulation is equivalent to the problem of constitutive luck.  How to interpret 
this? 
The manipulation problem that faces non-historical compatibilism is basically 
that it seems as if there is no principled way to distinguish between an agent who 
meets all the conditions for responsibility endorsed by non-historical compatibilism 
because she was manipulated into meeting those conditions, and an agent who meets 
those conditions in some more normal way.
169
  This is a significant problem for 
compatibilists.  Manipulation is plausibly a defeater of moral responsibility claims, 
and if there is no principled difference to be drawn between the manipulation cases 
and cases of non-historical compatibilist agency, then non-historical compatibilism 
either fails or has to claim that manipulated agents can be morally responsible.  It is 
not clear which is the worse alternative.  What is also not clear is how the 
manipulation problem could be equivalent to a luck problem.  A luck argument would 
have as its conclusion that a person’s actions only happen by luck.  The manipulation 
argument has as its conclusion that compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility are 
overbroad, classifying some cases of manipulation as cases where the agent is morally 
responsible for what she does.  These don’t seem like equivalent problems, nor does it 
seem that the conclusion of a luck argument is implied by the conclusion of a 
manipulation argument. 
There is a way to make sense of Levy’s claim though.  If it were the case that 
everything a manipulated person does she does just by luck, then if someone could be 
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manipulated into meeting the non-historical compatibilist conditions on responsibility, 
then someone could meet those conditions while her action was just a matter of luck.  
So non-historical accounts of compatibilism would then imply that people could be 
responsible for what is a matter of luck, and that is generally agreed to be impossible.  
But is it the case that manipulated actions are just matters of luck?  Looked at from the 
point of view of the manipulator it seems not.  After all the mad scientist controlling 
Jane via mad scientist technical gear will not think it was a matter of luck that she 
robbed the bank and brought the money back the mad scientist’s lair.  The mad 
scientist will say ‘Its not luck that she came here, I spent years developing this 
technology so that with the push of a button I would be enriched by the activities of 
others.’  From Jane’s perspective it will seem like very bad luck that she robbed the 
bank.  From her perspective it will seem like once she got under the control of the mad 
scientist it is just a matter of luck what she ends up doing.  In this case she had the bad 
luck that the mad scientist wanted some money.  It would have been good luck if the 
mad scientist had wanted to support his friend by sending his manipulated subjects to 
see the friend’s Broadway play.  Jane’s actions are all determined by the whims of 
someone she has never met and can have no influence over. 
How do we resolve the conflicting impressions we get from these two 
perspectives?  We don’t.  What we should do is introduce more precision to this 
discussion of luck.  I suggest that we stop taking there to be a simple property ‘being a 
matter of luck’.  When we say that X is a matter of luck I suggest we take that claim as 
elliptical for ‘X is a matter of luck for everyone.’170  The flip side of this suggestion is 
that we take it that claims about luck have the form ‘X is a matter of luck for Y’ where 
X is some state of affairs and Y is something that can be lucky.  What things can be 
lucky?  Humans clearly can.  I think animals clearly can.  After all the deer is lucky 
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when the hunter is so inept that he drops his gun while bringing it up to aim.  I think 
plants might be lucky as well.  Perhaps it is lucky for the oak that its bark was thick 
enough to withstand the small forest fire, and bad luck for the ash that it could not.  
Can rocks be lucky?  I doubt it.  Numbers and other abstracta certainly can’t be.  I 
don’t think that much of importance hinges on specifying the class of objects which 
can be bearers of luck, because all we are interested in here is the class of objects that 
can be morally responsible, which is clearly entirely contained within the class of 
objects that can be bearers of luck. 
With this revision in hand I think we can safely say that Jane’s robbing the 
bank was a matter of luck for Jane but not for the mad scientist.  This is a result that 
suits Levy fine, because Jane did not have control over the bank robbing and yet the 
mad scientist did.  In fact any manipulated action that was suitably chancy would be a 
matter of luck for the victim of manipulation, according to Levy, because of her lack 
of control.  Would manipulated actions be suitably chancy?  Not all would be.  If the 
manipulator suffered from a pair of mental illnesses, one which produced the 
compulsion in him to acquire other people’s things, and the other which produced in 
him a compulsion not to be directly involved in crimes, then, along with his evil 
scientists manipulation know-how, this would mean that in all the nearby possible 
worlds the manipulator would be manipulating Jane.
171
   
But it seems that something has gone wrong here.  Why should it matter, when 
we are figuring out whether something is a matter of luck for Jane, that the evil 
scientist has these particular compulsions?  His having them, rather than some 
temporary and chancy desire to have others rob banks for him is nothing to Jane. So I 
suggest another revision to Levy’s view, in the same spirit as the first.  It is to replace 
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the requirement of chanciness with the requirement of something’s being chancy for 
an agent.  The problem is that it is not obvious how we alter Levy’s account of chance 
to accommodate something being a matter of chance for one person and not for 
another.  After all, if something fails happens at all the nearby possible worlds but 
does happen in the actual world, it doesn’t matter who you are, that thing is just a 
matter of chance on Levy’s account.  My suggested revision to Levy’s account is to 
add to his account of chance that if, for all a person knows or can be expected to 
know, X is a matter of chance, according to Levy’s original account, then X is a matter 
of chance for that person. 
Why should we accept this intrusion of epistemic notions into our account of 
chance?  Because the intrusion is supported by some pretty common intuitions:   
 
Astronomer’s Wager:  Jon, Jane and Pat are astronomers of reasonable 
financial means.  They have been working for years on finding out 
information about a particular planet 400 light years away.  They know 
its mass, its location relative to other planetary bodies in its solar 
system, and that it has an atmosphere.  What they do not know is what 
the atmosphere is composed of.  They know that there are three options 
and that each option for the chemical composition of the atmosphere 
corresponds to a color that the atmosphere will have.  So they decide to 
take bets on what the color of the atmosphere is.  They will find out 
what color the atmosphere is the day after the bet is made.  But they 
have no information about what the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere is, let us say.  They have only just recently invented a 
device that allows them to gather information, and it will not go online 
until the day after the betting.  So when they pick which color to go 
with, they do so in the absence of all information.  Let us suppose that 
Jon, Jane and Pat all have, and have had most of their lives, a liking to 
one of the possible colors, and not the others.  So in the absence of 
information they are just going to pick their favorite colors.  Let us also 
suppose that their favorite colors are all different, so that each can pick 
their favorite color without conflicting with someone else.  Jon picks 
blue.  The next day the information comes in, and the planet has a blue 
atmosphere. 
 
I think it is a matter of luck for Jon that he wins the bet.  But his winning the bet is not 
chancy according to Levy.  Given the distance of the planet, what information they 
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were going to get about its atmosphere was set hundreds of years before the bet, so no 
small change just prior to the bet, or to the information arriving could have changed 
the color of the planet.  All three astronomers have had their favorite colors for years, 
and so again no small change could have produced a different arrangement of bets.  
But clearly the fact that they picked in complete ignorance makes it a matter of luck 
for Jon that he wins. 
 So I think we need an epistemic account of chance, not a metaphysical account 
of chance, if we are going to make Levy’s argument work.   
 
EpNCLuck:  E is a matter of non-constitutive luck for Y iff E occurs 
in the actual world at time t*, but for all Y knows at t, it fails to occur 
in a large proportion of possible worlds obtainable by making no more 
than a small change to the actual world at time t, where t is just prior to 
t*, and the agent lacks direct control over E’s occurrence, and E is 
significant. 
 
Does this suggested revision force upon Levy something he would find objectionably 
radical departure from his original account?  It would not amount to a radical 
departure from the claim that metaphysical chance is sufficient for luck, because 
metaphysical chance is sufficient for epistemic chance, which on this account is 
sufficient for luck.  Metaphysical chance is not necessary for luck on this account, 
however.    Something could fail to be metaphysically chancy but still turn out to be 
lucky on EpNCLuck.  But I don’t think Levy should find that objectionable.  That 
means more things can be counted as lucky than could on NCLuck, and since Levy’s 
goal is to argue that everything we do is a matter of luck, he could hardly find reason 
to complain.  
 So with this new version of Levy’s account of luck, I think we can safely 
assume that all manipulated actions are a matter of luck for the person being 
manipulated, and so that if the standard manipulation arguments are sound, then 
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people are lucky with respect to their constitutive traits and dispositions.  And that 
result, combined with his present luck objection to historical compatibilists, means 
that Levy has a general argument from premises about luck against compatibilism 
generally. 
1.2 Against Levy’s Luck Argument Against Compatibilism 
 There are two reasons to reject Levy’s luck argument and look for another.  
One, the account of luck that Levy gives is false.  Two, the account of luck Levy gives 
deprives his argument of any force not already had by other incompatibilist arguments, 
because of controversies over the nature of control.  The second problem is easier to 
appreciate so I will start there.  To see how controversies about the nature of control 
matter, that the proper account of ‘control’ as it appears in Levy’s account of luck, is 
one on which having control over one’s actions is possible if determinism is true.  
Since the absence of control is a necessary condition of luck, on Levy’s account of 
luck, it would mean that some actions, the ones that are under our control in a 
compatibilist sense, are not such that it is a matter of luck for us that we perform them.  
Why is this so?  Remember that Levy’s dilemma depends on the assumption that 
because our constitutive traits and dispositions are matters of luck for us
172
, actions 
wholly explained by those traits and dispositions are matters of luck.  This assumption 
is false if we assume a compatibilist account of control along with Levy’s account.  
That some action is explained wholly by the presence of dispositions that are outside 
of an agent’s control does not imply that the action is outside of the agent’s control, 
according to standard compatibilist accounts of control.  So even if it is a matter of 
luck which constitutive traits you have, it is not thereby a matter of luck what actions 
you perform, even if those actions are explained entirely by those constitutive traits, if 
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we assume a compatibilist account of control. 
 But if Levy demands that we accept an incompatibilist account of control, then 
it turns out that luck doesn’t play an important role.  If the argument only works 
because of the assumption of an incompatibilist account of control, then why not think 
that it is typical incompatibilist reasons that show that compatibilism is false, rather 
than these new impressive seeming reasons having to do with luck?  Put another way, 
the only way for Levy’s argument to work is for standard incompatibilist arguments to 
also work, and that raises the suspicion that it is standard incompatibilist intuitions that 
are expressed by, for example, the Consequence Argument, doing the work for Levy.  
A different version of the same problem reveals itself when you consider how 
dependent Levy’s argument is on the claim that there is no principled difference to be 
drawn between non-historical compatibilist free agency and manipulated agency.  
Levy’s argument is sound only if manipulation arguments are sound.  If there is some 
principled difference between cases of manipulation and non-historical compatibilist 
accounts of agency, then Levy’s argument is unsound. 
 Now those problems might seem somewhat trivial.  After all Levy can be 
thought of as engaging in the task of supplementing or strengthening incompatibilist 
arguments.  The fact that Levy’s argument is sound only if other incompatibilist 
arguments are sound is not relevant to that task.  That Levy’s argument is not 
independent does not stop it from having some function in the debate.  It would be 
interesting, after all, to know that there was a luck argument against compatibilism, 
since there is often thought to be a luck argument against libertarianism.  A luck 
argument against compatibilism would provide some reason to think that the skeptical 
worries about freedom and moral responsibility can be unified under the description of 
‘problems of luck’.  Even if Levy does not provide independent reasons to reject 
compatibilism, he could reasonably claim to have provided a new way to think about 
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the problems that face a free will defender. 
 I don’t think Levy has done that much though, because I think the account of 
luck he has offered fails.  I do not think chance plus lack of control plus significance is 
either necessary or sufficient for luck.  In particular I want to deny that chance is a 
necessary condition of luck, and deny that chance, the lack of control, and significance 
are together sufficient for luck.  First to chance: 
 
Lottery and Near Cheating:  Tom plays the lottery every week, picking 
the same set of numbers.  After years of failure Tom’s numbers one day 
come through for him, and he wins millions.  Unbeknownst to Tom, his 
friend Bill, wanting to see Tom finally win, hacked into the lottery 
computer system just that week, intending to switch the winning 
numbers to Tom’s numbers.  But, Bill finds out, Tom has actually won 
on his own.  Had Tom not won on his own though, Bill, a skilled 
hacker, would have successfully changed the numbers to make Tom 
win. 
 
I take it that no small change, prior to Tom’s winning would make it the case that Tom 
won.  So it is not a matter of objective chance that Tom won, but it is, I think, a matter 
of luck for Tom that he won.  This is not surprising given the lessons learned from 
Astronomer’s Wager.  There we saw that objective chance was not necessary for luck, 
but that epistemic chance might be.  And if we are considering Tom’s being lucky in 
winning, we can see that there is no counterexample to the epistemic chance condition 
on luck here.  But what about Bill?  It is very important for Bill that Tom do well.  
Tom’s winning the lottery, therefore, means that a deep desire of Bill’s is satisfied, 
and let us say no conditions are operative which prevent the fulfillment of this desire 
from constituting a good for Bill.  Is it a matter of luck for Bill that Tom won the 
lottery?   
 I think it is.  If I am right then Lottery and Near Cheating constitutes a 
counter-example to the epistemic chance condition, because after all, given Bill’s 
knowledge of his own hacking skills and of the nature of the computer system he was 
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to hack into, there was no chance that Tom was not going to win prior to Tom’s 
winning or prior to Bill’s actually hacking into the system.  What makes that true is 
Bill’s intentions to intervene if the numbers chosen did not match Tom’s lottery 
numbers.  But since those intentions were impotent in the actual case, it still seems 
like a matter of luck, for Bill, that Tom won.   
Also, neither objective nor epistemic chance are sufficient for luck.  This does 
not follow from Lottery and Near Cheating of course, but it can be made plausible by 
considering the intuitive ubiquity of chance in our lives, and how unintuitive it is to 
think that luck is similarly ubiquitous.  Consider the following case: 
 
Lazy Thief: Jon, Thomas and Alexandra have plotted to rob a bank.  
These three are very sophisticated thieves and they have prepared 
countermeasures for every eventuality.  Jon has the task of making it 
impossible for them to be tracked after the robbery has been carried off.  
Jon is lazy however, and neglects to cover the outfits they will be 
wearing with a substance which would make it impossible for police 
dogs to track them.  They rob the bank and are pursued by dogs.  Given 
that Jon neglected to properly prepare, it is possible for the dogs to find 
them.  It is however, very unlikely they will do so, as the three thieves 
take normal precautions against it (crossing rivers and the like).  The 
dogs do manage the track them however, against the odds. 
 
I don’t think it is a matter of luck for Jon that the three are caught, despite the fact that 
it is clearly a matter of chance that they are caught.  The fact that had Jon taken 
adequate precautions, the three would not have been caught, makes it the case that it is 
not a matter of luck that they are caught, despite the fact that even without the 
precautions it was still unlikely they would be caught. 
 So chance is neither necessary nor sufficient for luck.  It has been argued, by 
Jennifer Lackey in particular, that lack of control is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
luck.  Levy thinks that lack of control is necessary but not sufficient for luck, and here 
I agree with him.  But what about the question of whether chance, plus lack of control 
plus significance is sufficient for luck?  So far I have presented no counter-examples 
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to that.  If it were the case that Lazy Thief involved a lack of control, on Jon’s part, 
about whether the thieves were caught, then it would constitute such an example.  It 
seems, though, that it is precisely because Jon had it in his control whether it was 
impossible for them to be caught that it is not a matter of luck for Jon that they were 
caught.  Looks may be deceiving here, because it is certainly not in Jon’s control 
whether they were caught.  After all, their being caught was not something Jon 
intended, and it was something Jon took steps to prevent, though unfortunately for his 
fellow thieves he did not take all the relevant steps.  Jon did not bring it about that they 
were caught, he simply omitted an action that would have made it impossible for them 
to be caught.  This case produces a dilemma for Levy, because the fact over which Jon 
had control (its being possible that they would be caught by the dogs) is not chancy, 
and the fact that is chancy (their being caught by the dogs) is not something over 
which Jon exercised control.  So Levy cannot use the strategy of relocating the luck or 
absence of luck.   
1.3  A Different Strategy 
 Levy’s luck argument against compatibilism is the most developed version in 
the literature.  As we saw it both relies on a suspect account of luck and wouldn’t, 
even if Levy’s account of luck were correct, provide a reason to reject compatibilism 
unless standard incompatibilist arguments could be shown to do so.  As I said, I am 
interested in showing that previous forms of compatibilism fail to respond to the 
central incompatibilist insight, and the way to show that is by presenting a 
recognizably incompatibilist argument that does not rely on any of the contested 
notions found in standard incompatibilist arguments.  I want to avoid talk of control, 
not build a substantive account of it into an account of luck. 
 So if I can’t rely on an account of luck that includes the concept of control, 
what account of luck can I rely on?  I don’t think there is an account of luck that is 
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adequate.  Levy’s account comes closest of existing accounts to getting things right, 
and even it undersells the complexity of the concept.  I know of no way to improve on 
Levy’s account of luck that would not amount to ad hoc additions to the account that 
deal with the counterexamples I raised.  Does this mean that it is impossible for me to 
offer a luck argument against compatibilism?  No, for one does not need a fully 
worked out account of luck in order to be reasonably sure of certain claims about luck.   
I will now consider two ways of arguing for premise (4) of the Moral Luck 
Argument, which says that if determinism obtains then every property that a person 
bears which might enter into the moral judgments involved in praise and blame holds 
of that person by luck.  Each will be supported not by a full account of luck, but by 
plausible claims about luck. 
1.3.1 Transfer of Luck 
 The first way of arguing for (4) will look very familiar, as it is very similar to 
the Consequence Argument and Direct Arguments for incompatibilism.  The 
Consequence Argument and Direct Argument both appeal to transfer principles.  The 
Direct Argument appeals to the transfer of lack of responsibility principle, which says 
that if X is sufficient for Y, and you are not responsible for X then you are not 
responsible for Y.  The varied versions of the Consequence Argument also appeal to 
transfer principles.  One, for example, appeals to the principle that if you do not have a 
choice about X and X is sufficient for Y, then you do not have a choice about Y.  
Another appeals to the principle if that you do not control X and X is sufficient for Y, 
then you do not control Y. 
 These transfer principles have all been subjected to significant compatibilist 
scrutiny, and it is easy to see why.  If determinism obtains then the deep past along 
with the laws of nature are sufficient for every fact which might ground an attribution 
of moral responsibility.  All of our thoughts, actions, and character traits are the 
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consequences of facts about the deep past and the fundamental structure of the 
universe, two things that we are not responsible for, we do not control, and that we do 
not have a choice about.  If the transfer principles mentioned above are valid 
principles of inference, then determinism implies that we are not morally responsible 
for, do not have a choice about, and do not have under our control anything at all. 
 I do not want to take a stand on the validity of these inference principles.  What 
I want to do is take a quick look at what an argument that employs the following 
transfer principle can do: 
 
Transfer of Luck:  If X is a matter of luck for p, and X is sufficient for 
Y, then Y is a matter of luck for p. 
 
Transfer of Luck shares the form of the other transfer principles, with the difference 
being that it is about luck rather than control, choice or responsibility.  The argument it 
suggests shares the form of the Consequence and Direct Arguments, but is about luck 
rather than control, choice or responsibility.  That argument is: 
 
i.  If determinism obtains then a proposition expressing the state of the 
world at some time, T, deep in the past (P0) taken together with a 
proposition expressing the laws of nature (L) imply every proposition 
expressing the state of the world at a time later than T, including the 
proposition expressing the state of the world at the present time.  
[(P0&L)P] 
ii.  For any agent at the present time, Tp, P0 is a matter of luck. 
iii.  For all agents L is a matter of luck. 
iv.  So for any agent at Tp (P0 & L) is a matter of luck. 
v.  So, by Transfer of Luck, P is a matter of luck for every agent at Tp. 
 
I am going to grant that (4) follows from (2) and (3), even though the inference is 
invalid.
173
  The problem does not lie there and I am sure that with some work someone 
could justify the inference for a property like ‘is a matter of luck for’.174  What 
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parts’.   
174 Some reason to think so is that the excuse ‘X was just a matter of luck’ does not fail just because 
some part of X was not a matter of luck.  When a gambler wins at roulette, that is a matter of luck, even 
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concerns me are premises (2) and (3), as well as Transfer of Luck itself.  Do we have 
reason to accept any of these claims? 
 I think we have reason to accept (2) and (3). I think that a case can be made 
that the laws of nature are a matter of luck.  As an example of a law of nature that 
might hold by luck I would point to the relationship between the gravitational constant 
and nuclear force.  If the ratio were different life could not exist, or at least not life as 
we know it.  Every living thing is composed of carbon and oxygen, among other 
elements.  These elements are the product of fusion which took place in the core of a 
star.  The ratio between nuclear force and gravity determines how long a star can exist.  
Gravity exerts pressure keeping a star from exploding, while nuclear force exerts 
pressure pushing a star to explode.  Eventually all stars do explode, but given the 
amount of time they have before that event, carbon and oxygen can be created in the 
core of the star.  If the ratio of gravitational force to nuclear force were different 
enough from what the ratio is now, stars would not survive long enough to produce the 
elements necessary for life.  We are all lucky, it seems, that gravitational force bears 
the relationship it does to nuclear force. 
There are a variety of reasons one might question this example though.  Some 
physicists, like Martin Rhees, have claimed that for every possible set of natural laws 
there is a corresponding actual universe and that because of this fact it is not a matter 
of luck that the natural laws are so ‘fine-tuned’ for supporting life.175  One might 
wonder why this claim about a multiplicity of universes would, if it were true, imply 
that the laws of nature being as they are is not a matter of luck.  One might think that 
this claim shows that it is not a matter of chance that a universe with just our laws 
                                                                                                                                            
though part of what made it the case that he won at roulette, that he decided to play roulette that night, 
was not a matter of luck.  If someone’s house gets hit by a tornado, the insurance company could not 
point to the fact that it was not a matter of luck that they bought a house at that location in order to show 
that it was not a matter of bad luck that the house got hit by a tornado. 
175
 Rhees (2000) 
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exists, since for every possible set of laws a universe exists with those laws.  But we 
cannot infer from the fact that X is not a matter of chance, that X is not a matter of 
luck.   As we saw in Lottery and Near Cheating chance is not a necessary condition 
for luck. Perhaps what is meant is that it is metaphysically necessary that there be a 
universe with laws like ours, and also necessary that if human being exist we exist in 
that universe, and because of this ‘Our universe having the laws it has’ cannot be 
something we are lucky or unlucky with respect to.  Can we be lucky that 
metaphysically necessary facts obtain, or that necessary truths are true?  If EpNCluck 
is correct then we can be, because it could be beyond our ability to know that 
something is metaphysically necessary.  Presumably the existence of other concrete 
actual worlds is just the kind of thing that is beyond our ability to know. 
In ordinary discourse one is much more likely to find people treating events in 
the past as matters of luck than treating the laws of nature as matters of luck.  To give 
a personal example, my very existence seems to hinge on a past event which it seems 
plausible, to me at least, to treat as a matter of luck.  My paternal great-great 
grandparents knew each other as children.  They were separated by the violence and 
turmoil that plagued central Europe in the late 19
th
 century and only ever got married 
because of a lucky meeting at a train station.  My great-great grandfather was 
scheduled to depart from that train station around the same time my great-great 
grandmother arrived.  He recognized her and they struck up a conversation, leading 
him to miss his train, leading to them spending more time together that day, leading to 
them starting a relationship, leading, through many more steps, to me.   Everyone on 
my father’s side of the family treats it as a matter of good luck that our recent 
ancestors happened to see each other that day at the train station. 
Historical examples of past events being treated as matters of luck abound.  It 
was a matter of bad luck for Native Americans that they had not developed resistances 
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to common Eurasian diseases prior to the arrival of Spanish galleons.  It was good 
luck for the residents of Kokura and bad luck for the citizens of Nagasaki that clouds 
covered Kokura on the day that the atomic bomb was to be dropped on Kokura, 
causing the Americans to instead destroy Nagasaki.  It also seems pretty clear that, for 
descendants of those who suffered the initial good or bad luck that these events are 
still matters of good or bad luck.   
Even if one does not accept the examples offered, another argument that events 
in the deep past can be matters of luck starts with the premise that events in the recent 
past can be matters of luck.  It is a matter of bad luck that the economy crashed when 
it did for everyone who found themselves without a job at the time.  If one wished to 
maintain that events in the deep past were not matters of luck, one would have to think 
that at some point the event ‘the economy crashing’ stops being a matter of bad luck 
and starts not being a matter of luck at all.  At what point would that happen and what 
would explain this change? 
I think that premises (2) and (3) are more plausible than their denials.  If 
Transfer of Luck is a valid inference principle, then if (2) and (3) are true, then if 
determinism obtains everything is a matter of luck.  Given standard views about the 
relationship between luck and moral responsibility, this would amount to an argument 
for the incompatibilism of determinism and moral responsibility.  But Transfer of 
Luck is not a valid inference principle.  Imagine a gambler who has been down on his 
luck.  He has the quite common but also false belief that his losing more often than not 
at gambling means he is suffering from a case of bad luck, and therefore that he will 
fail in other enterprises as well.  This gambler is impulsive however.  The moment he 
feels his luck has changed he will, though he does not know it is so ahead of time, be 
filled with such confidence that he will immediately find the woman he loves and ask 
her to marry him.  When the gambler wins at roulette, he collects his winnings, leaves 
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the casino, drives to his girlfriend’s house, and asks her to marry him.  It is certainly a 
matter of luck that he won at roulette.  And his winning at roulette caused him to ask 
his girlfriend to marry him.
176
  But it doesn’t seem, to me anyway, that his proposing 
to his girlfriend is not a matter of luck.  After all, he proposed to his girlfriend because 
he loved her and because he thought that decisions taken at that time were bound to go 
well for him.  That he was caused to believe that by a lucky event does not make what 
follows from that belief a matter of luck.
177
 
It is for this reason that I think the first strategy will not work.  But one need 
not endorse a ‘luck transfer’ principle in order to make use of the central insight of the 
Consequence Argument, that determinism imperils moral responsibility because it 
says that how we behave is the consequence of events in the deep past and the laws of 
nature.  What I will argue is that our actions are a matter of luck, because they were 
‘in the cards’ from long before our birth.  The argument for this claim proceeds, like 
all the arguments so far, by appeal to examples.  I will start with examples that are 
uncontroversially cases of luck and try, through successive small alterations, to 
motivate the claim that our actions are not importantly different from uncontroversial 
cases of luck if determinism is true.  I am left with this roundabout method of arguing 
that determinism implies that everything is a matter of luck because I have rejected all 
the current accounts of luck, and because I have rejected the Transfer of Luck 
principle discussed above.  I cannot argue that determinism implies luck from some 
general account of what makes something a matter of luck, because I do not take 
myself or anyone else to be in possession of such a general account.  And I cannot let 
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place in the gambler story that make it the case that his winning at roulette is the cause of his proposal.  
Winning at roulette is not a logically sufficient condition for the proposal. 
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 What might be a lucky event is his proposing to his girlfriend around the time he actually proposed.  
After all if he had only started winning a week later, he wouldn’t have proposed to her for another 
week.  But from the fact that it is a matter of luck that X happened at time T, it does not follow that it is 
a matter of luck that X happened.  It is a matter of luck that the roulette wheel hits 7 when it does, but it 
is not a matter of luck that the roulette wheel hits 7 at all.  It is bound to happen sooner or later. 
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the argument rest on the intuitiveness of the claims that the past and laws of nature are 
matters of luck both because it is not clearly intuitive that they are, and because even if 
they are luck does not transfer along lines of logical or casual sufficiency. 
1.4 A Better Attempt at a Demonstration 
 I want to start with an uncontroversial case of luck.  I take the following case 
of gambling to be just such a case: 
 
Equal Poker:  Jack plays poker for a $1,000 pot.  There is nothing odd 
about the deal, it is a standard poker dealer doing his job as he ought to.  
The only odd thing about the players is that, while they all know only 
their cards, they are all equally skilled at calculating the likelihoods of 
other hands being present in the game given their knowledge of their 
own hands, at knowing how and when to bluff, etc..  Jack wins $1,000. 
 
It strikes me as uncontroversial that Jack’s winning the money is a matter of luck.  
One might say it is partly a matter of skill, but the fact that they are all of equal ability 
speaks against that.  Jack’s win does not express or manifest any skill not possessed by 
the other players, and let us suppose that no one at the table made a mistake 
uncharacteristic of a player of her skill.  I take it that this win is just a matter of luck.  
Now consider: 
 
High Stakes Equal Poker:  In this situation the same factors obtain as in 
Equal Poker except that the pot has changed.  Instead of being a game 
for money, the pot determines which opportunities for careers, social 
standing, and living environment the children of those at the table will 
have.  Jack wins, earning for his daughter the chance for a great job, 
high social standing, and great material conditions throughout her life. 
 
I take it that Jack’s daughter having the life she has is just as much a matter of luck as 
Jack’s winning $1,000.  Changing the stakes does not seem as though it can make a 
game of luck something other than a game of luck.  Now consider: 
 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker:  The situation here is the same as in 
High Stakes Equal Poker except that here every aspect of the lives of 
the children of the players is determined by who wins, who comes in 
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second, etc.  Every hard fact concerning the children of the players is 
set by who wins the pot.
178
  Jack wins, wining for his daughter the same 
great life, but with every last detail set completely.
179
 
 
Again only the stakes have changed, and so it does not seem as though there could be 
any principled move distinguishing High Stakes Equal Poker and Absurdly High 
Stakes Equal Poker.  The next change will not be one of changing the stakes, but of 
changing the players: 
 
Computerized Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker:  Everything is the 
same as Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker except that it is no longer 
Jack and other parents playing for the lives of their children.  Rather, it 
is sophisticated poker playing computers that are playing out the hand.  
All the computers have equal computational abilities, mirroring the 
similarity of skill in Equal Poker.  Jack’s daughter get’s the same life 
she got in Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker. 
 
It is again hard to see what could make it the case that we should judge Computerized 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker differently than Absurdly High Stakes Equal 
Poker.  It doesn’t seem as though it should matter that it is computers, rather than 
people playing.  Contests can be matters of luck even though no people are competing.  
Horse races are matters of luck, plausibly.  The next step in this train of examples is: 
 
Lonely Computerized Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker:  This 
example is exactly the same as Computerized Absurdly High Stakes 
Equal Poker except that there is only one computer playing.  It is 
playing against itself in the same way that a computer can simulate a 
chess or baseball game.  The programs of the competing computers are 
simply brought together into one machine in this example.  Once the 
cards are dealt the computer follows out its simulation program, a 
program which exactly mirrors what occurs in Computerized Absurdly 
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 By ‘hard fact’ I mean those facts about the world at one time that do not logically imply facts about 
the world at some earlier or later time.  I mean to exclude all facts that van Inwagen meant to exclude 
from his specification of the proposition expressing the state of the world in the deep past in his version 
of the Consequence Argument. 
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 This case would not make sense if it were the case that Jack’s daughter already existed, for if she did 
there would already be some relevant facts true of her.  So this example should be treated as though 
Jack is playing for his unborn, and probably unconceived, child.  As for how it could be that all the facts 
about her life are set before she is born, I leave it to the imagination of the reader to provide their own 
favorite philosophical bogey man to do the trick; an evil demon will work. 
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High Stakes Equal Poker. Jack’s daughter gets the same life she got in 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker. 
 
If it doesn’t matter that we replaced the people with computers, it hardly seems to 
matter that we combined the computers.  It is no less a competition than it was in 
Computerized Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker, and presumably that was no less a 
competition than Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker, or at least if it was, this made no 
difference to whether it was a matter of luck how Jack’s daughter ended up.  Time for 
the penultimate example: 
 
Super Lonely Absurdly High Stakes Poker:  There is no computer 
player in this case.  The cards are dealt and they determine by 
themselves how Jack’s daughter’s life ends up.  After all a computer 
could have simply inspected the cards in Lonely Computerized 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker and read off of them how each 
child’s life would go.  There was a mathematical formula that could 
describe the operations of the lonely computer, and that mathematical 
formula could just be used to ground the inference from the cards as 
they are dealt to the life that Jack’s daughter will have. 
 
It is hard to tell what the difference is between this case and Lonely Computerized 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker.  There are no players, and there is no competition, 
but this process will yield exactly the same outputs as the computer played games in 
the earlier examples, give the same initial deal.  It is hard to figure out where the luck 
goes away in this story.  But if it hasn’t left us yet, then I do not see how we can avoid 
saying that in the next example how Jack’s daughter’s life goes should be considered a 
matter of luck: 
 
Super Lonely Absurdly High Stakes Poker with a Cosmic Dealer:  
There are no more cards being dealt, it is initial arrangements of energy 
and matter in the universe that take the cards’ place, and the 
mathematical formula which read the result off the deal is replaced by a 
much more complex formula consisting of all the laws of nature and 
the laws of logic.
180
  The initial input, fed into the formula, invariably 
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 Or if you like the laws of nature are part of the package of information that replaces the cards as 
inputs to the formula, and the formula is just the laws of logic. 
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yields the same life for Jack’s daughter.  The only variances in Jack’s 
daughter’s life comes from varying the initial arrangement of energy 
and matter in the universe. 
 
If luck has been preserved at every step in the iteration of examples, then I 
have my argument, because Super Lonely Absurdly High Stakes Poker with a Cosmic 
Dealer is really just the situation that obtains if determinism obtains, or so close to it 
that no one could hope to block the inference from the proposition that Jack’s 
daughter’s life is a matter of luck in Super Lonely Absurdly High Stakes Poker with a 
Cosmic Dealer to the proposition that Jack’s daughter’s life is a matter of luck if 
determinism obtains.  And of course there was nothing special about Jack or his 
daughter in the example.  This result would generalize.  Every hard fact that concerns 
us would hold, for us, as a matter of luck if determinism obtains. 
So that is my argument for (4) from the Moral Luck Argument. Premise (3) I 
argue for elsewhere.
181
  Premise (1) is what I take to be a standard definition of Moral 
Luck, and even if it isn’t, it can be accepted as a stipulative definition because it is the 
definition I appeal to in my defense of premise (2) which is the only remaining 
premise left to defend.  That defense is the next and final step of the presentation of 
my argument. 
2. The Impossibility of Moral Luck 
I say that moral luck does not exist.  This much the Moral Luck Argument 
requires.  It is common to go further and say that moral luck is impossible.  The idea is 
that it is a conceptual truth that there is no moral luck.  Is this correct?  I am not sure.  
Remember that the Moral Luck Argument is not one that I endorse.  But, like the 
claim that determinism entails luck I think that a good defense can be given of the 
claim that moral luck is impossible.  I will present two arguments for the claim that 
moral luck is impossible which build from a principle I argued for earlier, that praise 
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and blame are forms of benefitting and harming (PBBH).   
To some, such arguments are bound to seem misguided because they constitute 
an attempt to explain something more fundamental by appeal to something less 
fundamental.  The thought is that it is obvious, or knowable a priori, or deeply 
intuitive that moral luck does not exist, and that it is unlikely or impossible to find any 
principles which are more obvious or intuitive than the claim that moral luck does not 
exist which could be used to argue that moral luck does not exist.  I do not agree, for 
two reasons.  The first has to do with the fact that, as we have seen, the concept of 
luck is extremely complex and that initially appealing accounts of luck fail.  Typically, 
those who assert the obviousness of the claim that Moral Luck does not exist also 
endorse either an account of luck on which X is a matter of luck for Y if X is outside 
of Y’s control or an account on which X is a matter of luck for Y if X is a matter of 
chance.  As we saw both of these accounts are false.  Given that the commonly 
accepted accounts of luck are false how can we trust the declarations of obviousness 
or direct intuitiveness of claims involving luck?  The second is that I have known 
many quite clever people who claim that moral luck exists.  That is by itself sufficient 
reason to reject the thought that it obviously doesn’t or that intuition tells us it doesn’t.  
So I think an argument must be offered. 
2.1 Two Arguments for the Impossibility of Moral Luck 
 The fundamental reason to reject the possibility of moral luck is that moral 
luck would be unfair if it existed.  This might sound Pollyannaish.  Certainly unfair 
things exist.  Why should moral luck be an exception?  It has to do with the kind of 
fact would obtain if moral luck existed.  If moral luck existed then people could be 
legitimately praised or blamed for something that is just a matter of luck.  For it to be 
legitimate to praise or blame someone they have to deserve it, so if moral luck exists 
then people deserve to be praised and blamed for what is just a matter of luck.  It is 
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because the fact that would obtain if moral luck existed is a fact about the nature 
morality that it matters whether or not it would be unfair if the fact obtains.  I will 
argue that if people sometimes deserve to be praised or blamed for what is just a 
matter of luck, then people sometimes deserve to be treated unfairly.  What I take to 
be impossible is for anyone to deserve to be treated unfairly.  I am not making the 
strong claim that it is never right to treat people unfairly. I am open to the possibility 
that sometimes consequentialist concerns can outweigh concerns of fairness.  What I 
don’t think is the consequentialist considerations that would make unfair treatment 
right could make unfair treatment deserved.  Or, more simply, I think that if X 
deserves to be treated Y-ly then it is fair to treat X Y-ly, and that any moral theory 
which does not endorse this claim is false.
182
  If this is right then the impossibility of 
moral luck is moral fact, if anything is. 
 I have two arguments for the claim that praising and blaming people for what 
is a matter of luck is unfair.  Both appeal to PBBH, the principle that ff X praises Y, X 
benefits or does good for Y, and if X blames Y then X harms Y, that I argued for in 
the last chapter.  The first argument is called the Argument from Justice, and it says:  
 
J1.  PBBH 
J2.  X does not deserve to benefit from or be harmed by what is just a 
matter of luck for X. 
J3.  So X does not deserve to be praised or blamed for what is just a 
matter of luck for X. 
J4.  For it to be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed X must deserve 
to be praised or blamed. 
J5.  So it cannot be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed for what is 
just a matter of luck for X. 
J6.  Therefore there is no moral luck. 
 
The second argument is called the Argument from Fairness and it says: 
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 This is a material conditional, and so any moral theory which denies that anyone deserves anything 
is one that does not deny this clam linking fairness and desert.  Such views are very likely false, I think, 
and false because of this denial, but they are not false for the same reasons that moral theories which 
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F1.  Every morally relevant property of a person’s actions or will 
counts as either a benefit or a harm to that person. 
F2. If the moral quality of a person’s actions or will is just a matter of 
luck, then that person ought to feel alienated from the moral quality of 
her actions and will. 
F3.  If someone ought to feel alienated from a harm then that harm 
counts as an affliction or a deprivation, not a failure, and if someone 
ought to feel alienated from a benefit, then that benefit counts as a gift, 
not an achievement. 
F4.  PBBH 
F5.  To harm someone because they suffer from an affliction or 
deprivation and to benefit them because they have received a gift are 
both unfair. 
F6.  So it is unfair to praise or blame someone for what is just a matter 
of luck. 
F7.  So X does not deserve to be praised or blamed for what is just a 
matter of luck. 
F8.  For it to be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed X must 
deserve to be praised or blamed. 
F9.  So it cannot be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed for what is 
just a matter of luck. 
F10.  Therefore there is no moral luck. 
 
The Argument from Justice and the Argument from Fairness differ in how they get 
from PBBH to the claim that it is unfair to praise or blame someone for what is just a 
matter of luck.  The Argument from Justice makes the move by appeal to a single 
principle J2, which says that X does not deserve to benefit from or be harmed by what 
is just a matter of luck. The Argument from Fairness appeals to F4, which says that 
it is unfair to benefit or harm someone because they have already received a gift or 
deprivation, as well as several principles about alienation. 
 Before moving on to discuss the details of these two arguments, I need to say 
something about fairness and justice.  Both concepts, that of justice in particular, have 
received attention from moral and political philosophers, and so it is incumbent upon 
me to say what account of fairness and justice I am appealing to in making these 
arguments.  The short answer is that I could appeal to any reasonable account of those 
                                                                                                                                            
deny that desert implies fairness are.  No-desert views fail to explain all the moral phenomena, while 
views which deny that desert implies fairness fundamentally misconceive central moral concepts. 
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concepts, because the claims I make about justice and fairness ought to be considered 
part of what any good account of the concepts needs to account for.  In other words, 
any account of fairness or justice according to which premises J2 and F5 are false is 
thereby a bad account.
183
   
 So these arguments should be consistent with any good theories about what is 
fair and what is just.  Are they?  I think so.  The conclusions certainly are.  Prominent 
theorists about justice and fairness have assumed that it is unfair for people to suffer 
from simple bad luck.
184
    This may seem to only account for half my conclusions, the 
half dealing with bad luck rather than good luck, but in the context of distributive 
justice, which is the context in which justice and fairness are most often discussed, 
ensuring that people do not suffer from bad luck is going to involve ensuring that other 
people do not benefit from good luck, at least most of the time.
185
  As for how well my 
two arguments comport with adequate theories of justice I should point out that justice 
only gets mentioned in the title.  The argument itself is about people getting what they 
deserve or not, and it is only because of my attachment to a view of justice on which 
justice is just a matter of people getting what they deserve that I name the argument as 
I do.  Here again I think that the claims I make accord with any intuitively correct 
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 There are various reasons this could be so.  It could be that J2 and F5 are part of, or follow from part 
of, the common sense concepts of justice and fairness.  It might be that these premises are implied by all 
of the normative theories which are likely to be true, and so that they should be considered part of the 
concepts of fairness and justice.  There are likely other stories besides these to tell about why it is that 
some claims are part of the data to be explained in philosophy and some claims are controversial claims 
we use good theories and accounts to prove or disprove.  I do not want to take a stand on which story is 
the best.  I wish only to stand on the assumption that there is a good story out there. 
184
 See Rawls (1971), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (2000) 
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 To allow people to benefit from good luck would be to place the people who did not have that good 
luck at a comparative disadvantage.  There will of course be some cases in any theory of distributive 
justice that is not perfectly egalitarian where some benefits from good luck will be allowed.  In Rawls’ 
(1971) case it would be after the demands of the second principle of justice are met, while in Dworkin’s 
(2000) case it would be after equality of resources has been established.  But the fact that they would 
allow some uncorrected for benefits from good luck does not change the fact that there is just as much a 
presumption, based on concerns of fairness and justice, against benefiting from good luck as from 
suffering from bad luck.  It is worth noting that after these basic minimums, however specified, have 
been met suffering from bad luck will be allowed as well, but that there will have to be a good 
explanation provided to those who so suffer about why they are allowed to suffer. 
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account of what people do and do not deserve. 
2.2 The Argument from Justice 
 J2 seems overly strong.  Sometimes people do deserve to be benefitted or 
harmed because of something that is just a matter of luck.  In the last chapter I 
discussed the lottery winner and said that the lottery winner does deserve to be 
rewarded for correctly guessing the lottery numbers, even though that was just a 
matter of luck.  The lottery winner had a derived desert claim to the winnings, as 
opposed to a basic desert claim.  So J2 needs to be revised to say that X does not 
basically deserve to be benefitted or harmed by what is just a matter of luck.  J4 also 
needs to be revised in light of this revision to J2, from claiming that the legitimacy of 
praise and blame depends on X deserving to be praised and blamed to claiming that 
the legitimacy of praise and blame depends on X basically deserving to be praised and 
blamed. 
 Is it true both that legitimacy of praise and blame involves basic desert and that 
the desert it involves is basic desert?  I think both claims are correct.  I want to look 
first at whether the desert involved in moral responsibility is basic desert and not 
derived desert. 
2.2.1 Defending J4 
 What would it mean for the desert involved in moral responsibility to be 
derived desert?  One way for this to be true would for constructivism about moral 
responsibility to be correct.  Constructivism is a position in metaethics which states 
that some or all moral truths are true in virtue of human beings have certain 
dispositions to agree to regulate their behavior in accordance with those truths, or to 
behave as if they were true.
186
 Constructivist moral theories can differ about how 
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 For obvious reasons constructivist theories of moral truth are most naturally applied to deontological 
moral theories which make little to no room for axiological claims in the moral theory.   
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many moral truths are constructed and how many are not.  It is not obviously clear that 
all moral truths could be constructed, at least not while meeting the conditions that 
constructivist place on moral truths.  After all constructivists are all committed to 
some form of internalism about moral judgments, and it is not clear how all moral 
reasons could be constructed while still being such as to necessarily produce some 
motivation to follow them, at least in rational people.  To see this imagine a 
constructivist having to answer the question, ‘Why should we care about what 
principles all rational people would decide to abide by?’  The constructivist might say 
that you have a natural impulse to care about what other people think, but this is 
implausible.  To say that one ought to care what others agree to because this shows 
them the kind of respect they deserve, is to appeal to a moral principle in order to 
justify the moral claims of the construction procedure, which suggests that this moral 
demand for respect is not itself constructed.  Another option would be to say that 
moral norms are grounded on other kinds of norms about which we need not accept 
motivational internalism, such as logical or epistemological norms.  
 As long as constructivism is not committed to all moral norms and facts being 
constructed, I think it remains plausible to treat the desert claims involved in moral 
responsibility as matters of basic desert.  It seems absurd to think that we could, 
simply by agreeing, make someone morally responsible for something. If Alex robbed 
the bank, then there is no way that we could, simply by agreeing to it, make it the case 
that Richard is responsible for robbing the bank, and no one, constructivists included, 
thinks that we could.  If we all decided that people could be responsible for 
involuntary movements, wouldn’t that just amount to our being mistaken about what 
responsibility is?  It seems that the basic principles of moral responsibility are also just 
basic moral principles.  So if some moral principles cannot be constructed, principles 
about moral responsibility are a likely candidate. 
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 But while I think that constructivism about moral responsibility is likely false, 
in the end it doesn’t matter whether it is true, because if it is true it is going to have to 
accept some distinction similar to that of basic versus derived desert.  Certainly the 
thoroughgoing constructivist cannot accept precisely that distinction, because there is 
no such thing as basic desert on her theory.  But in order for constructivism to allow 
for plausible first-order normative theories, it is going to have to accept a distinction 
which is nearly extensionally equivalent.  After all there is a real distinction between 
desert claims that come about because of some particular person promising something 
and those that cannot arise in that fashion.  There are certain kinds of desert claims 
which are not up to us in any straightforward way, and there are those which are.  The 
constructivist will think that, in the end, all desert claims are up to us in some way or 
other, but if they do not make a distinction like the one I have made they will not be 
able to explain the priority of certain desert claims over others.  For example, duties to 
country cannot outweigh duties to respect basic human rights.  Duties that arise from 
promises cannot outweigh duties to alleviate severe deprivation.  What explains this?  
I think it is that one set of desert claims derive their force from the other set, and so the 
latter set cannot be overridden by the first.  And constructivist can accept this claim 
about priority or fundamentality, and simply explain what makes the fundamental set 
of desert claims fundamental in some way other than I do.  I say that they are 
fundamental because they are not up to us.  Perhaps the constructivist will say they are 
fundamental because while they are up to all of us taken together, they cannot be up to 
any of us taken individually, or in any group smaller than that of all human agents or 
rational agents.  But such an explanation is necessary, and that explanation will have 
two map on to the common sense distinction between basic and derived desert to a 
significant extent.  So L2 and L5 could be revised to talk about the fundamental kind 
of desert, whatever account of that kind of desert one favors.  
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2.2.2 Defending J2 
 The two key premises of the Argument from Justice are J2 and PBBH.  I 
have already defended PBBH, so all that has to be added to the defense of the 
Argument from Justice is J2.  So why believe that X does not deserve to benefit 
from or be harmed by what is just a matter of luck for X?  For one thing, this principle 
seems like common sense.  When people have their homes destroyed by a natural 
disaster or contract a terminal illness, we say, in some contexts, that they do not 
deserve it.
187
  Now there could be many things that we are responding to about cases 
like natural disaster and disease, but I think what we are responding to is the fact that 
it was just a matter of luck.  To see this, consider the following contrasting case: 
 
The Farmer and the Investor:  Manuel, a poor farmer, lives in the 
shadow of a volcano.  He was born there and has never had the money 
to leave the family farm for somewhere safer.  The volcano has not 
erupted in many years, but it is due for another eruption at any time.  
Jonas is a foolish, rich young man who has decided to invest all his 
wealth in the development of a mineral extraction plant in the shadow 
of the same volcano.  The price of investment is low because everyone 
else is avoiding the project due to safety concerns, while the potential 
payoff is very high because of the quality of the mineral deposits.  
Predictably, the volcano erupts, destroying Manuel’s home and farm, 
and the entire mineral operation along with all of Jonas’ wealth.  Both 
Jonas and Manuel have lost all their worldly possessions. 
 
I think that Manuel clearly does not deserve to have lost all his worldly possessions, 
while I think that it might be the case that Jonas did.  I think the explanation for this is 
that losing everything was a matter of bad luck for Manuel and it wasn’t for Jonas.  
Jonas took a serious risk, knowing that more likely than not he would lose everything 
he had, and his taking that risk was essential to the strategy he had adopted to put his 
wealth to use.  That provides good reason to think it was not a matter of luck that 
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 I think the context in which we are most likely to say and think this is in the case of children who 
suffer in this way. 
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Jonas was wiped out, even though there was an element of chance present.
188
  What 
else could explain the differences in desert, if not the differences in luck?  Both lost all 
their worldly possessions because of a natural disaster over which they did not have 
control.  Neither was the intentional victim of suffering.   
 Because of cases like this I think that J2 is very plausible as long as we keep in 
mind that it is basic desert we are discussing.  Do I have an explanation of why J2 is 
true?  No.  While I denied that the impossibility of moral luck was a brute moral fact, I 
do have to appeal to such brute moral facts somewhere, and I think J2 is a better 
candidate than the impossibility of moral luck.  And while I think that explaining the 
impossibility of moral luck by reference to PBBH, J2, and J5 does amount to giving a 
good argument, in the Moorean sense, I can understand why someone might think that 
the impossibility of moral luck is no less obvious than PBBH, J2 and J5.  It is for this 
reason that I have included the Argument from Fairness.   
2.3 The Argument from Fairness 
 As a reminder let me restate the Argument from Fairness: 
 
F1.  Every morally relevant property of a person’s actions or will 
counts as either a benefit or a harm to that person. 
F2. If the moral quality of a person’s actions or will is just a matter of 
luck, then that person ought to feel alienated from the moral quality of 
her actions and will. 
F3.  If someone ought to feel alienated from a harm then that harm 
counts as an affliction or a deprivation, not a failure, and if someone 
ought to feel alienated from a benefit, then that benefit counts as a gift, 
not an achievement. 
F4.  PBBH 
F5.  To harm someone because they suffer from an affliction or 
deprivation and to benefit them because they have received a gift are 
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 I say only good evidence because I think there are ways of filling in the story so that Jonas’ losing 
everything is a matter of luck.  If Jonas invested the money because of some real practical necessity, 
such as needing to raise enough money to pay a ransom, and the only way to get the return on the 
investment he needed was to invest in the volcano project, then I think that his losing everything is a 
matter of bad luck.  If, on the other hand, Jonas was merely trying to make enough money to move on 
to another larger exploitive project, then it is not a matter of luck that he lost everything, and, I take it, 
he deserved to lose it all. 
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both unfair 
F6.  So it is unfair to praise or blame someone for what is just a matter 
of luck. 
F7.  So X does not deserve to be praised or blamed for what is just a 
matter of luck. 
F8.  For it to be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed X must 
deserve to be praised or blamed. 
F9.  So it cannot be legitimate for X to be praised or blamed for what is 
just a matter of luck. 
F10.  Therefore there is no moral luck. 
 
F10, F9, F7,and F6 all follow from other premises, so they are of no interest in 
evaluating the argument.
189
  PBBH I have already defended, and F8 is the same 
premise as J4, so it has already been defended as well.  That leaves F1, F2, F3 and F5 
as the central premises in this argument.   
 Of those four I think only F1, F2, and F3 need a significant defense.  F5 
strikes me as a truism.  How could it be fair to harm someone for the reason that they 
had already been harmed?   How could it be fair for someone to benefit someone just 
because they had already received a benefit or gift?
190
  The harms and benefits 
mentioned in F5 are unfair because they are entirely gratuitous.  But while F4 is very 
plausible, F1, F2 and F3 are very contestable.  The concept of alienation figures in 
both F2 and F3 and alienation is almost as slippery a concept as luck.   
2.3.1 Alienation 
According to my account, to feel alienated from something is to feel that it 
does not stand in one of several important relations to you, and that it should stand in 
such a relation to you.  After all, to feel that one is alienated from something is to feel 
that something is amiss.  Now it is plausible that for different kinds of objects, there 
are different kinds of relations such that we are supposed to stand in them to the 
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 On the assumption that the inferences are all valid, which I think they are. 
190
 The lottery case is not relevant here though it might appear to be so.  In the case of someone winning 
the lottery we confer a benefit upon them because we promised to do so, not because they already 
received a gift or benefit.  
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object, and such that if we do not stand in that relation to the object then we are 
alienated from the object.  Perhaps for activities the relation is that of authorship.  
Perhaps for talents or capacities the natural relationship is that of controlling them.  
Whatever the correct details are, what I want to defend is the claim that: 
 
X is alienated from Y only if X fails to stand in the relation to Y that it 
is proper or natural for X to stand in.
191
   
 
This gets at one aspect of what we mean when talking about alienation.  Another 
important aspect is the relation the concept of alienation bears to identity.
192
  I have 
identified a necessary condition of alienation, but I am far from having a sufficient 
condition to give.  After all we fail to stand in natural and proper relations to things all 
the time without being alienated from them.  When someone fails to be killed by 
smallpox they have failed to stand in the normal relation to smallpox, but they are not 
alienated from smallpox.  There are ranges of objects for which it doesn’t make sense 
to talk about our being alienated from them.  Some we can’t be alienated from because 
of their insignificance (dying your hair blue doesn’t make you alienated from it), and 
some because it is not clear whether there is a natural or proper relation at all (what is 
our natural relation to dandelions?), among other reasons.  I think that for it to make 
sense to claim that we are alienated from an object, it has to be the case that the natural 
or proper relationship we bear to it is one that makes it somehow expressive of our 
identity.  So I will, for the remainder of this paper treat alienation as at least: 
 
the relation that holds between a person, P, and some object, X, when P 
does not bear relation R to X, where R is the natural or proper relation 
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 It will likely strike the reader that this account is quite broad.  While the account will narrow, it is 
worth noticing that any adequate account of alienation is going to have to be quite broad in order to 
accommodate the wide range of things from which a person can be alienated.  We speak of people 
being alienated from elements of their psychology, like addictive desires, from other people, from the 
products of their labor, from their state, from their religion, etc.   
192
 The connection seems pretty well agreed to.  Frankfurt started a tradition of talking about desires 
from which we are alienated as being external desires, and that they have that status because we fail to 
identify with them. 
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for P to bear to X, and where P standing in relation R to X entails that 
X is expressive of some important aspect of P’s identity.   
 
This account is not a lot to go on however, and so I will, for the most part, rely on 
appeals to examples to justify my claims about alienation.  If the reader is not attracted 
to this loose and very general account of alienation, my hope is that the appeals to 
examples are sufficiently convincing. 
2.3.2 Defending F2: Alienation and Luck 
2.3.2.1 The Intuitive Case for F2 
Why would it be the case that if the moral quality of Y’s actions and/or will is 
a matter of luck for Y then Y ought to feel alienated from the fact that she her actions 
and/or will have that moral quality?  That would amount to saying that moral quality 
of her actions and/or will did not bear the proper relationship to Y’s identity, because 
it is a matter of luck for Y.
193
  Why would that be the case?  Is it because luck is 
universally alienating?  Obviously it is not.  It is a matter of luck which parking space 
I get in the morning, and I am not alienated from my parking space.   
 The answer is that luck seems to be an all-purpose defeater of the kinds of 
relations we ought to stand in to evaluatively significant features of our life.  In what 
follows I will present a series of examples to motivate this claim. 
The first set of examples are one’s in which the circumstances in which a 
person lives are a matter of luck. 
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 On my way of thinking about alienation, it could be that we are alienated from X in one way but not 
in another.  If for some object there are multiple distinct relationships that are proper for us to stand in 
to it, then we could be alienated from that object with respect to one relationship, but not the other.  
This fact forces me to make the argument for the No-Moral Luck more complex.  Instead of just talking 
about alienation simpliciter I should say that ‘if X is a matter of luck for Y then Y ought to be alienated 
from X at least with respect to one relationship.’  This is not an altogether strange way of talking.  
Suppose that after years of good relationships, two sisters become embroiled in a fight over each other’s 
religious activities.  It might be that, qua friends, they are alienated from each other, but that ‘she is still 
my sister.’ 
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Working Class Alienation – Tom works the line at a factory.  He works 
12 hours a day so that he can earn enough to pay for rent, food and 
transportation.  This work schedule leaves no time for anything other 
than sleeping, eating, washing his clothes and a few other activities 
necessary to keep his job.  Tom works this way because the factory 
happened to be hiring when Tom left school.  Now that he works there 
he has little ability to retrain for a different job.  He is now stuck in this 
position.  Tom knows people he grew up with whose work situation is 
quite different.  When they left school there were other opportunities 
available.  Tom thinks that if things had gone a little differently for 
him, if there had been a job opening that would have allowed him to 
pursue more education while working, that he would be capable of 
doing much more with his life than simply subsist.  In particular Tom is 
certain he could be a sculptor, greatly desires to be a sculptor and is 
greatly frustrated by his inability to become one. 
 
It is not enough, for Tom to count as being justifiably alienated from his job and from 
the material conditions of his life that it is not the life he would choose.  Most people, 
perhaps all people, live a life that is not exactly what they would choose.  The feeling 
of alienation is not the feeling of disappointment.  It is important in this example that 
Tom has some concrete idea about what it is he should be doing.  He ought to be a 
sculptor.  That is what he values doing, and he thinks he has the proper skills for it.  It 
is not just any divergence from what one wants out of life that could make for 
alienation, but this is not just any divergence.  To see that imagine the case with a 
slight change, where what frustrates Tom is how much work he has to do, or how he 
cannot buy a good mattress, or microwave.  These are ways in which his life is less 
than optimal, by his own lights, but the frustration Tom feels over those divergences 
would not and could not, assuming Tom is a psychologically healthy adult, constitute 
a feeling of alienation from his life. 
 
Arranged Marriage – Frieda lives in a culture where marriages are 
arranged.  At a young age it was decided that she would marry Samuel, 
a member of a prominent family who wanted access to the lands owned 
by Frieda’s parents because of the discovery of oil on, or under, that 
land.  So Frieda is married to Sam because there happened to be oil 
under her parents’ farm.  Sam is not a cruel or heartless man.  He is 
simply married to someone he does not love and who does not love 
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him.  They are polite and respectful to one another, but they do not 
enjoy each other’s company, at least not any more than one would 
enjoy the company of a casual friend.  But, being married, they are 
required to support one another in their life goals, and share some 
meaningful goals in life, like raising a family, running a household, 
planning for retirement, engaging with the community at social 
gatherings, etc. 
 
What seems clear to me is that if Frieda does not feel alienated from her marriage and 
the aspects of her overall situation which come along with it, then there is something 
wrong with the way that Frieda is thinking about her situation.  Perhaps she lacks the 
self-respect to think that core aspects of her life ought to be determined by her 
decisions.  Perhaps she is unreflective and so does not appreciated the fact that 
different modes of life are possible.    
 
Orphan – Shu is a Chinese orphan, whose parents died in a car wreck.  
He is eventually adopted by a German couple and goes to live with 
them in Munich.  He is immersed in Bavarian culture.  But he could, he 
thinks to himself from time to time, just as easily have been adopted by 
a British couple, an Indian couple, or a Chinese couple.  This thought 
makes Shu feel as though the culture in which he is immersed is not 
really his own, that the activities characteristic of members of that 
culture that he engages in are not fully wholehearted.  It is not that he 
thinks German culture is somehow not valuable.  How could he?  Who 
doesn’t like Bach?  It is just that he feels as though the culture is not his 
culture.  After all he had parents to whom he was biologically related.  
He had an ethnic/cultural group in which he would have been 
immersed, had tragedy not struck. 
 
These are all cases of alienation, and, I would claim, are paradigm cases of it.  What I 
want to highlight about these cases is that in them, it seems pretty clear, the feeling of 
alienation is caused by the belief that the circumstance from which the person is 
alienated is just a matter of luck.  In Tom’s case what was a matter of luck were the 
material conditions of his life, and this was a matter of luck in virtue of it being a 
matter of luck which employers were hiring and not hiring when he left school.  In 
Frieda’s case that it was a matter of luck that oil was found beneath her family’s farm 
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made it a matter of luck who she was married to.  In Shu’s case that it was a matter of 
luck which parents adopted him, and this made it a matter of luck which culture he 
lived in.   
Now imagine that Tom had lost out on the chance of being a sculptor not 
because of the poor opportunities when he graduated, but because he was lazy the first 
few years out of school, and did not pursue the opportunities that existed.  Would it 
any longer be appropriate for him to feel alienated from his life, or at least from the 
fact that he never had the opportunity to get the kind of job that would allow him to 
develop his ability as a sculptor?  I think it would not be.  After all it was a decision of 
Tom’s that led to his situation, and for one’s life to be shaped by one’s decisions is 
how things are supposed to be.
194
   
2.3.2.2  A Problem for F2 
 So that is the intuitive case for F2.  I think the intuitive case is strong, but I 
think that the premise needs to be refined so as to escape an equally intuitive case for 
denying F2.  The basic problem is that even bracketing issues about the relationship 
between determinism and luck, luck seems to pop up quite a bit in ordinary life.  And 
when luck appears, it is not always alienating.  In fact there are some very central 
projects in one’s life the success of which depends, for most people, on luck.  So, for 
example, it is for most people a matter of luck that they meet their eventual spouse.  
Many facts about one’s children and the kind of people they will become depend on 
luck.  Whether one is successful in one’s chosen career seems to depend on luck.  But 
we are not alienated from our spouses, our children, and our jobs.  So F2 is false, so 
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 Complexities can arise given the nature of the decision.  Suppose that instead of years of laziness, 
Tom got to his current situation because he passed up one great opportunity.  When he was presented 
with the opportunity Tom was not in his right mind, whether because of drinking or fatigue.  The 
decision he made, to pass up the opportunity, was not in accord with his considering beliefs on how to 
handle such situations, and he cannot imagine what he was thinking when he made the decision.  It 
strikes me as plausible that he should feel alienated from how his life turned out, because in this case 
the decision did not bear the proper relationship to his identity.  In one sense he didn’t make the 
decision at all, it was just the alcohol/weariness talking. 
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the argument goes. 
 I think the argument against F2 fails and I think that to see why one needs to 
attend to two facts.  One is that alienation, according to the definition I have offered, 
only results when a natural relationship is subverted somehow. The second is that 
there is a difference between something’s being just a matter of luck for a person and 
something’s being partly a matter of luck for that person.  In F2 I mean to be talking 
about benefits and harms that are entirely a matter of luck.  What is more, I think that 
in the cases under discussion the natural relationship at issue is one that admits of 
partial luck, just not complete luck.  
 Lets take a closer look at one of the problem cases for F2, the case of one’s 
relationship with a spouse.  As we saw earlier with Arranged Marriage, having the 
matter of who will be one’s spouse settled just by luck is alienating.  What is also 
almost always true is that it is just a matter of luck whether two people who will 
become spouses meet.  I met my wife in college and my meeting her was almost 
entirely the result of our happening to pick the same dorm hall to live in.  Our meeting 
was entirely a matter of luck I think.  But does that mean our subsequent marriage is 
entirely a matter of luck, or put another way, is it therefore entirely or completely a 
matter of luck that we got married?  Bracketing concerns about determinism, I don’t 
think so.  It was a matter of luck that we met, but from that point on our relationship 
developed as it did in large part because of choices we made.  That the relationship is 
a product, in large part, of our choices, it seems to me the relationship is probably not 
a matter of luck, not completely anyway.  Certainly the fact that a necessary condition 
of our getting married, our meeting in the first place, was a matter of luck does not 
imply that our getting married is just a matter of luck.  It is a necessary condition of 
my admittance to the Cornell graduate program that Cornell University was at some 
point founded, and it is a matter of luck to me that this happened.  But my being 
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admitted was not just a matter of luck. 
 Now my meeting my wife is more than just a necessary condition of our 
getting married, it is an essential part of any properly informative story about our 
relationship.  The same is not true of Cornell’s founding and the story of my career as 
a graduate student.  The right thing to say here is that because of the luck involved in 
meeting my wife, my marrying her is partly,  but not completely a matter of luck, and 
that being partly a matter of luck in no way involves our failing to have the 
relationship natural between spouses.  There is a significant difference between the 
Arranged Marriage case and the case of my wife and me.  Our choices helped to guide 
our relationship in a way that Frieda’s did not, and this explains why it is not true that 
we ought to feel alienated from our marriage and Frieda should.   
 The case of one’s relationship to career success is different.  Career success is 
a matter of luck to a far greater extent than one’s deep personal relationships are.   
Whether one gets a job for which many others are competing is just a matter of luck in 
many labor markets.
195
  Whether one advances in one’s profession depends in large 
part on how well others do relative to you.  Whether a person keeps her job depends in 
large part on market forces which are just a matter of luck for almost every individual 
in the market.
196
  It seems as though success in one’s career is not just partly a matter 
of luck, that it is, or approaches, being completely a matter of luck.  It is not just that it 
is a matter of luck that the process leading to career success of failure started as it did.  
Every step along the way to career success or failure looks like it is a matter of luck 
that it occurs as it does.  But ought we be alienated from our careers?  More 
importantly, ought we be alienated from them for the reasons listed, i.e. the 
dependence of our success upon the actions of others and the operation of impersonal 
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 The philosophy job market seems to be the paradigm example of luck in job allocation. 
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 The behavior of market forces being a matter of luck is even clearer than natural disasters being a 
matter of luck, since market forces are, in the west at least, largely driven by investment activities 
which are only nominally distinguishable from gambling. 
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market forces.
197
 
 I think we should distinguish between two different ways to be successful.  
One is success at the activity one is asked to do in one’s career, and the other is career 
success.  The standards for the first kind of success differ from career to career.  
Authors need to be able to write good books, accountants need to be able to accurately 
and honestly calculate debt and holdings and the like, managers needs to be able to 
promote efficiency among their employees.  The standards of success for career 
success are more general, they are the same standards across careers.  I have in mind 
things like advancement in rank or pay, gaining the respect of one’s colleagues, 
acquiring a stake in decision making, etc.   
 It is career success, conceived of generally, that seems to be mostly a matter of 
luck, not success in the activity which constitutes one’s career.  Whether one is a good 
author does not depend on what your publisher thinks of you, whether you advance in 
the publishing world does.  And while the natural relationship authors have to writing 
does plausibly exclude that success being mostly a matter of luck, it is not at all clear 
that the same is true of career success.
198
  So I do not think that the kind of luck we 
have in how our careers go entails that we ought to feel alienated from our success or 
failures in our career, because the aspects of our career that ought not be matters of 
luck usually aren’t, and those aspects which are usually matters of luck are such that 
this is not a problem. 
 So in some aspects of our lives, luck is not alienating.  What F2 claims is that 
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 It is important to make these distinctions, because there might be reasons having to do with 
oppression and repressions of creativity that make it the case that we ought to be alienated from the way 
we earn our living, and these reasons don’t seem to be directly relevant to luck. 
198
 An interesting question is how much the natural relationship depends on the importance someone 
ascribes to the object in question.  So while many recognize that career success depends on recognition 
from others and because of that don’t treat it as very important, some people still do.  For them career 
success is among the central goals of their lives.  When career success is given this kind of importance I 
think that the natural relationship to career success changes and it becomes luck excluding, because 
career success is, for this person, at the same time a central life goal, and I think that the natural 
relationship to our central life goals is luck excluding. 
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when it comes to the moral quality of our actions and will, luck is alienating.  The 
reason why is that our success or failure in our moral projects is, or ought to be, one of 
the central preoccupations of our lives, and so the general point I argued for earlier, by 
appeal to examples, covers that moral success. 
2.3.3 Defending F3 
Now I want to look at F3.  Why should one think it is true that if someone 
ought to feel alienated from a harm then that harm counts as an affliction or a 
deprivation, not a failure, and if someone ought to feel alienated from a benefit, then 
that benefit counts as a gift, not an achievement?  I think that feeling alienated has a 
regular, though no necessary, connection with other emotions, like pride, shame and 
guilt.  If one feels alienated from some aspect of one’s life, it inhibits emotions of this 
kind in relation to that aspect of one’s life.  So, for example, if I feel alienated from 
my job, then it would be very odd for me to take pride in the success of my 
corporation.  It would be strange to run across someone who wore shirts with the 
company logo on it, attended corporate sponsored activities, and generally speaking 
loved for things to go well at work, who also claimed to feel that their job was some 
alien encumbrance on them.  It would be similarly strange to find someone who 
treated the social mores she was raised with as alien, who felt guilt anytime she failed 
to live up to them.  While we might not disbelieve her expression of alienation 
because of this expression of guilt, we might ask her to see that what made those 
mores feel alien should also make her not care so much about what they had to say 
about her.  It would seem to us, or to me at least, that she was failing to sufficiently 
follow the thought or feeling that the mores were alien through. 
The two examples I have mentioned are certainly not sufficient to prove that 
there is a natural connection between these emotions.  That would take some empirical 
work by psychologists, if they could be convinced that such investigations served a 
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purpose.  But I think that the connection is a commonly accepted one, and that is 
enough for me to go on with confidence to ask why such a natural connection between 
feelings of alienation and the absence of feelings of pride or guilt should matter.  The 
reason is that the inhibition of guilt and shame is exactly what is appropriate in the 
case of gifts and afflictions.  If the reason you have a great job is entirely because 
some friend or family member gave it to you through nepotism, then it is a gift.  If you 
walk around feeling proud of yourself for getting that job, then you are either 
delusional or ridiculous.  If you take ill because an epidemic has stricken your town, 
then to feel guilty for failing to go in for work or be a good host would be irrational.  
Gifts and afflictions are not things to feel guilty or proud about.  I think this fact 
explains why it is that there is a natural connection between feelings of alienation and 
the inhibition of feelings like pride and guilt.  It is because feeling alienated from a 
harm or a benefit makes success and failure seem like things that happen to one that 
we don’t normally take pride in them or feel guilt because of them. 
2.3.4  A Replacement for F2 and F3? 
As I said, alienation is a tricky concept, and while I think that what I have to 
say about alienation is correct, I also want to provide independent reason to accept the 
Argument from Fairness.  Essentially F2 and F3 aim to show that if the moral 
qualities of our actions and/or will are just matters of luck, then our having good moral 
qualities is like a gift, and our having bad moral qualities is like an affliction.  I think 
this claim is intuitive on its own merits, and to show that I will appeal to pairs of 
examples, in one of which there is an accomplishment or failure that is brought about 
in the normal way, while in the other the same result comes about because of luck. 
 First to cases of accomplishments and gifts: 
 
John’s Job:  John is looking for a position with a local business.  He 
works on his resume, lines up his references, puts in a personal call to 
the Human Resources representative, and lands the interview.  In 
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response he buys himself a new suit, so as to look professional and 
serious, and practices his interviewing skills.  The interview goes well, 
in large part because of John’s practicing for it, and John learns that he 
has the job within a week of interviewing.  His new employers tell him 
how impressed they are at how he presented himself, his references, 
and his prior experience.   
 
John’s Job with Luck:  Now imagine that instead of getting back to 
John telling him how impressed they were with him, his employers let 
him know that his getting the job was determined by a random number 
generator.  The company is in the business of creating and selling such 
generators, and as a PR stunt has decided to fill all their job vacancies 
using it.  It was just a matter of luck that John got the job.   
 
Sarah’s Knowledge:  Sarah is very intellectually curious about a great 
many topics.  This curiosity has led her to pursue advanced degrees in a 
variety of areas.  She studies diligently and always puts her best effort 
into her work.  As a result she has deep knowledge over a wide range 
of topics. 
 
Sarah’s Knowledge with Luck:  Sarah has deep knowledge over a wide 
variety of topics, but not because of curiosity, diligence and hard work.  
Sarah is very intelligent, has a photographic memory, and, as she lives 
in Ithaca, is constantly exposed to people with advanced degrees.  
Through conversation at parties she has managed to develop deep 
knowledge in all the areas where her friends are well educated. 
 
The claim here is that one would not be justified in taking equal amounts of pride in 
the accomplishment for both of the pair of situations, in each case, where what 
distinguishes the pairs is the extent to which luck plays a role in the accomplishment 
having happened.  The explanation for why you aren’t justified in taking equal 
amounts of pride is that in one of the two cases, it just doesn’t look like the 
accomplishment is actually your accomplishment, or even an accomplishment at all.
199
  
Something similar seems to go for unsuccessful actions and failure. 
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 I will say that I think a person treating a successful action of hers as something other than an 
accomplishment is an expression of alienation from the action.  That I cannot come up with an 
independent case for the principle argued for by F2 and F3 that doesn’t at the same time suggest that 
alienation is lurking in the background is part of the reason why I think that alienation has some 
explanatory role to play. 
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Game Show:  George is a big trivia fan.  He loves to discover and 
memorize interesting little tidbits.  This being the case he applies to be 
a contestant on Jeopardy.  He makes it on to the show and proceeds to 
play horribly.  He wagers poorly, uses a bad strategy in picking 
categories and amounts, rings in for questions he has no idea about, and 
allows these mistakes to flummox him so that he misses questions he 
knows the answers to.  He plays an all around poor game. 
 
Game Show with Luck:  In this case, instead of playing the game 
poorly, George plays as well as he can.  He makes none of the mistakes 
mentioned in Game Show.  He wagers intelligently, picks categories he 
knows best, rings in only if he is likely to know the answer, and keeps 
his cool.  Unfortunately the day he gets on Jeopardy the categories are 
ones in which he is not very knowledgeable and in which his opponents 
are well versed.  George does his best, but the combination of the 
opponents and categories he happened to get leads to his losing. 
 
George could and should say, in the luck case, that his not winning the game was no 
failing of his.  It was because of bad luck in the categories that he lost, and while this 
result was unwelcome it was not his failure.  It doesn’t look like it was anyone’s 
failure.  There is no reason for him to feel shame at his performance or regret about 
how he played.  The most that seems rational here is a wistfulness about how 
differently things might have gone.  This contrasts with the case where George did not 
win because of his own poor play.  There he should feel regret and self-recrimination.  
After all in that case, it seems obvious, he blew his opportunity.    
 
Novelist:  Duncan is a would-be novelist.  He has the outlines of a great 
story in mind.  He knows the characters and he knows the plot.  The 
book is going to turn on a crucial chapter which consists of the 
description of the internal anguish and struggle of the protagonist.  The 
chapter is a tough one to write and the task of writing it has been 
keeping Duncan from making much progress on the writing of the 
book.  One day while having iced tea in the sunshine, Duncan suddenly 
realizes how to write the chapter.  He begins to write, but the 
excitement of finally figuring the chapter out is too much for Duncan to 
handle while writing.  He becomes distracted, calling up friends to tell 
them that he has finally figured it out, having a few shots of whiskey, 
and imagining what he will say in his interview with the London 
Review of Books.  In all the excitement he neglects to actually write 
the chapter.  When he goes back to his computer after having distracted 
himself, he finds that he no longer remembers what to write. 
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Novelist with Luck:  In this case Duncan does not allow himself to be 
distracted with bragging, celebrating and daydreaming.  In this case 
Duncan’s building happens to have a fire drill just after he figures out 
how to write the chapter.  Despite his best attempts to keep in mind the 
way to write the chapter, by the time he gets back up to his apartment 
the knowledge is gone. 
 
In the first case, Duncan wasted his opportunity to do a good job writing his book.  In 
the second case, it seems legitimate to describe that opportunity as being stolen from 
him.  Here again, as with the previous examples, we see that it is rational, when a 
successful or unsuccessful attempt occurs, to not feel the emotions characteristic of 
such a successful or unsuccessful attempt if it is due to luck.   
Now as I said I think the best explanation of what I take to be the common 
intuitions about these cases is that the normal emotional reactions to success and 
failure are blocked by the unpleasant feeling of alienation from the results.  So I stand 
by the Argument from Fairness as presented. 
2.3.5 Defending F1 
By way of defending F1 I want to do away with a misreading of it which 
makes it seem implausible.  It can sound extremely egoistic to say that the only 
morally relevant things about my actions and will involve my being harmed or 
benefited.  This sounds incredibly self-absorbed, as though affairs that do not work to 
my harm or benefit cannot be morally relevant for me.  After all isn’t it in cases where 
no benefit accrues to me that I show most clearly my altruism?  And isn’t it in cases 
where it wouldn’t have hurt me at all to be kind that I show myself to be heartless or 
cruel?  I do not wish to endorse such a self-centered position.  I think that, bracketing 
concerns about determinism and luck, whenever someone does something 
blameworthy, they have suffered a harm, because they have failed to respond correctly 
to the relevant moral decisions.  I take it that any time one fails, then one is harmed, 
  169 
even if one does not have a desire to succeed.  By way of illustration think of a drug 
addict who has been enrolled in a forced rehabilitation program, where drugs are 
denied him and obstacles to consuming drugs are put in his way.  These obstacles and 
denials are for his own good and effective enough that it takes significant planning and 
effort on the drug addict’s part to get access to narcotics.  Suppose the drug addict gets 
some drugs, consumes them and so fails to rehab properly.  Even though the addict 
had no desire to kick his habit, the fact that he failed at rehab and the fact that it would 
have been better for him to rehab, makes it the case that he has suffered a harm.   
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Chapter 4:  Real Selves and Reasons Responsiveness 
 
 How could a compatibilist respond to the Moral Luck Argument?  Not by 
advancing particular accounts of control and ability, for the argument ought to be 
compatible with any coherent account of those concepts.  What she would have to do 
is argue against either the claim that Moral Luck is impossible or the claim that 
determinism implies that every morally relevant property of ours holds of us as a 
matter of luck.  How would she do that?  I have already pointed out ways in which 
taking certain positions in moral theory would allow her to deny that Moral Luck is 
impossible.  One might deny PBBH, perhaps by endorsing hedonism about the good 
for human beings.  One might deny that if X does not deserve to be treated Y-ly then it 
is not fair to treat X Y-ly.  One might question the connections I have argued for 
between alienation and fairness.  These would all be ways of showing that the Moral 
Luck Argument is unsound, by attacking the moral presuppositions of the denial of 
the possibility of moral luck. 
 What would be the problem with this approach taken by itself?  It would have 
the same problem that other piecemeal approaches to compatibilism have, which I 
mentioned in the introduction.  It would not give us any reason to reject other 
incompatibilist arguments we have seen or give us any reason to be confident that we 
could respond to future incompatibilist arguments that might be developed. 
 I think the proper strategy for compatibilists to pursue is one in which 
particular responses to incompatibilist arguments are derived from an explanatorily 
powerful, extensionally adequate account of what makes actions free and such that we 
can be morally responsible for them.  We would not want a collection of ad hoc 
principles which, taken together, give an extensionally adequate account of freedom 
and moral responsibility.  What we want is an account which explains why free 
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actions are free in a way that makes sense of why all those actions have the moral 
importance we ascribe to them.  After I present my favored compatibilist account, I 
will explain how it is of use in responding to standard incompatibilist arguments.  
 I assume that the starting point for any good compatibilists account of free 
agency and moral responsibility starts with the claim that freedom is connected in 
some deeply important way to reason.  The belief in such a connection has a long 
history among both compatibilists and libertarians and it has some claim to being a 
fundamental shared belief about freedom of the will.  Both the compatibilist views I 
will look at in this chapter are organized around the claim that to be free is for one’s 
actions to be controlled by one’s practical reason in the right kind of way. 
1.   Watson’s ‘Real Self View’ 
 Watson begins the presentation of his view with a qualified endorsement of the 
classical compatibilist claim that “a person is free to the extent that he is able to do or 
get what he wants.  To circumscribe a person’s freedom is to contract the range of 
things he is able to do.”200  Classical compatibilists like Hobbes, Locke, Hume and 
more recently Ayer, Schlick, Hobart and Nowell-Smith all endorsed a very similar 
principle.
201
  That principle I will call the conditional account of freedom: 
 
(CAF)  X does A freely iff if X desires to A then X will A and if X does not 
desire to A then X will not A. 
 
The idea behind CAF is that freedom consists in the dependence of one’s actions on 
one’s will, where one’s will is here construed as an those desires one has that are 
relevant to the action in question.  Obviously this formulation of CAF is insufficient.  
For one thing a person can have conflicting desires, and CAF implies that people who 
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 Ayer (1954), Schlick (1939), Hobart (1934), Nowell-Smith (1948) 
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have conflicting desires cannot act freely, and this is not true.
202
  A further problem is 
that the identification of one’s will with what one desires is overly restrictive.  After 
all on a very common sense way of thinking about desires, I do not desire to go to the 
dentist and when I do go it is purely because I realize it is good for me to go to the 
dentist.  CAF implies that I do not act freely in this case, and that seems not just 
wrong but close to backwards.  There are obvious refinements to make to CAF to get 
it around these problems.
203
  A problem remains, however, which cannot be easily 
dismissed, and it has to do with internal compulsion.   
 Internal compulsions, like those experienced by those with obsessive 
compulsive disorder, are plausibly defeaters of freedom.  Actions which are explained 
by internal compulsions are prima facie un-free.  The difficulty internal compulsions 
present is that they do not prevent someone from getting what she wants, rather they 
determine, in part, what she wants.  CAF seems to be silent on issues regarding the 
source of desires.  All that matters on this view is the relationship between desire and 
action, not desires and the mechanisms which produce them.   
 This problem is one that Watson is aware of.  His awareness of the problem 
explains the qualified nature of his endorsement of CAF or something like it.  How 
does he solve the problem?  First by introducing a seemingly unhelpful addition to 
CAF: 
 
(CAF’)  X does A freely iff if X really wants to A then X will A and if X really 
does not want to A then X will not A. 
 
How does adding the ‘really’ help?  On its own it doesn’t.  But what it suggests is the 
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 Suppose I both want ice cream and also do not want ice cream.  Then, whether I get ice cream or not 
I will fail one half of the consequent of CAF.   
203
 To deal with the first problem one could revise CAF so that it is dependence on the strongest desire 
that a person’s actions must depend on.  To deal with the second one could remove talk of desires 
entirely and replace it with something like ‘explanatory attitude’, where this could cover evaluative 
judgments, desires, intentions, etc.  It is clear that Frankfurt, in talking about wants and wanting meant 
to be talking about this larger class of attitudes. 
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view that we sometimes don’t really want to do the things we desire to do.  This in 
turn suggests a diagnosis of what is going wrong in cases of internal compulsion – the 
subject of the compulsion is pursuing things she doesn’t really want even though she 
has a desire for them – that allows us to keep interpreting cases of un-free actions as 
cases where the person’s actions do not depend on her will. 
 So that is how employing the concept of ‘really wanting’ rather than just 
‘wanting’ can help.  But until we have an idea of what is involved in an agent really 
wanting A rather than merely wanting A we won’t know whether Watson is entitled to 
make use of the benefit of this distinction.  There are two questions to be answered 
here.  The first is what makes it the true that ‘X really wants A’ and the second is what 
psychological states constitutes really wanting A.   
 Before going on to answer those questions, I should back up and point out that 
this strategy for defending CAF is not unique to Watson.  Harry Frankfurt pursued a 
similar line in his ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’204 paper well 
before Watson.  I have chosen to deal with Watson because I think Watson provides a 
much clearer and more plausible answer to the second question, about what really 
wanting consists in.  That said, Frankfurt provides a much clearer answer to the first 
question, about what makes it true that ‘X really wants A’.  Frankfurt’s answer is that:  
 
Identity Claim: X really wants A iff the psychological state which constitutes 
the token wanting of A is either a psychological state X has essentially, or 
bears the proper relationship to a psychological state that X has essentially.
205
   
 
It is clear how Identity Claim works.  If we want to know what makes a 
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 I attribute the claim that people must have some psychological states essentially to Frankfurt even 
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comments (see Frankfurt(2002) among other places)  he has made about, for example, Agamemnon and 
his decision about whether to kill his daughter or give up the invasion of Troy.  Frankfurt says that 
Agamemnon could not survive such a decision because it would require violating volitional necessities.  
I take it that this commits Frankfurt to the claim that people have their volitional necessities essentially. 
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wanting a real wanting rather than an alien or intrusive wanting of the kind had by 
compulsives, Frankfurt will tell us that the real wanting is either an essential part of 
who we are, or properly connected to an essential part of who we are.  How could 
something be intrusive or alien if it has its source, literally, in our essential nature?  
How can we intrude or be alien to ourselves? 
 Now there is much that is not clear in Identity Claim.  What is the proper 
relationship that must obtain between essentially held psychological states and non-
essentially held psychological states for non-essentially held psychological states to 
qualify as real wanting?  What is the relationship that must obtain between a token 
wanting and the psychological state that constitutes it?  Are psychological states 
supposed to be literally essential features of a person, or is it enough that they are, for 
example, a stable constituent of a set of psychological states that is, under some 
description, an essential feature of the agent?  I will deal with these questions in due 
course, but before I do I need to present the answer to the second question.  Watson’s 
answer is: 
 
 Agential Rationalism:  If X really wants Y then X believes Y to be good. 
So really wanting something involves judging that it is good.
206
  Why would this be 
true? 
Watson is not clear on this point.  He offers Agential Rationalism simply as a 
suggestion, drawn from Plato’s moral psychology, which is of help to compatibilists.  
The problem is that there are other potential accounts of what really wanting involves.  
Frankfurt, at times, seems to endorse the claim that really wanting Y amounts to 
having a desire for it that is endorsed by the highest order desire one has relative to the 
practical question of whether to Y.  Bratman endorses the view that when one really 
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‘wanting’ stands to ‘wants.’ 
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wants Y one has a general intention or policy or plan for life that gives reason giving 
force to Y.  Watson offers an argument against Frankfurt’s view, but none against 
Bratman’s.207  Worse, his argument against Frankfurt is at important points unclear 
and where the argument is clear, it has been refuted.  I will offer a reconstruction of 
the unclear parts of the argument against Frankfurt because I believe they point to 
general reasons to prefer Agential Rationalism to the alternatives. 
1.1 Watson vs. other Real Self Views 
 Everyone in this debate agrees that it is not sufficient for X really wanting Y 
that X desire Y.  Uncontroversially, people suffering from manic disorders are not 
responsible for their behaviors.  But manic disorders work by generating desires to 
perform the manic behavior.  Addictions sometimes work the same way.  In these 
cases authors who are part of this debate say that the desires in question are alien, or 
they are such that the agent is alienated from them.  The argument for Agential 
Rationalism cannot be that agents cannot be alienated from evaluative beliefs, though 
it can seem as if this is what Watson had in mind.
208
  After all we can be alienated 
from our beliefs.   
 
Racist Liberal: Consider the liberal who was raised in a racist environment.  
She believes in the ideals of racial equality and in the irrationality of 
discrimination based on race.  When asked in a moment of cool reflection by 
another person of her own race, she will affirm these liberal commitments and 
also make clear that she understands the evidence in support of those beliefs.  
However, when she actually interacts with members of another race she tends 
to think things like ‘These are violent people’ or ‘This situation is dangerous’.  
Later she always renounces those beliefs, but in the moment of actual 
interaction she accepts them.  Her all things considered judgment is that racism 
is irrational and wrong, but her upbringing has made her such that when 
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 Watson (1975) says the question which shows that Frankfurt’s view is not satisfactory is ‘Can’t one 
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confronted by racial difference she does not take all things into consideration 
and reflexively falls back on racist beliefs.  
 
I think that the racist liberal’s racist beliefs are alien beliefs.  I also think there is a 
good case to be made that they are alien evaluative beliefs.  They certainly have 
evaluative implications.  If one thinks that a person is violent one is going to probably 
also think that a wide range of activities are not ones you should engage in with them.  
So Agential Rationalism should not rest on the argument that we cannot be alienated 
from our evaluative beliefs.  But looking at alien evaluative beliefs provides some 
clues as to how one could defend Agential Rationalism.  There is a clear sense in 
which the liberal racist has racist beliefs.  But there is also something odd about her 
racist beliefs.  After all in moments of cool reflection she repudiates them, not just as 
immoral, but also as incorrect.  It seems as though she believes X but also believes 
that X is incorrect.  This has a paradoxical air that I hope can be dispelled.
209
   
What I think is interesting is that it is hard to come up with a case of alienation 
from beliefs that does not involve the agent thinking that the belief is false.  In fact I 
think it is very plausible that when an agent is alienated from a belief, it is because it 
conflicts with other beliefs which she takes herself to have good evidence for.  A 
second point I want to make is that it is very plausible that no other psychological state 
aside from belief goes into the proper account of what makes belief rational.
210
  It is 
not as though, when wondering whether it is rational to believe in other concrete 
possible worlds my desire for a plentiful ontology will play a role in making it rational 
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is rational in believing P, what desires and intentions the person has will not, except when P is about 
whether the person has those desires or intentions.  
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for me to accept Lewis’ position.  These two facts about belief set it apart from the 
other kinds of attitudes, like desires and intentions, as better accounts of what really 
wanting amounts to.  Intentions and desires often are rational or irrational because of 
the relation they stand in to beliefs.  If I desire cocaine, that desire is irrational if I 
believe that cocaine will kill me.  If I intend to climb Mt. Everest, that is irrational if I 
believe that I cannot do it.  Something similar goes for the explanation of the alien 
status of some desires and beliefs.  When I am alienated from a desire, part of how I 
know that is the desire’s insensitivity to the beliefs related to that desire.  If I think it is 
irrational to take cocaine, that it is bad to take cocaine, that there is no good reason to 
take cocaine, that taking cocaine will just make my heart race in an awful way, but 
still desire to take cocaine, that is good evidence the desire for cocaine is alien and 
probably the result of an addiction. 
Given Identity Claim the attitudes that constitute ‘really wanting’ are in a 
significant sense basic.  The attitudes which constitute a person’s really wanting 
something make it the case that the person is free and responsible, and make it the case 
that their actions and some other attitudes are non-alien.  It would be odd for them to 
play this role when what makes the attitude rational and non-alien is some different 
kind of attitude entirely, one that, by hypothesis, the agent does not have essentially.  
But this is exactly the situation we seem to be in if desires or intentions are substituted 
for evaluative beliefs in the account of what real wanting amounts to.  We are not in 
the same situation with regards to belief.  Beliefs are not made rational or non-alien by 
other beliefs. 
1.2 A Revision to Watson’s view 
 So according to Agential Rationalism, Identity Claim, and CAF’ a person, 
X, acts freely when X’s actions counterfactually depend on those evaluative beliefs 
which in part constitute X’s identity.  Before moving on to dealing with criticisms of 
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this view, I want to take some time to clarify it.  It is not required on this view that free 
actions be caused by evaluative beliefs which in part constitute the agent’s identity.  If, 
for example, the action were caused by a desire that action could still be free if the 
desire agreed in the right way with an evaluative belief which in part constituted X’s 
identity.
211
  What is required for a desire to agree with a belief?  Let us suppose that 
the right way to think about desires is as an attitude taken towards propositions, just as 
beliefs are.  If a desire for p agrees with an evaluative belief, it will be because the 
evaluative belief is a belief that p is good.  This much at least is required for 
agreement between desires and evaluative beliefs. 
 But it seems as though more is necessary.  Consider the following case: 
 
Alcoholic Wine Enthusiast:  Jon believes that drinking wine is good.  
Jon is also an alcoholic.  On his birthday Jon goes to a winery and 
drinks wine all day.  The explanation for his drinking is the desires that 
result from his alcoholism.  These desires agree in their content with an 
evaluative belief Jon had.  But had Jon been acting from his evaluative 
belief, he would not have drunk to excess. 
  
 Intuitively Jon is not responsible for getting drunk.  After all he got drunk 
because of a compulsive desire to drink.  The fact that this compulsive desire agreed in 
content with some evaluative belief of his is not sufficient to show that he is 
responsible for his actions.  One might think the problem here is that Jon has no 
evaluative belief in favor of drunkenness, and that he should be required to have one if 
he is to be held responsible for getting drunk.  More generally one might think that for 
any state of affairs, S, for X to be responsible for S, S must have been caused either by 
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an evaluative belief that constitutes in part X’s identity and that is in explicitly in favor 
of S or by a desire that is in favor of S.  This formula will not work though.  Think 
about another example very close to Alcoholic Wine Enthusiast but differing only in 
that this example Jon is not an alcoholic, just a wine enthusiast.  He drinks to excess, 
but the desire to drink is not compulsive.  Here, I think, Jon is responsible for getting 
drunk, despite the fact that he neither desired nor saw any value in getting drunk.  He 
is responsible for getting drunk because he is responsible for his drinking, and his 
drinking is what made him drunk, and he had reason to know that this would happen. 
 I think the right way to complete the account of agreement is by appeal to the 
modal facts about the desires and beliefs.  In Jon’s case his desire for drink had 
nothing to do with his evaluation of wine tasting, and one way to see this is the 
counterfactual independence of the one from the other.  Whether or not Jon judged 
wine tasting good, Jon was going to have that desire for drink, and vice versa.  Their 
agreement was just a coincidence, and what Jon’s case shows is that coincidental 
agreement is not enough.  On the other hand, to demand that at every possible world 
where X has the belief X also have the desire seems too strong.  If someone saves a 
child from drowning and we find out it is from a general desire to protect the innocent, 
we would not withhold praise from him if we found out that had he lacked the desire, 
his moral judgments about the duties of bystanders would have led him to perform the 
same action.  But of course if we are taking seriously the claim that the relevant 
evaluative beliefs constitute the agent’s identity, then to demand that at any world 
where the agent has the desire she also have the corresponding belief would be to 
demand too little.  By hypothesis she always has that belief, so this demand amounts 
to just the demand for agreement in content again.   
 Presumably the problem with compulsive desires is that they normally render 
practical reasoning irrelevant.  No matter what you think about compulsions, you are 
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unlikely to resist them.  So if the desire is such that if the agent were to believe 
differently, the desire would not have caused the action it is a desire for, then we 
would be reasonably sure the desire was not a compulsive desire.  We face again here 
the problem that according to Watson the agent is going to have the relevant 
evaluative beliefs at all possible worlds, or at least all the nearby ones.  So what we 
should say is that the kind of desire, where kinds are individuated by causal source, is 
such that it would not cause the agent to do what the desire is a desire for her to do, if 
the desire were opposed by an evaluative belief to the contrary. 
1.3 Criticisms of Watson’s View 
1.3.1 Wolf’s criticism 
 I will deal first with some criticisms of Watson’s view that fail before moving 
on to criticisms which succeed.  Susan Wolf has been a consistent critic of Watson’s 
view and views like it that she labels Real Self Views.  Wolf spends a chapter of her 
book, ‘Freedom within Reason’, discussing the Real Self view, and comes to the 
conclusion that Real self view is committed to the claim that “the condition that an 
agent’s actions be attributable to the agent’s real self is to serve as not just a necessary 
but also as a sufficient condition of responsibility,” and “that any agent who has a real 
self is responsible at least for any action that is actually governed by her valuational 
system.  Thus any agent who has a real self is responsible for any wholly unalienated 
actions, for any actions that the agent would, on reflection and in light of relevant 
information, unqualifiedly regard as actions that are truly hers.”212 
 Is it true that Watson must endorse the claim that any action which can be 
attributed to the agent is one the agent is responsible for?  Here it matters what we 
mean by ‘attributability.’  It can be used in such a way that to say that X is attributable 
to A is just to say that A caused X.  If that is all that is meant then of course 
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attributability is not sufficient for moral responsibility.  If I turn on a light and in doing 
so ruin some developing pictures, it may very well be the case that the action was 
caused by my identity constituting evaluative beliefs, but I am not morally responsible 
for ruining the pictures if I didn’t know the room was being used as a dark room. 
 Of course it is typical for ‘attributability’ to take on a more elevated meaning 
and it is not strange to hear people talk about ‘deep attributability’ or something’s 
being ‘really attributable’.  What deep, real or true attributability amounts to is not 
clear to me, and I suspect its meaning is plastic enough that anything which might be 
taken to matter to assignments of moral responsibility can be built into it.  But then it 
just becomes a stand in for the more immediately contestable term ‘responsibility.’  So 
the burden of defending the Real Self view is just the burden of proving that the real 
self really is the self.  After all if Y is attributable to X iff X is responsible for Y, and 
if, as Identity Claim says, the person just is their real self, then of course an action’s 
being attributable to the real self is necessary and sufficient for the person to be 
morally responsible for the action. 
So the first claim that Wolf makes about the Real Self view is either false or 
trivially true, depending on what you take the term ‘attributability’ to mean.213  The 
claim that, according to the Real Self view, we are responsible for all wholly 
unalienated actions is one that I do not accept.  Watson might have accepted it, but I 
don’t think he should have, for reasons having to do with mundane actions.  After all 
we are certainly not alienated from mundane actions like putting our left shoe on first 
in the morning.  Nor are such actions plausibly in agreement with an evaluative 
judgment that constitutes, in part, our identity.  On the view I am sketching, we would 
not be morally responsible for those actions.  This might seem counter-intuitive, but it 
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shouldn’t.  After all mundane actions of this sort have no moral significance.  An 
agent could not merit blame or praise for such actions anyway.
214
 
But what about morally significant actions which are caused by desires that do 
not disagree with an identity-constituting evaluative belief, but do not agree with one 
either?  Intuitively a person is responsible for such actions, but on the view as it has 
been presented so far, it seems as though she cannot be.  This appearance is deceptive 
though.  So far I have only attributed an account of free action to Watson and I have 
yet to present an account of moral responsibility.  The general account of moral 
responsibility that Watson favors is an expressive account of moral responsibility.  
Expressive accounts can be contrasted with production accounts of moral 
responsibility: 
 
Expressive account of Responsibility:  X is morally responsible for Y only if 
Y expresses some morally relevant property of X’s. 
Production account of Responsibility:   X is morally responsible for Y only 
if X is the cause of Y. 
 
Though never stated explicitly, I think most disputants in the free will debate are 
working with a production account of moral responsibility.  The idea is that a person is 
only responsible for the causal effects of the decisions they make.  While the 
expressive account does not deny that typically if we are responsible for something 
then we are the cause of it, it does not restrict moral responsibility to such cases.  
According to the expressive account, states of affairs must express morally relevant 
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properties of the agent for the agent to be responsible for those states of affairs.  I take 
it that for Y to express some fact about X it must be the case that Y provides evidence 
supporting our believing in that fact.  If we know that Y could only have been caused 
by that fact about X, then Y provides evidence for that fact. 
 What differentiates the accounts?  In the kinds of cases I was talking about 
above, we have actions caused by desires that neither agree nor disagree with 
evaluative beliefs that constitute X’s identity.  The morally relevant features of X do 
not play any role in the causal explanation of these actions, but they are morally 
significant actions.  If Watson were committed to a productive account of 
responsibility it is not clear how he could justify the intuitive claim that people are 
responsible for such actions.  But Watson is committed to the expressive account, and 
on that account there is no problem here.  After all the fact that X does not have an 
evaluative belief that speaks to the issue is itself a morally relevant fact about X.  A 
more detailed case will help here: 
 
Amoral Agribusiness Executive:  Pete is an executive at a major agribusiness 
corporation.  His business is involved in an attempt to push indigenous farmers 
off the land their families have held for generations so that they can be 
replaced with a huge tract of land that will be farmed by transient farmers.  
Pete does not think that what he is doing is right or good for the world or 
anything like that.  Nor does he think that what he is doing is wrong.  He 
experiences no shame when confronted with the facts about what his 
corporation is doing, but neither does he self-righteously defend himself.  He 
simply expresses his boredom with the subject and moves on.  He does not 
have any evaluative beliefs concerning this issue. 
 
Certainly the fact that Pete does not care about the fate of the farmers whose lives he 
holds in his hand is itself a morally relevant fact about him.  On the expressive account 
of responsibility what he is doing to those farmers expresses his lack of appropriate 
moral concern.  And this is a fact about who Pete really is, about what Pete really 
wants or values or cares about, so holding Pete responsible for not caring is not 
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problematic on Watson’s view.215    
 Before moving on I want to review where we are on Watson’s view.  Starting 
from the stated desire of defending: 
(CAF)  X does A freely iff if X desires to A then X will A and if X does not 
desire to A then X will not A. 
 
we moved to: 
 
(CAF’)  X does A freely iff if X really wants to A then X will A and if X really 
does not want to A then X will not A. 
 
and in an effort to explicate ‘really wanting’ we were provided with the following two 
principles: 
 
(Identity Claim) X really wants A iff the psychological state which constitutes 
the token wanting of A is either a psychological state X has essentially, or 
bears the proper relationship to a psychological state that X has essentially.   
 
(Agential Rationalism):  If X really wants Y then X believes Y to be good. 
 
So the account of free action Watson presents is as following: 
 
(The Real Self CAF)  X does A freely iff if X has an evaluative judgment that 
in part constitutes X’s identity in favor of A then X will do A and if X has an 
evaluative judgment that in part constitutes X’s identity in favor of not doing 
A, then X will not do A.
216
 
 
and the account of moral responsibility is this: 
 
(The Real Self Expressive Account of Responsibility):  X is morally 
responsible for A iff A expresses some fact about the evaluative beliefs of X’s 
that constitute, in part, X’s identity. 
 
 There, then, is the view.  What are Wolf’s criticisms?  She says: 
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Nonetheless, we sometimes do question the responsibility of a fully developed 
agent even when she acts in a way that is clearly attributable to her real self.  
For we sometimes have reason to question an agent’s responsibility for her real 
self.  That is, we may think it is not the agent’s fault that she is the person she 
is – in other words, we may think it is not her fault that she ahs, not just the 
desires, but also the values she does.
217
 
 
Wolf contends that certain forms of insanity lead us to ask these kinds of questions.  
By way of examples she gives us the Son of Sam murderer, those under the spell of 
deep hypnosis (as in the novel 1984) and the victims of severe childhood abuse.  The 
contention is that these people are not responsible for “what they are or what they 
do.”218  Because of the circumstances by which their real selves were produced, Wolf 
claims, these people are not responsible for what they do, even though they identify 
with, and are not alienated from their real self. 
 Now as we have seen the Real Self view is not committed to the claim that 
agents are responsible for all unalienated actions, so it is not immediately clear that it 
would claim the people in the cases mentioned above are responsible for their actions.  
But I think that given certain ways of filling out the details of such cases, the Real Self 
view would declare the agents in question responsible for what they do.  With at least 
one case I do not see a reason to be the least bit troubled by this position.  The Son of 
Sam strikes me as someone who deserves to be blamed for what he has done, so I will 
not deal with that case at all.  The other two cases that Wolf mentions do present 
problems.  Both are examples which are taken to support the claim that we must be 
responsible for our character if we are to be responsible for our actions, or, as Pettit 
has put it, that responsibility has a recursive character. 
 The Real Self view denies this claim.  Wolf correctly attributes this position to 
the Real Self view but then overreaches in describing what denying that moral 
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responsibility is recursive amounts to.  Wolf takes the Real Self theorist to be 
committed to a view, expressed by Hobart, which Wolf considers to indicate a shallow 
conception of responsibility.  Hobart says, in response to just these kinds of questions 
about responsibility for character: 
 
“He did make his character; no, but he made his acts.  Nobody blames 
him for making such a character, but only for making such acts.  And to 
blame him for that is simply to say that he is a bad act-maker.”219 
 
Wolf’s criticism of this claim is that it conflates the conception of responsibility at 
issue with the kind of responsibility that human beings uncontroversially possess.  She 
says that the property ‘being an act-maker’ is something human beings share with 
objects like tires, and events like earthquakes, and so that any conception of 
responsibility that consists entirely by ‘being an act-maker’ cannot be the conception 
of responsibility we are interested.  After all when Kant declared that compatibilists 
gave us the liberty of a turnspit, it was not meant as a way of saying compatibilists 
were correct, but rather missing the point. 
 This argument on Wolf’s part strikes me as wrong in three ways.  One is that it 
is not at all clear that earthquakes and tires produce actions.  If it is part of the nature 
of an action to be intentional, purposive, or intelligent then of course these events and 
objects do not make actions.  And it seems to me plausible that actions are to be 
differentiated from other events by just those properties.  Further Hobart said that it is 
the accusation of being a bad act maker that constitutes the meaning of blaming 
expressions.  Presumably it is also the accusation of being a good act maker that 
constitutes the meaning of praising expressions.  So moral responsibility would, on 
this view, consist in being the producer of actions that have moral qualities.  Now 
many compatibilists of Hobart’s day also held a kind of consequentialism that most 
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moral theorists today recognize as deeply wrong, and shallow even.  I believe Wolf’s 
knowledge of that fact seeped into her evaluation of Hobart’s claim.  But 
compatibilists are not committed to ethical views on which all it is to be a good action 
is to produce good consequences.  A compatibilist could adopt the claim that it is 
being produced by good intentions that makes an action good, or some combination of 
effects and intentions.  On such a theory, even if tires could make actions they 
certainly couldn’t make good or bad actions.  So the depth that Wolf is looking for 
would be provided by the depth of the moral theory attached to the compatibilist view.  
The third problem with this criticism is that it simply gets wrong what Watson’s view 
is.  There is no reason to think Watson must commit himself to Hobart’s view.  
Hobart’s view of responsibility is clearly a productive account, and it has none of the 
moral psychological complexity of Watson’s view. 
1.3.2 Watson’s criticism of Watson  
But despite the fact that Watson’s view escapes Wolf’s criticism, and despite 
the fact that it marks a significant improvement over classical compatibilism, the view 
still fails, as Watson has noticed.
220
  Several problems stem from the fact that only 
evaluative beliefs can be the source of free and responsible action, and some of them 
are sufficient to reject the view, though some are not.  With regard to the latter we 
should talk about Watson’s claim that “Notoriously, judging good has no invariable 
connection with motivation.”221  I agree with Watson that this is true, but I disagree in 
thinking that its truth is a problem for his view.  This is just the denial of a strong form 
of motivation internalism about ethical judgments.  But there is no reason to think that 
Watson’s view requires motivational internalism about ethical judgments.  The most 
that Watson needs, as far as I can tell, is the truth of the claim that ethical judgments 
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can sometimes motivate, and this claim strikes me as very compelling. 
 There are two major problems for Watson.  The first is that Agential 
Rationalism is an implausibly restrictive account of what it is to really want 
something.  According to Agential Rationalism anytime someone has a desire which 
conflicts with an evaluative belief that in part constitutes her identity, if that desire 
causes the action then the agent did not act freely.  But this is implausible.  We can see 
this by considering two different kinds of cases, about both of which Watson admits 
his theory has counterintuitive implications; weakness of will and perversity.  A 
person displays weakness of will when she acts contrary to her all things considered 
judgment about what is best to do.
222
  In such cases one’s evaluative judgments do not 
determine one’s actions, and so the agent does not act freely, according to Watson.  
This result is unintuitive.  In the case of weakness of will the agent fails to do 
something that it certainly seemed like she could have done.  That the non-weak 
willed action was within her power is what makes her will weak, rather than simply 
overmatched.  If we conclude that she did not fail freely, it casts into doubt the whole 
basis for treating weakness of will as blameworthy.
223
  It is open for Watson to say 
that in cases of weakness of will the agent can still be morally responsible on account 
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of the weak-willed action.  After all the fact that someone’s all things considered 
judgment failed to determine her action suggests that something is lacking in the depth 
of her conviction, and in certain cases this seems as though it could be blameworthy.   
But this response fails to satisfy for two reasons.  The first obviously is that it 
is intuitive that what we are blaming people for when they are weak willed is at least 
sometimes the moral quality of the action they performed, not for the weakness of 
their commitment to their ideals.  There is a difference in blameworthiness between a 
student athlete who breaks his diet and eats a piece of chocolate cake and policeman 
who violates his own principles by stealing money from the evidence room.  Certainly 
they both show weakness of will, but one of them does something worse than the other 
and the accusation is that Watson’s view would not allow us to blame the policeman 
more than the student athlete.  The second problem with this response is precisely the 
fact that it allows us to hold the agent responsible for weakness of will while also 
claiming that she did not act freely.  If she did not act freely, how is it fair to hold her 
responsible for weakness of the will?  She couldn’t do any better, so how can be blame 
her for being weak-willed?  This points to a tension in the account.  It is very plausible 
that an action must be done freely for someone to be responsible for it, but while on 
the account Watson gives of free action it is sufficient or close to sufficient for moral 
responsibility, it is not a necessary condition.  What Watson needs is an account of 
how actions caused by desires that run counter to one’s evaluative beliefs can be free 
and such that we are morally responsible for them. 
This lesson shows up again when considering what Michael Stocker has called 
perverse actions.
224
  Simply put, perverse actions are actions which are performed 
because they are bad, or wrong, or vile, or unjust.  When people act perversely they 
are motivated by the thought that what they are doing is not what they should be 
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doing, and so they are acting from a desire that disagrees with their evaluative 
beliefs.
225
  But, just as with weakness of will, perversity of action is not an excusing 
condition; it is itself something that a person can be blamed for, so Watson’s inability 
to explain how we can justifiably hold people responsible for perverse actions is a 
significant problem for his view. 
By far the most serious problem, what I will call the fragility of identity, has to 
do not with Agential Rationalism taken by itself but with the combination of that 
claim and Identity Claim.  Taken together those claims imply that for any agent there 
will be some evaluative beliefs that in part constitute her identity.  The most natural 
way to take that is that the property of having such a belief is an essential property of 
the agent’s.  So if the person stops having those essentially held beliefs they would go 
out of existence.  I take it is as obvious that this is an implausible view.  It suggests the 
absurd view that sometimes a good argument or some compelling evidence could 
amount to a murder weapon.  To avoid such a conclusion Watson would have to claim 
that the beliefs in question are incorrigible, or at least such that no one would stop 
believing them.  Logical and mathematical beliefs might have this feature.  So might 
beliefs such as ‘there is an external world’ or ‘there are other minds.’  The problem is 
that these beliefs have no practical import.  In fact it is difficult to think of any beliefs 
that have practical import that are such that no one could, having once come to accept 
it, come to reject it.
226
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Isn’t it relevant here that Watson has clearly rejected Identity Claim?  
Whether or not he once accepted it, he certainly came to reject it, and perhaps I have 
identified the reason why.  So why should we not replace Identity Claim with a 
principle that is less ontologically robust, such as the one Watson actually seems to 
endorse: 
 
Practical Identity Claim:  X really wants A iff the psychological state which 
constitutes the token wanting of A is either a psychological state that is part of 
X’s practical identity, or bears the proper relationship to a psychological state 
that is part of X’s practical identity. 
 
What is someone’s practical identity?  Watson says that “the point of speaking of the 
‘real self’ is not metaphysical, to penetrate to one’s ontological center; what is in 
question is an individuals fundamental evaluative orientation.”227  He also says that 
one’s adopted ends, which are, I take it, the content of the evaluative beliefs Watson 
has in mind, “express what I’m about.”228 
 So what about this weaker claim?  I think we can tell from the ‘ontological 
center’ comment that we should not think of practical identity as identity sans phrase 
nor as part of our identity sans phrase.  So someone could lose their practical identity, 
or have it change significantly, without ceasing to be.  This takes care of the problem 
of the fragility of identity.  Unfortunately we have all new problems.  The essentialist 
claim made in Identity Claim was not gratuitous; it did real work.  It put beyond 
question the claim that agent was really committed to the wants identified as real 
wants.  Can this weaker claim do the same job?  It isn’t clear, partly because the 
suggestion is so under-described.  But there are some prima facie reasons to think it 
cannot.  What Identity Claim did was to give reason why it is that compulsive desires 
were not a source of responsibility, but other wants were.  Can Practical Identity 
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Claim do the same?   
 I don’t think so.  After all the connection between a person and her practical 
identity is contingent.  No matter what practical identity she has, she could have had 
another one.  So what is to prevent someone’s practical identity from being an alien or 
intrusive element in her psychology?  There is a very real sense in which the agent is 
stuck with her practical identity.  Imagine an agent trying to get rid of her practical 
identity.  What would that amount to?  She cannot abstract from her practical identity 
and make judgments about whether she wants to keep it or discard it. Without her 
practical identity she is incapable of making such judgments, as the material necessary 
for making evaluative judgments just is her practical identity.  On Watson’s picture we 
all might have had very different practical identities, but we are stuck with the kind of 
person we are, and that is all there is to say.  I do not think it is a coincidence that the 
same article where Watson presents Practical Identity Claim he also claims to be 
only explaining part of moral responsibility, attributability.  Once we know that 
someone’s actions are attributable to them, we are justified in making aretaic 
judgments, Watson thinks.  Examples of aretaic judgments are ‘He is a coward’ or 
‘She is dishonest’.  They are judgments about excellences that people have or lack.   
 If this is all Watson is arguing for then there is no clear sense in which he is 
taking part in the traditional debate about free will.  No incompatibilist should deny 
that aretaic judgments are still justified in the face of determinism.  Whether someone 
tends to tell lies for bad reasons is something that does not depend on the whole causal 
history of her actions, and so there is no prima facie compatibility problem to be 
resolved here.  So this way of weakening Identity Claim saves Watson’s view from 
one absurdity, only to lead it into triviality. 
 I cannot see anyway out of these three problems for Watson, and so now I wish 
to turn to another account of moral responsibility that, while saddled with its own 
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problems, can help resolve Watson’s difficulties.  As an added bonus Watson can help 
solve the problems that this account, the Reasons-Responsiveness account, is saddled 
with. 
2.  Fischer and Ravizza’s Reasons-Responsiveness View 
 Fischer and Ravizza
229
 present the following view: 
 
Reasons Responsiveness:  X is responsible for Y only if Y proceeds from a 
moderately reasons responsive mechanism that X has taken responsibility for. 
 
Fischer and Ravizza intended for Reasons Responsiveness to serve as a specification 
of a more general and intuitively plausible principle: 
 
 Control Principle:  X is responsible for Y only if Y is under X’s control. 
Y’s proceeding from a moderately reasons responsive mechanism that X has taken 
responsibility for is meant as an account of what it is for X to be in control of Y.
230
 I 
am going to sidestep these issues about control, and focus on Reasons 
Responsiveness  on its own merits. 
2.1 Reasons Responsive Mechanisms and Asymmetry. 
 There are two aspects of the view that need to be explained.  The first is that of 
a moderately reasons responsive mechanism, and the second is the notion of taking 
responsibility.  What is a reasons-responsive mechanism?  Fischer and Ravizza admit 
that they have little to say, but what can be said is that it is a psychological mechanism 
which allows agents, to certain extents, to be receptive and reactive to reasons.  A 
strong reasons responsive mechanism is one that, whenever there is sufficient reason 
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to do otherwise, would be receptive to that reason and would lead to an action in 
accordance with that reason.  A weakly reasons responsive mechanism is one that 
would in some possible worlds where there is sufficient reason to do otherwise lead a 
person to do otherwise.  It should be obvious why Fischer and Ravizza don’t want to 
make it a necessary condition of a person being morally responsible for her action that 
it issue from a strong reasons responsive mechanism.  That would mean that unless the 
agent was such that she would always recognize that reason to do otherwise and act on 
that reason, she would not be responsible for her actions.  This condition would rule 
out moral responsibility for wrong actions, since in every case of wrong action there is 
sufficient reason to do otherwise that the psychological mechanism is not sensitive 
to.
231
   
It is harder to see why it is that weak reasons responsiveness is not sufficient 
for moral responsibility.  To show why I will borrow an example from Michael 
McKenna.
232
  Suppose Matilda is at a dance, and loves to dance so much that she 
would not leave the dance floor for $100 dollars.  But if she were offered $1,000 she 
would leave the dance floor.  So the psychological mechanism governing her dancing 
decisions is weakly reasons responsive.  But then suppose that Matilda, while she 
would leave the dance floor for $1,000 would not leave it for $1,001.  The problem is 
that the pattern of effects of the mechanism does not conform to any reasonable 
pattern, and so cannot count as reasons-responsive at all.
233
  So a moderately reasons 
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counterfactuals to figure out that something has gone wrong here 
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responsive mechanism is one that need not be strongly reasons responsive, but which 
has a pattern of counterfactual effects that corresponds to a rational pattern.  More 
specifically what Fischer and Ravizza claim is that responsible actions proceed from 
mechanisms which are regularly, i.e. rationally patterned, receptive to reasons, 
meaning that the agent who has that mechanism is aware of reasons in a regular way, 
and is weakly reactive to reasons, meaning that the agent sometimes acts in the way 
the reasons recommend.  
Before moving on I should briefly deal with a criticism that dogs Fischer and 
Ravizza.
234
  It has to do with what these reasons responsive mechanisms are.  To see 
whether a reasons responsive mechanism is strong, weak or moderate what we have to 
do is see whether, in other possible worlds that very same mechanism responds 
appropriately to reasons.  As McKenna puts it, we have to hold the mechanism fixed.  
But to do this, don’t we have to know what the mechanism is?  This is something that 
Fischer and Ravizza do not tell us, and it opens them up to potentially absurd 
conclusions.  Assuming you agree that Matilda is not responsible for her dancing 
behavior, this refusal to specify what the psychological mechanisms are undermines 
Fischer and Ravizza’s ability to explain why.  In the Matilda example I had been 
assuming that the mechanism was ‘dance behavior controller’, in which case the very 
same mechanism is present in the possible world in which Matilda is offered $1,001 as 
the one in which she is offered $1,000.  But what if the mechanism really were the 
‘dance behavior controller for occasions in which monetary offers of even amounts are 
made’?  Then it is a different mechanism in play when she receives the $1,001 offer, 
and so we cannot establish that she is not appropriately rational via Fischer and 
Ravizza’s test. 
How to deal with this?  Well for one thing we could just get rid of talk of 
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mechanisms altogether, as some other Reasons Responsiveness theorists have.
235
  But 
we could also just provide a specification of what kinds of mechanisms count when it 
comes to moral responsibility.  Now our relationship to our actions is one of causation, 
and it is reasonable to suppose that our being morally responsible for our actions 
involves our causing them in the right way.  So the reasons responsive mechanisms 
ought to be the kind of psychological mechanism that could play a role in causing 
action.  Which one’s do this?  I don’t know, I am just a philosopher.  It is not the job 
of philosophers to provide answers to questions like ‘what mechanisms in the brain 
cause action?’236  The kinds of mechanisms that can figure into our being morally 
responsible are the kinds of mechanisms that figure in psychological explanations of 
behavior.  Presumably ‘dance behavior controller for occasions in which monetary 
offers of even amounts are made’ is not going to enter into a scientific explanation 
anytime soon. 
Fischer and Ravizza differ from other Reasons Responsiveness theorists in 
thinking that it is the agent’s psychological mechanisms, and not the agent herself, 
who must be reasons responsive.  They adopt this position, they say, because it allows 
them to avoid a position like the one adopted by Susan Wolf and Dana Nelkin.  
According to Wolf and Nelkin a person is responsible for what she did when it is the 
case that she could have acted the right way for the right reasons.  What this amounts 
to is the view that a person is responsible when she is able to be strongly reasons 
responsive, in Fischer and Ravizza’s terms.  Taken together with a non-conditional 
account of ability, Wolf and Nelkin’s view implies that if determinism is true then no 
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one is responsible for behavior that is either wrong or done for the wrong reasons.  
How does talking about mechanisms rather than agents help avoid this asymmetrical 
view?  Fischer and Ravizza offer Frankfurt style counter-examples to Wolf’s claim 
that in the absence of alternative possibilities no one can be blamed for their actions.  
The only way that talking about mechanisms rather than agents makes a difference is 
that this can be useful, according to Fischer and Ravizza, in explaining why we ought 
to agree with Frankfurt about the force of his examples against PAP. 
 But there is a better way to avoid this conclusion.  One might disagree with the 
claim that the kind of reasons responsiveness that is required for moral responsibility 
is the property of responding to actual reasons.  Nomy Arpaly provides us with an 
account on which a person is praiseworthy for her actions when they are done for the 
right reasons, and blameworthy when they are done for the wrong one.
237
  The gloss 
on acting for a reason, according Arpaly, is that a person acts for reasons X when it is 
the case that the person is sensitive to reason X or reliably tracks reason X.  This 
seems very much like a mechanism in the sense that Fischer and Ravizza use the term.  
But what is different is that it is not required, on Arpaly’s view, for a person to 
sometimes get things right, morally speaking, for them to count as morally 
responsible.  This is not just the difference that Arpaly can accommodate the intuition 
that someone’s complete depravity is not an excuse, but also the claim that, with 
regards to a particular reason, the fact that a person never reacts properly to it is not an 
excuse.   
 I think that Arpaly’s version of the Reasons-Responsiveness view gets things 
intuitively right.  So why would one prefer versions where people need to sometimes 
get things right morally, in order for us to be justified in blaming them for getting it 
wrong?  The reason has to do with normative competence.  Susan Wolf in particular 
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has accused other compatibilist views of disregarding the fact that a moral agent must 
be normatively competent to count as a responsible agent.  At first glance that 
normative competence is a necessary condition for moral responsibility seems right.  
We are committed generally to not blaming people for failures when they are not 
competent.  If I do not know how to do calculus I should not be blamed for failing to 
satisfactorily complete a calculus problem.  And it seems as though something similar 
is true for moral failings.  Children faced with moral dilemmas are not blamed for 
their failures, for example.   
 Wolf, Nelkin, and let us assume Fischer and Ravizza
238
, seek to meet this 
demand by demanding that people actually be able to react to reasons properly.  I 
don’t think that this is the right way to meet the demand for normative competence.  
Before I say why, however, let me run through what I take to be some facts about how 
we normally think about normative competence.   
For example consider two gymnasts.  One is an Olympic class gymnast, the 
other is an amateur, trying his hand at gymnastics for the first time.  When the amateur 
tries and fails to perform some basic maneuver on the rings, we don’t blame him for 
that.
239
  We will recognize that he is not a good gymnast, but we won’t think he failed 
or ought to feel bad about his performance.  He lacks the basic competence to be open 
to the kinds of evaluation actual gymnasts are open to.  If he had brought the 
maneuvers off it would have been nothing but beginners luck, and we don’t praise 
those who show beginners luck as we do those who display great skill. 
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 Wolf (1990) and Nelkin (2008) accept the view that one any occasion of action, it must have been 
possible, given the past and the laws of nature, that the person act in accordance with the right reasons.  
Fischer and Ravizza think that the person’s mechanisms must be such that they sometimes respond 
correctly in similar cases.  What Fischer and Ravizza are demanding sounds a great deal like the general 
capacity to do what is right, and so both can be seen to demand the ability, in some sense, to do what is 
right.   
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 This is not moral blame of course, but it is blame nonetheless.  Suppose that the gymnast finds out 
that because of his lack of effort there is no way he can compete for the national title, an important goal 
of his that has no moral significance.  It would make perfect sense for his parents, coach or friends to 
say ‘You have no one to blame but yourself that you can’t compete.’ 
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So far all is as Nelkin and Wolf would have us believe.  Competence is a 
necessary condition for praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.  Now consider the 
Olympic class gymnast.  Suppose this competition is one being held in some small 
high school gym in the middle of Kansas, and the Olympic gymnast is only competing 
here so that he can meet some minimum number of required events to stay a 
professional in good standing.  But no one else here is even close to his level, and this 
causes the Olympic gymnast to get lazy and bored.  This laziness and boredom leads 
to his failing to bring off a maneuver on the rings properly.  He knows how to do the 
maneuver, let’s say that he has done it hundreds of times successfully, most recently 
the day before the competition.  But he just doesn’t put much effort into it and fails.  
Intuitively he should be blamed for the failure, but it would be wrong, on the basis of a 
failure which occurred for these reasons, to impugn his status as an excellent gymnast.  
We have no reason to downgrade our estimation of his gymnastics abilities because of 
a failure that comes through laziness.   
 To draw the parallel between the gymnastics case and the case of moral 
deliberation, it seems to me that the failure of the excellent gymnast corresponds to a 
failure in reactivity, and not receptivity.  His excellence had to do with his knowledge 
of how to do the maneuver and possession of the physical skills necessary to pull it 
off, and his failure did not involve anything going wrong with that knowledge or with 
those skills.  The expert knows what to do, but does nothing with that knowledge.  His 
responses to the situation are what is lacking, not his appreciation of what is to be 
done.  The lesson to draw is not that competence isn’t necessary for praiseworthiness 
or blameworthiness, but that competence consists in have the right kind of awareness 
of what to do and perhaps general skills necessary to perform the action, and does not 
concern at all one’s tendencies to act on that knowledge, or use those skills, properly. 
So should we just lop off the reactivity requirement from moderate reasons 
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responsiveness and say that people are responsible for their actions when those actions 
are caused by mechanisms which are regularly reasons-receptive?  Reasons receptivity 
seems to me to capture most of what is attractive about Reasons-Responsiveness, but 
it fails to take account of one important fact; sometimes a failure to have moral 
knowledge is itself a moral failure.   
 
Bad Son: Pete is tremendously self-absorbed. This leads to him being 
inattentive to the feelings of others.  Further, his self-absorption means he does 
not realize that he has caused his parents significant sorrow by not 
communicating with them.  He does not realize that his friends feel neglected 
because he never considers doing something with them that they like but which 
he does not.  In light of this situation it seems pretty clear that he owes his 
family and friends apologies, and some thoughtfulness.  But of course he does 
not realize this.  This ignorance does not absolve him of guilt when he doesn’t 
apologize and doesn’t start being thoughtful.  This ignorance compounds the 
problem.  He does not realize that he is doing wrong, because he is too 
concerned with his own fun to think much about the moral quality of his own 
actions.  It is not as though he doesn’t know that it has been years since he has 
contacted his parents, or that he has never gone out with his friends except to 
places he likes to go.  He simply does not appreciate that these facts are of 
moral interest.   
 
 What cases like this suggest is that we need a further refinement.  It is not that 
receptivity as a whole must work regularly, for that would imply that the selfish son is 
not responsible for the harm he has caused.  He knows the facts that make it the case 
that he has reason to apologize and be especially thoughtful, but because of his moral 
failings he fails to see them as reason giving.  It does not seem right that Pete should 
get off the hook for hurting people because he is so insensitive to their feelings that it 
doesn’t occur to him that he is hurting them.  This insensitivity to the relationship that 
normally exists between not communicating with people who care about and those 
people’s feelings being hurt is itself a moral failing of his.  So, let me introduce now 
the quite popular claim that normative facts supervene on non-normative facts.  I think 
that what is required for moral responsibility is not regular receptivity to normative 
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facts, but receptivity to the non-normative facts upon which normative facts 
supervene.  Pete knows all he needs to know in order to realize that he is hurting the 
feelings of people to whom he has a special duty of care and respect. 
 But this revision seems like it might go too far.  Sometimes moral ignorance is 
a moral failing, but sometimes it is not.  Let us contrast Pete with someone who was 
raised in such hellish circumstances, perhaps as a child soldier, that he never actually 
acquires certain moral concepts.  He knows the words ‘altruism’ and ‘beneficence’ but 
has never understood them, in part because of the abuse he has suffered, and the 
complete absence of expressions of such virtues in his life.  He is unable to ever 
recognize situations where reasons for altruism or beneficence are present, not because 
of an inability to appreciate the non-normative facts upon which the reasons 
supervene, but because he has never even acquired the relevant normative concepts.  
Holding someone like this responsible for what they do strikes me as wrong.  So the 
receptivity a responsible person has to the non-normative facts which ground the 
reasons for action needs to be stronger than her receptivity to the fact that this 
grounding or explanatory relation holds, but she has to be able, in some broad sense, 
to appreciate that the grounding or explanatory relationship holds.
240
  So let me 
suggest the following formula: 
 
Moderate Reasons Receptiveness: X is morally responsible for Y when it is 
the case that Y issued from a psychological mechanism of X’s which is 
regularly receptive to the non-normative facts upon which ground reasons for 
Y and weakly receptive to the fact that the reasons for Y are grounded on those 
non-normative facts. 
 
 To be strongly receptive to the non-normative facts in question means always 
or nearly always being aware of them when they are present.  What insures that a 
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 I think that this ability can be accounted for entirely in terms of possession of the requisite moral 
concepts, but I will not argue for that here.  There are several ways a compatibilist could account for 
this ability in a way that does not require the ability to do otherwise.  
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person is strongly receptive to the non-normative facts will be in part perceptual 
capacities.  But that is not all.  Some non-normative facts are only accessible because 
of theoretical knowledge we have.  Perceptual facts alone do not reveal that an 
utterance is a case of one person ridiculing the other, for example.  The receptivity to 
the fact of the supervenience relation is going to require even more conceptual 
apparatus, for it does not follow from X being a case of ridicule that X is also a case of 
rudeness; perhaps it was joking among friends with acerbic senses of humor.  A 
complex web of information sensitive mental attitudes make it the case that one sees 
some event as having evaluative significance. 
2.2  Taking Responsibility 
The second aspect of Fischer and Ravizza’s view to be explained is the notion 
of ‘taking responsibility for a mechanism.’  There is a problem, which only Fischer 
and Ravizza, seem to be aware of, that faces all reasons-responsiveness views.  
Mechanisms of the type that I have been discussing can fail to be the agent’s own in 
just the same way we saw that desires or beliefs could fail to be the agent’s own in our 
discussion of the Real Self View.  For instance, those suffering from OCD seem to 
take completely trivial facts to give them reason to engage in time consuming, 
potentially harmful activities.  Another example would be manipulation.  If someone 
only succeeds in responding correctly to reasons because of a mechanism whereby 
their decision making processes were taken over by someone else, that person would 
not deserve praise. 
 Fischer and Ravizza have tried to give an account of what it is for a mechanism 
to be one’s own, in terms of taking responsibility for mechanisms.  To take 
responsibility for a mechanism is to come to believe that the mechanism is causally 
efficacious, to come to believe that it would be fair if you were blamed or praised for 
actions which are the result of that mechanism, and to come to believe both of those 
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things with some evidence.  Now it is odd that X’s belief about the fairness of holding 
X responsible is part of the reason it is actually appropriate to hold X responsible.  It 
suggests that someone who tends to honestly make excuses for herself is inevitably 
going to succeed, and this doesn’t seem right.  By way of defense Fischer and Ravizza 
claim that by not seeing one’s self as an active moral agent, one makes it the case that 
one is not an active moral agent.  There is no argument offered for this view, they 
offer it in order to make the intuitive basis of their view clear.  In the absence of 
argument I must report that I see no reason to think that this is true.  Consider the hard 
incompatibilist who thinks that he is not responsible for anything he does, because no 
one is responsible for anything they do.  Now suppose for the sake of argument that 
hard incompatibilism is false, and that some people are sometimes responsible for 
what they do.  On Fischer and Ravizza’s view it looks as though the hard 
incompatibilist, if he really means it, is not responsible for his actions, even if his view 
is incorrect.  And this seems incredible, and would be incredible even to the hard 
incompatibilist.
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 There is a further problem.  What is this evidence that the person must be 
aware of?  The evidence for the causal efficacy of the mechanism is not hard to 
imagine.  That is just the efficacy of one’s own practical thought on the subject, and 
we see evidence of that efficacy all the time.  But what about the fairness of blaming 
and praising the person for actions which are caused by the mechanism?  What 
evidence is there supposed to be of this fact?  What makes it fair to blame or praise 
people for their actions?  This last question sounds strikingly similar to the problem of 
moral responsibility, the problem Fischer and Ravizza are trying to answer.
242
  So, it 
seems, their view is that people are responsible for what they do only when they have 
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 If I am right that fairness based incompatibilism is the best form of incompatibilism, then it is the 
very same question. 
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good evidence that they are responsible for what they do.  This is hardly helpful.
243
 
 So Fischer and Ravizza’s account of what makes a mechanism one’s own fails.  
They need an in principle way to distinguish mechanisms that are one’s own from 
mechanisms which are the vehicle of internal compulsion.  And this exactly the job 
that I earlier said Identity Claim was perfect for.  As I said earlier I think that these 
two views solve each other’s problems, and I think it is pretty straightforward how 
Identity Claim can help Fischer and Ravizza; mechanisms are our own when they are 
partly constitutive of our personal identity.  Before moving on to give a more robust 
account of a view which combines the best aspects of both Watson’s view and Fischer 
and Ravizza’s view, I want to deal with an argument, offered by Nomy Arpaly, that a 
reasons-responsiveness view need have no recourse to controversial claims about 
personal identity, like Identity Claim.
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2.3  Could Identity Claim Help? 
 Arpaly says: 
 
“Compatibilist accounts of self-control tend to become accounts of one part of 
the self controlling the other another, and there is nothing wrong with that 
either.  The problem starts when we make our notions of praise-and 
blameworthiness dependent on a notion of self-control, thus, in effect, 
postulating that some parts of a person’s mind are not ‘the agent’ and some are, 
or even without postulating such a neat division of the soul, that some things 
that the agent does are not ‘really her actions’ while some are.  It is hard to 
argue as to what makes a particular part of the agent deserving of the privilege 
of being ‘the agent’, to find out what kind of self-control is the relevant one, 
and how to accommodate such questions as ‘if my great love is calling me to 
follow her, but my common sense tells me to stay, which is the real me to 
which I need to submit’.”245 
 
Arpaly is certainly right that it is difficult to argue for the position that one part of the 
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 As a reminder Identity Claim says that  X really wants A iff the psychological state which 
constitutes the token wanting of A is either a psychological state X has essentially, or bears the proper 
relationship to a psychological state that X has essentially.   
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 Arpaly (2006) pg. 20 
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agent constitutes who the agent really is, while other parts do not.  The arguments for 
and against Agential Rationalism show how hard it is to come up with good reasons 
that support one part of an agent’s psychology over another.  But where Arpaly is 
incorrect is in her assumption that the account we give of the Real Self is going to 
provide answers as to what to do in all or even most cases of practical deliberation.  It 
is only this assumption that could justify bringing up the cases of common sense 
versus love as a criticism of the Real Self view.  My own position is that there is no 
reason to think that the Real Self view is going, all by itself, to answer questions about 
what to do.  For one thing it might be that one’s love and one’s common sense are 
both part of the agent’s Real Self.  There is no reason to think that every case of 
internal conflict is a conflict between the agent’s true self and alien desires.  
Sometimes agents are actually conflicted, perhaps because two ends they have reason 
to think are valuable cannot both be realized, or perhaps because two people to whom 
they are deeply loyal have become adversaries, or perhaps because they simply have 
conflicting duties.  A second point is that it does not follow from the claims I have 
made about moral responsibility that a person must take the property ‘expressing who 
I really am’ to be a reason that speaks in favor of a course of action.  So even if at my 
core I am conservative and hardheaded, that does not seem to be a reason to not follow 
my great love.  Perhaps there is something wrong with being conservative and 
hardheaded. 
 Arpaly goes on to say: 
 
“To say that a severely manic person is not blameworthy for throwing your 
expensive vase onto the floor, one does not need to speculate that the vase 
throwing was not really her action but an action performed by her disorder, or 
that it was not an action at all.  It is enough to point out that all the moral 
concern in the world short of sainthood would not have prevented the a person 
who suffers from mania from doing something similar, while for a normal 
person, it takes a marked lack of moral concern to allow such an action.  
Cigarettes are, by some measures, as addictive as heroin, but unwilling, severe 
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heroin addiction can be a blame reducing condition in context in which a 
cigarette addiction is not.  To explain this, there is no need to try to draw a line 
between irresistible desires and resistible desires, to say that a tobacco driven 
action is more yours in some way, or to look at differences in the structures of 
the two addict’s wills. It is enough to point out that for a heavy user, heroin 
withdrawal amounts to torture, while cigarette withdrawal is only slightly 
uncomfortable.”246 
 
This amounts to an argument that Identity Claim or other claims like it, are not 
necessary to make sense of and justify our intuitive judgments about responsibility.  I 
think this is wrong.  Putting aside Arpaly’s own example for a moment, lets look at the 
kind of case I have been appealing to, that of someone suffering from OCD.  Such 
people suffer from compulsive desires.  We need not say that they are irresistible; 
rather the point is that they have their source in a mental disorder, and they are 
insensitive to the agent’s other beliefs, desires, intentions, commitments, etc.  Suppose 
our obsessive compulsive misses a meeting he had scheduled because he spent hours 
turning on and turning off the water faucets in his hotel room. What Arpaly would say 
is that no amount of moral concern would have been sufficient to make the obsessive 
compulsive wrench herself out of the loop of compulsive behavior and make it to the 
meeting.  So the fact that he missed the meeting tells us nothing about the moral 
quality of his will.  This all seems right, but it seems to be missing the point that we 
need an account of why the compulsive desires the agent has do not count against the 
moral quality of his will.  If someone had no compulsion and blew off a meeting so 
that he could do something trivial, we would normally treat that as expressive of 
contempt for those he was meeting with.  It would show that he did not think they 
were as important as the faucets in his hotel room.  Why is this not the case with the 
obsessive compulsive?  Because they suffer from a disorder, one might say.  That is 
true, but why does that matter?  The disorder is just a pattern of behavior and thought 
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caused in a certain way.  Certainly it is one that negatively impacts the obsessive 
compulsive’s proper functioning in society, but so does being rude to people, and we 
don’t let people off the hook for being rude because being rude is a pattern of behavior 
that hurts the rude person.  What Arpaly is doing is helping herself to the claim that 
the desires of the obsessive compulsive do not count when we are figuring out her 
moral quality of will, but she is doing so without saying why this is the case.  She can 
choose to simply rely on the intuition that this is so, but when other theorists, both 
compatibilist and incompatibilist, have an explanation of why the intuition is justified, 
this is a poor foundation to rest on.
247
  Identity Claim aims to provide just such an 
explanation. 
3.  The Combined View 
 The Combined View as I am calling it, amounts to a significant revision of 
both views.  First let me point out that Reasons Receptiveness is importantly 
incomplete.  What I wanted to do, in arguing for it rather than Reasons 
Responsiveness was argue that the normative competency requirement on moral 
responsibility implied neither that for a person to be responsible for Y it had to have 
been possible for the agent to have reacted the right way to reasons nor that the agent 
must sometimes have responded the right way to similar reasons.  But the argument 
for an understanding of normative competence which did not have those implications 
would not support the claim that the agent could fail to react to reasons at all.  I agree 
with Arpaly that blameworthiness requires some reaction or other to reasons, just not 
the right reaction.  So let us consider: 
 
Revised Reasons Responsiveness: X is morally responsible for Y when it is 
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the case that Y issued from a psychological mechanism of X’s which is 
regularly receptive to the non-normative facts which ground reasons for Y and 
weakly receptive to the fact that the reasons for Y are grounded by on those 
non-normative facts, and it is the case that X has some measure of reactivity to 
those reasons. 
 
I have argued that any reasons responsiveness view, whether it is my Revised 
Reasons Responsiveness view or some other needs an account of what makes the 
mechanisms in question the agent’s.  My suggestion is that we employ Identity Claim 
to help the reasons responsiveness theorist out.  Because Identity Claim is about 
‘really wanting’ we will have to present the following account of ‘really wanting’, 
meant as a replacement for Agential Rationalism: 
 
Agential Reasonability:  X really wants Y only if Y is the object of an attitude 
which is a reaction to the output of a psychological mechanism of X’s which is 
regularly receptive to the non-normative facts which ground reasons relevant 
to Y supervene and weakly receptive to the fact that the reasons for Y are 
grounded by those non-normative facts. 
 
Notice that in moving from Revised Reasons Responsiveness to Agential 
Reasonability I have changed ‘weakly receptive to the fact that the reasons for Y 
supervene on those non-normative facts’ to ‘weakly receptive to the fact that the 
reasons relevant to Y supervene on those non-normative facts.’  The reason to do this 
is that because I have allowed that any reaction to reasons is compatible with moral 
responsibility, we shouldn’t build into the view that in performing Y the agent was 
reacting to reasons for Y.  Consider the following case: 
 
Selfish Architect:  Howard is a reasonably intelligent adult living in New York.  
He owns and operates a large architecture firm.  He is famous in the city and is 
the first person a developer goes to see when planning a new building.  As a 
result he has more clients than he could ever manage himself.  Rather than 
allowing other firms to take jobs he cannot see to personally, he takes every 
job that is available to him.  To cover the work he hires architecture students 
right out of college and pays them low wages.  Now if Howard passed up on 
some jobs it would allow some of the people who work for him, for low 
wages, to start their own firms.  The different for Howard would be slight.  He 
would be very wealthy and well respected either way.  The difference for his 
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workers would be significant though.  It would allow them to exercise their 
creativity in the way that they saw fit.  It would allow them to live 
comfortably, and would grant them a measure of economic independence, all 
of which they lack now.  Howard is aware of all these facts, but his reaction to 
them is to gobble up more and more of the architecture market. 
 
One would not want to say that there are reasons, moral reasons anyway, in favor of 
Howard’s continuing to gobble up the architecture market in New York.  What 
Howard was responding to was the reasons for sharing the market.  His reaction to 
those reasons was to defy them.  Howard is selfish, and that selfishness consists in his 
reactions to the reasons to be selfless. 
 Revisions are necessary to Identity Claim as well.  As it stands Identity 
Claim posits a connection between attitudes of a certain type and the identity of the 
person who has those attitudes.  For the same reasons that it made more sense to 
analyze real wants in terms of belief, we should say that the psychological 
mechanisms referred to in Agential Reasonability are party constitutive of a person’s 
identity.  After all the attitudes which constitute reactions to the outputs of those 
mechanisms are only rational, when they are rational, because of the mechanisms and 
how well they track the actual normative and non-normative facts.  It would be an odd 
picture of identity which had it that reactions to reasons-receptive mechanisms were 
part of our identity, but the reasons-receptive mechanisms were not.  I do not mean to 
say that it is only the reasons-receptive mechanisms that are part of our identity.  After 
all the reasons-receptive mechanisms do not contain any necessarily motivational 
component, and as we are giving an account of how identity relates to action, it seems 
we need a motivational element to get us from the reasons receptiveness to action.  So 
the Combined View should say that moderately reasons-receptive mechanisms along 
with a tendency to react in a certain way to the deliverances of that mechanism are 
part of an agent’s identity.  Given that we are talking about mechanisms and the 
reactions to them, the term ‘really wants’ doesn’t work very well now.  In its place let 
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me suggest ‘values.’  This is a change that is of course congenial to Watson, who all 
along thought that it was values that were integral to an agent’s identity. 
 At this point I think the preliminaries are well in hand, and I will present the 
principles to which the Combined View is committed: 
 
Responsibility as Expression of Values:  X is responsible for Y iff Y is 
expressive of X’s real values. 
Valuing as Responsiveness to Reasons:  X values (or disvalues) Z iff X has a 
psychological mechanism that is regularly receptive to the non-normative facts 
which ground reasons relevant to Z supervene and is weakly receptive to the 
fact that those reasons are grounded by those non-normative facts and X has a 
tendency to react positively (or negatively) to those reasons. 
Identity Claim’:  X really values Z iff X values Z and X’s valuing Z is either 
an essential property of X’s or is properly related to a value X has essentially. 
 
This is not a complete list.  We need other principles to fill in some gaps.  In particular 
we need an account of when it is that actions are expressive of real values.  I have 
been treating ‘Y expresses Z’ as roughly equivalent to ‘Y provides good evidence for 
Z’ and when it is that actions provide good evidence for mental states is mostly an 
empirical matter.
248
  With regards to Valuing as Responsiveness to Reasons we need 
an account of what normative facts supervene on which non-normative facts.  We also 
need to know what psychological mechanisms are strongly receptive to those non-
normative facts and to the fact that the supervenience relation holds.  But these 
problems are problems for ethicists and empirically minded epistemologists, 
respectively.  To fill in these gaps goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 One question I must answer is about the proper relation mentioned in Identity 
Claim’.  I dealt with Watson’s account of that relation, but given the significant 
revisions that have been made to the view, it is not clear that agreement is going to 
always be the right relation.  I think the correct picture here is one that admits of 
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several kinds of relationship.  Agreement in content is one, but so is explicit 
endorsement of the kind Frankfurt thought was necessary.  If one values Z essentially 
and one’s valuing Z causes one to value W, this too seems sufficient for it to be true 
that one really values W.  There is no reason that I can see to limit one’s self to just 
one among these relations, and so I will not. 
 This pluralism shows up again in the range of possible forms reactivity to 
reasons can take.  Suppose a person becomes aware that there is good reason to tell the 
truth to a friend who is laboring under a painful misconception.  Assuming the person 
values honesty, her reaction to this awareness could take the form of a desire to tell the 
truth, but it could also take the form of a belief that one’s duty is to tell the truth.  It 
might be that the awareness of the reason leads right to the person developing the 
intention to tell the truth.  This pluralism about the psychological states that can 
constitute a reaction to reasons means that the Combined View does not face the 
problems with Weakness of the Will or Perversity of Action that Watson’s view did.  
Watson had difficulty with such cases because intuitively we can be responsible for 
weak-willed or perverse actions, but they are by definition actions taken against one’s 
all things considered judgment about what is best.  But on the Combined View 
evaluative beliefs are not privileged the way they are in Watson’s view, so the fact that 
these are actions which go against an all things considered judgment does not imply 
that we cannot be responsible for them.  If one acts in a weak-willed or perversely 
because of a desire which is a reaction to the deliverance of a moderately reasons-
receptive mechanism, then one would be responsible for that action. 
 For example, consider someone committed to the all things considered 
judgment that it was wrong to cheat on her taxes but who had a desire to save money 
which lead her to cheat on her taxes.  According to Agential Rationalism the all 
things considered judgment necessarily represented what the agent really wanted, but 
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the Combined View is committed to no such claim.  An attitudes representing what an 
agent truly wants is a matter of that attitude’s relationship to identity constituting 
psychological mechanisms.  I have mentioned two forms that the appropriate 
relationship between attitude and mechanism might take; it could be a causal 
relationship or one of endorsement.  There is no reason to think that an identity 
constituting psychological mechanism can only stand in the appropriate causal 
relationship with beliefs or judgments.  In the case under consideration the Combined 
View would just say that if the agent is responsible for cheating on her taxes then it is 
because she really values money more than she values following the law, and that this 
fact expressed itself in the desire which motivated her action.   
Such a story is not the least bit far-fetched.  A fundamentally self-interested 
person could, through exposure to social and educational pressure, develop the belief 
that loyalty to the state and respect for the law are important.  This would not express 
what the agent truly cares about.  Acceding to outside pressure, even if an agent does 
it by deceiving herself, does not express what the agent truly values.  In such a case 
what the agent really wants and really cares about would have to come about in some 
way other than the making of a judgment.  It could come about through an emotional 
reaction, such as disgust at the prospect of doing her taxes, or as an impulse to cheat.  
But it might feel to the agent as though she was acting weakly.  She might say to 
herself, I know I ought to do my taxes honestly, but I cannot help myself.  Whether or 
not she would do so would depend on whether or not she recognized the desire as 
expressive of what she truly cares about.
249
  The more complete the self-deception the 
more likely the agent is to feel as though she is behaving weakly in pursuing what it is 
that she truly cares about. 
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This is a reason to reject a view, like Frankfurt’s, in which an attitude expressed our identity only if we 
explicitly endorse it.  It sometimes takes hard work to figure out what we truly want, and it is hard to 
see how such a view could accommodate that fact. 
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A similar story could be told to explain the phenomenology of perverse 
actions.  I will not take a detailed look at a case of perverse action because the 
Combined View is not committed in the first place to the claim that we always act 
under the guise of the good.  A desire might represent what the agent truly cares about 
without the agent thinking to herself that the desired object is good.  Some desires are 
just impulses, and we do not, in feeling an impulse to do something, think it is good.  I 
do not mean to say that perverse actions are always caused by brute impulses.  This 
might only rarely be the case.  But the observation that some desires are just impulses 
is enough to show that the Combined View is not committed to the claim that we only 
choose something because it is good.  Sometimes when we act responsibly the action 
is motivated by a desire that does not represent its object as anything other than 
desirable or pleasant.  In some cases an  agent might find evil pleasant or desirable in 
this simplistic way.  In other cases an agent might perform a perverse action because 
of a hatred for her society in general, including the moral code it has adopted.   
3.1 The Combined View and the Fragility of Identity 
 The final issue to consider is whether the Combined view is immune to the 
‘Fragility of Identity Problem.’  The answer to that is that it is not immune.  No 
version of the Real Self View is completely immune to it.  Accepting Identity Claim’ 
brings along with it an account of identity on which a person’s identity is fragile to an 
unintuitive extent.  While the Combined View shares this problem with other views of 
its kind, it does have the virtue of offering an account of identity on which a person’s 
identity is less fragile than it would be if Watson’s view were correct.   
 What made Watson’s view implausible was that it was committed to the claim 
that there were certain beliefs on which one’s identity depended.  Of course the 
Combined View avoids that commitment.  Valuing can have evaluative beliefs as a 
component, but no value has evaluative beliefs or even a tendency to have evaluative 
  214 
beliefs as an essential part.  This is another application of the fact that the reactivity 
component of valuing can take many forms.  If someone stopped having certain 
evaluative beliefs, perhaps because they became convinced of evaluative anti-realism, 
this would not necessarily mean that they stopped valuing things.  Consider someone 
who values altruism, but then is presented with the specious argument that no one can 
be altruistic because the tendency to help others is simply an evolved trait which aims 
at helping the individual survive.  If the person is not able to detect the problems with 
the argument she might well lose her belief that altruism is noble.  But what is not 
plausible is that such an argument will actually cause her to lose all esteem for 
altruism, if she really valued It in the first place.  She will still have a range of 
emotional reactions, including admiration, respect, pride (if she knows the altruistic 
person), shame (if she isn’t as altruistic as she could be), etc.  She will still, if she ever 
really valued altruism at all, continue to feel the desire to be altruistic.  So for this 
reason values, as the Combined View conceives of them, are more resilient than any 
attitude. 
 This does not take us very far however.  We also want to know that the 
moderately reasons receptive mechanisms are more resilient than evaluative beliefs.  
This seems very likely to be true.  Such mechanisms are going to consist of perceptual 
faculties, and any conceptual apparatus necessary to interpret such information.  The 
most straightforward way to think of these mechanisms is as functions from the non-
normative facts to propositions about what reasons there are in favor of a given course 
of action.  We can individuate these functions by their inputs and outputs, so that any 
causal process that takes set of facts F as inputs and yields set of reasons R as outputs 
is the same mechanism as any causal process which takes F as inputs and yields R as 
outputs.  This adds an extra layer of resilience to these mechanisms.  The way in 
which a person gets from her awareness of the non-normative facts to her awareness 
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of reasons is not an essential property of hers.  That she gets from those facts to those 
reasons is, but this function can be realized by multiple causal processes.  By way of 
illustration, consider a person who believed in God and believed that God had 
forbidden being disrespectful to one’s parents and because of these beliefs took the 
fact that her parents were present to give reason to be respectful.  Suppose this person 
loses her faith.  If she still takes herself to have reason to be respectful of her parents, 
perhaps because she is thankful to her parents for the sacrifices they made, then this 
will count as the same reasons-receptive mechanism that was in play when she was 
respectful of her parents because of her religious faith. 
 So there are at least two ways in which the Combined View presents a more 
resilient account of identity than does Watson’s view.  We are still left with the view 
that there are some values that a person has which the person literally cannot lose, 
because if the value ceased to exist so would the person.  But of course we all know of 
cases where people we know have had their values change.  So either those values are 
not essentially held, or the cases we are thinking of are not actually cases of a single 
person experiencing a change in values at all; they might be cases where one person 
ceases to be and another takes her place. 
This last option sounds absurd, but it seems like the Combined View is 
committed to saying that such things could happen.  Strictly speaking it needn’t carry 
that commitment.  It is open to the compatibilist to simply insist that anytime a 
person’s values change, it was only values inessential to their identity that changed.  
The compatibilist might even throw in a cliché like ‘Leopards don’t change their 
spots.’  A general insistence that all change is relatively superficial would, however, 
be arbitrary.  To back it up the compatibilist would have to say why it is that those 
values are not essential parts of the person’s identity, and that is probably going to 
require figuring out which values are essential parts of her identity.  But once the 
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compatibilist names those values, she is going to face a dilemma.  Is it really 
impossible for any set of circumstances to come along which would make it the case 
that the person standing before me would lose one of those values? 
 Suppose we are talking to Miriam, who is a committed racial supremacist.  She 
reliably sees reason not just to favor members of her own racial group over others, but 
to oppose the efforts of members of any other racial group to achieve anything of 
significance.  Now if Miriam were, after years of such noxious behavior, to suddenly 
start fighting for racial equality, it would certainly come as a surprise, but would not 
strike anyone as reason to think that Miriam has been replaced by some other person.  
And the Combined View does not need to disagree.  There are psychological stories 
to tell about Miriam that do not involve any significant change in her essential values.  
If it were the case that Miriam was only ever a racial supremacist because she both 
valued being in a group and strongly identifying that group to the exclusion of others, 
and was exposed to racist ideologies as a child, then as long as she still valued 
identifying strongly with a group her identity is not compromised.  So if the impetus 
for her to change her behavior was her having become convinced that racial 
distinctions are unimportant, and that she is most importantly a Christian and not an 
Anglo-Saxon, then her commitment to racial equality can be seen as an expression of 
the same value which led her to adopt racial supremacist views, and it is this stable 
value that helps constitute her identity. 
 In the overwhelming majority of cases where someone seems to undergo a 
fundamental evaluative shift a story like this can probably be told.  If some story like 
this could not be told the evaluative shift would seem rationally inexplicable to us.  
And the fact that the Combined View can accommodate all these cases without being 
forced to say that the person does not survive the evaluative shift marks a significant 
improvement over other Real Self Views.  In Miriam’s case her actions were at one 
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point motivated by an evaluative judgment that her race was superior to all others, and 
then her judgments on that issue changed.  Watson might have said that while Miriam 
survives it is her practical identity which has changed, but it is hard to know what to 
do with that diagnosis.  If he had accepted the much more straightforward Identity 
Claim he would have been led to the conclusion that Miriam clearly stopped being the 
same person.
250
 
 I think it is uncontroversial that Combined View implies that personal identity 
is more resilient than it would be if any other prominent Real Self View were true.  
The question is whether it allows for identity to be as resilient as identities usually are.  
At this point I should introduce some terminological clarity into this discussion.  I am 
speaking of identities as though these are things that a person possesses, and on one 
way of using the term ‘identity’ that is true.  We speak of ethnic identities, 
professional identities, assumed identities, and all sorts of other identities that a person 
possesses non-essentially.  These are things that a person has, and they play a role in 
any complete characterization of who that person is, but they are not essential features 
of that person.  So this is not what I have in mind when I talk about identity.  When I 
talk about an identity I mean to talk about that set of properties which make it the case 
that some person X at time t is the same person as some person Y at time t+n.  I am 
talking about what makes it the case that some person, Miriam in this example, has the 
personal identity she has.  To add more clarity I am talking about what makes the 
person X numerically identical to the person Y.
251
  What the Combined View implies 
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 This is of course a very odd thing to say.  Who or what is Miriam such that she could remain Miriam 
yet be another person?  This issue could become very complex, but I think for now I am entitled to say 
that ‘Miriam’ is the name for the person residing in a particular body, and that Identity Claim is 
committed to the view that multiple people can occupy one body over the course of the life of that 
body.  
251
 I do not want to talk about qualitative identity in the least.  For one thing it is not clear to me how 
one can make qualitative identity and numerical identity come apart, because the following seems to be 
a property ‘being numerically identical with Miriam.’  Even if there were a principled way to exclude 
such properties it seems to me that qualitative identity is just the numerical identity between sets of 
property types. 
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is that it is a necessary condition of some person X being numerically identical to 
some person Y that some of their values are the same.
252
  And this further implies that 
certain changes of value are such that they destroy personal identity. 
 So let us consider a case where we can stipulate that an value which is essential 
to someone’s personal identity changes.  Consider Wallace, a murderer on death row.  
Wallace killed several people one night after losing his temper at their having beaten 
him at billiards. He was unrepentant at trial and after being sentenced to death was 
openly defiant for years in prison.  Then he experiences a religious conversion.  To 
keep things simple let us that Wallace was a rather simple minded person before the 
conversion and that he valued his own pleasure and convenience more than anything 
else.  This value informed all his actions and was at least an essential feature of his 
character, and if the Combined View is right, also of his identity.  Then Wallace is 
exposed to religious literature that condemns him and his old way of life.  Here is 
where the description gets odd.  The person we know as ‘Wallace’ ceases to exist once 
the religious conversion occurs because it involves an effective renunciation of 
Wallace’s values.  There will still be a person we call ‘Wallace’, and Wallace’s body 
will still exist, but Wallace the person will no longer exist.  And this seems bizarre to 
many people.
253
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 As I am treating values as mechanisms, this means that identity requires sameness of mechanisms.  
There are two ways one might take this.  One could require only that X and Y both have mechanisms 
that can be characterized in the same way, so that if X values honesty then Y need only value honesty.  
This is a more permissive standard than the one I think is correct.  The more restrictive standard 
requires that the mechanisms be numerically identical.  What goes into the mechanisms being 
numerically identical is going to depend on whether or not theses like dualism, idealism or physicalism 
are correct.  For example, if physicalism is true then the mechanisms which constitute valuing are parts 
of the brain and for one mechanism to be the same as another it would have to be part of the same brain 
I take it.  If dualism or idealism is correct then of course sameness of mechanism would not require 
sameness of brain.  I don’t think one needs to take a stand on this issue to defend the Combined View 
as a view about moral responsibility.  This question about sameness of mechanisms does not appear to 
have much to do with the Fragility of Identity problem.  The question about whether to allow the more 
permissive or more restrictive standard for sharing values is relevant to questions about survival of 
bodily death I take it. 
253
 Though many people speak as though they take this possibility seriously.  People speak of being 
born again, or of not being the same person anymore. 
  219 
 This implication of the Combined View is not one that can be avoided. The 
best someone like me can do is bite the bullet while trying to make the experience 
seem more palatable.  And I think much that seems bizarre can be stripped away from 
this implication.  As I already said Wallace’s body survives the change in values just 
fine.  This is one way to explain why it seems odd to say that Wallace the person has 
ceased to exist.  His body, which is the aspect of Wallace with which we are most 
familiar, survives and this might be what explains our insistence that Wallace 
survives.  The survival of that body might by itself be sufficient to make it legitimate 
to say ‘Wallace survives’.  The name ‘Wallace’ could be taken to refer to a cluster of 
metaphysically independent entities which are in almost all circumstances found 
together.
254
  The body is one of these things that I think is metaphysically distinct from 
the person that is of more importance, and that is the subject of experiences. 
 I think the main reason why people find the claim that some values are 
essential properties of the person who has them absurd is that they take it that if X is 
not the same person as Y, then X cannot be the same subject of experiences as Y.  
They take it for granted that if Wallace before the conversion is a different person than 
Wallace after the conversion then Wallace after the conversion did not experience all 
the things that Wallace before the conversion did.  To deny that Wallace after the 
conversion experienced committing those murders is absurd, but the Combined View 
need not say such an absurd thing.  The Combined View makes claims about what 
makes X the same person as Y, and that is not necessarily the same thing as what 
makes X the same subject of experiences as Y.   
 Why am I entitled to distinguish between personhood and subjecthood in this 
way?  This is certainly not what most other philosophers take to be the case.  The 
                                                 
254
 Velleman (2002) has suggested a view of this kind.  He thinks that the pronoun ‘I’ when self-
applied, can legitimately be taken to refer to many different things associated with the self for which no 
unified account can be given. 
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debate over the nature of personal identity is normally motivated by concerns over 
whether we can anticipate experiencing anything after death or after going into a Star-
Trek style transporter device.
255
  The reason I disagree with most philosophers about 
this is first, that it is clear that the necessary conditions for being a subject are not the 
same as the necessary conditions for being a person, because some animals like dogs 
are subjects without being persons.
256
  Second, personhood has a role in our practical 
deliberations that subjecthood doesn’t and shouldn’t.  It is in virtue of someone being 
a person that we can be held to honor our promises to them, enter into friendships and 
romantic relationships with them, hold them responsible for what they do, etc.  
Subjecthood does not seem involved in the reasons why it is appropriate to treat 
persons this way.
257
 
 So if the facts which made it the case that Wallace before the conversion was 
the subject he was are not affected by the conversion then Wallace after the 
conversion is the very same subject as Wallace before the conversion.  If this is 
compatible, as I think it is, with Wallace before the conversion being a different 
person than Wallace after the conversion, then much of the oddity of the Combined 
View is gone.  To say that someone’s personal identity can change is to say that the 
basis for holding them responsible, for being in personal relationships with them, for 
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 Parfit (1984) is probably the seminal work on personal identity and deals heavily with transporter 
cases and the question about whether we can anticipate having certain experiences.  Most literature on 
personal identity has followed Parfit on this. 
256
 Though less obvious I think that it is possible for a person to persist after they are no longer a 
subject, as with people who suffer from severe brain trauma and have no higher brain activity.  Even if 
they will not regain consciousness it is still the case that they stand in relationships with people that 
only make sense if they are still persons. 
257
 This might seem false because subjecthood is clearly a necessary condition of it being appropriate, 
for instance, to enter into a friendship with someone.  This is so, I think, because subjecthood, or at least 
having once been a subject,  is plausibly necessary for personhood.  How could one actually value 
something without being aware of it at all, or even being capable of being aware of it?  But this 
connection between subjecthood and personhood does not impact my claim that subjecthood and 
personhood are distinct in the way that the Combined View needs them to be.  I am claiming that 
subjecthood persists despite the termination of personhood, which is not incompatible with subjecthood 
being a necessary condition of personhood. 
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any claims they make on the basis of past promises, among other things, has been 
removed.
258
  This claim by the Combined View is still controversial, but it is not 
bizarre. 
 At this point it might seem like I have so restricted the concept of person that I 
am advocating a view that it is very much like Watson’s own view, on which our 
values are essential to our practical identity, but not our personal identity.  This is not 
the case.  It is true that I have admitted that values are not essential to the identity of 
subjects, but this does not mean I have adopted a position like Watson’s.  I have 
simply made clearer what is at stake in personal identity.  Many philosophers, perhaps 
most, agree that personal identity does not involve bodily identity and I have simply 
argued that personhood is similarly isolated from subjecthood.  What Watson 
advocates is a position on which values are not integral to personhood at all.  A 
practical identity is something that a person has, whereas personhood is not something 
had by subjecthood or bodily identity, but is, along with them, something we refer to 
in referring to ourselves.  On Watson’s view it is a contingent fact that a person has 
any of the values she has, and on mine it is not.  It is a contingent fact on my view that 
a given subject is the person she is, and so a contingent fact that a given subject has 
the values it has.  But this is not troubling.  Assume for a moment that physicalism is 
true, and that all facts and phenomena are physical facts and physical phenomena.  
Then X’s being a subject is grounded entirely upon certain features of X’s brain, and 
X having the values is grounded upon some other features of her brain.  Is it at all 
worrisome to suppose that consciousness and all the things that go into practical 
decision making and the having of characteristic conative and cognitive dispositions 
are manifested in different modules of the brain?  Is it troubling that the one part of 
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 It also might imply that no unified narrative account of the person’s life is any longer available.  It 
might also that previous allegiances are no longer binding, such as to a political party or nation, so that 
to work against those groups would no longer count as a betrayal. 
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X’s brain can change independently of the other? 
 As long as my claim that subjecthood and personhood are distinct is not paired 
with a further claim that subjecthood has some kind of priority over personhood, then 
my version of the Real Self View is not importantly like Watson’s.  There is a final 
issue related to the resiliency or fragility of personal identity that I want to discuss and 
that is whether or not a view like the Combined View could make do with mere 
continuity of values rather than sameness of values.  If it could then the Combined 
View would be as good as any other psychological account at protecting the resiliency 
of personal identity.  Instead of saying that for person identity to be preserved that 
sameness of some set of values must be preserved, the Combined View would say 
that for X at time t to be the same person as Y at time t+n, Y’s values must be related 
in some appropriate way to X’s values.  What is the appropriate relation?  The relation 
that is typical for psychologically continuity accounts of personal identity is a causal 
relation such that if X has some value V, and Y has some value W, W is appropriately 
related to V iff there is some non-deviant causal link between V and W.   
 The benefits of this proposal for amending the Combined View are clear, but I 
think the costs of the proposal include undermining its ability to account for why 
certain values are not alien but rather belong to the agent.  The benefits of the proposal 
include both greater resiliency of personal identity and the removal of the necessity of 
saying that a person is essentially committed to some particular value.  To see why it 
brings greater resiliency think again about Wallace.  If Wallace’s conversion occurred 
because of some relatively normal causal process then even though all his values 
changed, they changed in a way that is rationally explicable, then Wallace is the same 
person before and after, on this proposal.  This would eliminate the odd implications 
of the the Combined View when it comes to personal identity without having to 
appeal to the distinction I proposed between subjecthood and personhood.   
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 The way in which the proposal secures these goods, however, undermines the 
Combined View’s response to incompatibilism.  The Combined View, sans 
amendment, says that people are morally responsible for their actions when those 
actions are explained by the person’s essential values.  To quote Dewey speaking 
figuratively, “that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions.”259  For any action which 
we are responsible we can, when questioned about why we are responsible for it, give 
a clear answer; the action is the outcome of a decision that was guided by our values, 
what we care about.  And the reason why we are permitted to say that the values are 
ours is because they constitute us, and their constituting us is not incompatible with 
determinism.  This explanation is not available if we reinterpret the Combined View 
in such a way that it implies a psychological continuity account of personal identity.  
Suppose X has value V at time t, and performs an action explained by X’s having that 
value at time t.  In this case X can still say that the action is explained by V.  X can 
even say that the action is explained by X’s character, given the common sense 
connection between our character and what we value.  But at this point the explanation 
runs out.  V is an accidental feature of X’s.  There is no prima facie reason to think 
that V is not an alien feature of X’s character, especially given the fact that X was 
determined to have V, was powerless with respect to V, has V just by luck, or 
whatever else the incompatibilist might say.  The most the revised Combined View 
could say is that the action at time t was the causal product of a value that played a 
role in maintaining X’s identity.  But the way it did so is not incompatible with its 
being an alien feature of X’s identity.   
 To see this consider Jenny, who, up until she went to college was very open-
minded and adventurous.  When she reached college she tried drugs and became 
addicted, and this addiction became the driving force for all that she did.  When the 
                                                 
259
 John Dewey(1891) pgs. 160–61. 
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addiction caused her to hit bottom she received help in the form of entrance into a very 
strict rehabilitation program.  Because of this program Jenny was able to break free 
from her addiction.  Here we have a relatively familiar, non-deviant causal process 
which seems to preserve psychological continuity over robust psychological change.  
Jenny went from open-minded and adventurous to a desperate junky to a very severe, 
disciplined former addict.  The fact that all three traits were part of a chain of 
psychological traits that proceeded in causally regular fashion does not mean that the 
addiction was not an alien feature of Jenny’s psychology while she was addicted.  It 
was alien despite playing a role in maintaining Jenny’s identity. 
 So the Combined View must demand sameness of values, not continuity of 
values, when it comes to its account of personal identity.  The account of personal 
identity it offers is quite controversial, though it does not endorse absurd claims about 
subjecthood that it might seem to. 
4.  How does the Combined View Help Compatibilism More Generally? 
 Recall the reasons I gave for the necessity of compatibilists giving an account 
of what makes us morally responsible for an action.  The idea is that compatibilists 
needed a theory to unify their responses to various incompatibilist arguments and to 
explain why those responses were correct.  I think that the Combined View can do 
that.  In this section I want to explore some ways that the Combined View can be of 
help to compatibilists. 
4.1 The Combined View and the Argument from Alternatives 
 Probably the most straightforward argument for incompatibilism is the 
Argument from Alternatives: 
 A1.  If determinism obtains then no one can do otherwise. 
 A2.  If X is morally responsible for doing Y, then X must have been able to do 
 otherwise. 
 A3.  So if determinism obtains then no one is morally responsible for their 
 actions. 
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Compatibilists have denied both A1 and A2.  Classical compatibilists often endorsed 
conditional analyses of ability on which determinism was not incompatible with the 
ability to do otherwise, denying A1.  Harry Frankfurt has argued that A2, also known 
as the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), is false.
260
  Does the Combined 
View make either argumentative strategy stronger? 
4.1.1  The Combined View and the Conditional Account of Ability 
 I don’t think that the classical compatibilist strategy of denying A1 is helpful, 
but that a similar strategy would be.  Classical compatibilists were interested in 
claiming that ‘X is able to Y’ just meant ‘If X had wanted to Y, then X would have Y-
ed.’261  And this semantic claim is clearly false.  This is not the correct account of 
what the word ‘ability’ means, as we can see by the number of competent speakers of 
English who think that it can be true that ‘If X had wanted to Y, then X would have Y-
ed’ even if it is false that ‘X is able to Y’.  If the semantic claim is correct, then it 
would be obvious that those expressions were materially equivalent to anyone who 
understood what ‘ability’ means.  Presenting their argument as based on the meaning 
of words weakens the compatibilist argument against A1 and is unnecessary.  Instead 
of making a claim about the meaning of some expression compatibilists should be 
content making a claim about the real nature of abilities.  The meaning of the word is 
not what is at issue.  What is at issue is whether people actually have the ability to do 
otherwise, and all you need to justify that claim is some position about when people 
are actually able to do otherwise, not a claim about what people mean when they say 
‘ability’ or what ‘ability’ means in some natural language.262  
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261
 See Ayer (1954), Hobart (1934), Moore (1993), Nowell-Smith (1948), Schlick (1939) 
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 Figuring out what the right answers to these claims about meaning are don’t seem to be the job of 
philosopher’s anyway.  The former question, about speaker meaning seems to be something the speaker 
has authority over, and the latter question, about word meaning, seems to be a question for linguists. 
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 So if we respond to A1 with a conditional account of the nature of ability, 
rather than a conditional analysis of the word ‘ability’ is there anything that the 
Combined View could add?  Yes, I think so.  Traditional conditional accounts of 
ability took the antecedent of the conditional to be the agent wanting something, or 
deciding to do something, or intending to do something.  When the antecedent of the 
conditional is just the occurrence of a transitory mental state like a desire, or a 
decision or an intention, the conditional account of ability fails.  The reason it fails is 
the same reason CAF failed, internal compulsion.
263
  If someone acts as she does 
because of an internal compulsion, than she is un-free even though she gets what she 
wants.  Internal compulsions present a different problem for conditional accounts of 
ability.  When people act as they do because of a compulsion, be it internal or external, 
they cannot do otherwise.  But some forms of internal compulsion look like they 
eliminate the ability to do otherwise without making false the conditional, the holding 
of which is materially equivalent to the person having the ability to do otherwise, 
according to the conditional account of ability.  Suppose I am severely arachnophobic, 
and at seeing a spider I immediately run away.  The psychological effect of seeing a 
spider is so great that it immediately produces the desire to run away, and completely 
blocks the formation of any other attitude having to do with the spider.  So, because of 
an internal compulsion that results from a phobia, I run away and cannot do other than 
run away.  This internal compulsion works such that if I have it I cannot face a spider 
and develop any attitude other than a desire to run away.  So the nearest possible 
world in which I desire, or decide or intend to do something other than run away is a 
possible world in which I do not suffer from the phobia.  In most of those worlds I will 
successfully do something besides run away, and so the counterfactual conditional in 
the conditional account of ability is true.  So, according to the conditional account of 
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ability I have the ability to do something other than run away, when my running away 
is caused by an internal compulsion, just because were I to not suffer from that 
compulsion I would do something besides run away.  So the conditional account of 
ability not only gives the wrong answer when it comes to some cases of internal 
compulsion, it compounds the problem by offering a terrible explanation.  Essentially 
it says that internal compulsions do not compromise our ability to do otherwise 
because if we did not have the internal compulsion we would do otherwise. 
 The Combined View can help remedy this problem.  The difficulty in the 
arachnophobia case was that for the antecedent of the conditional to be satisfied the 
internal compulsion had to be absent.  If, in place of beliefs, desires, intentions or 
decisions, we revised the conditional account of ability so that the antecedent 
mentioned only the psychological features that are, according to the Combined View, 
essential properties of the person who has them then it would escape the criticism I 
just outlined.  So in place of the ‘If X wants to Y, then X will Y’ we have ‘If X has a 
moderately reasons receptive mechanism according to which there is sufficient reason 
to Y, then X will Y.’  It would escape the problem because the victim of the internal 
compulsion would, in the actual world, satisfy the antecedent of the conditional, but 
fail to satisfy the consequent.  In the case of the arachnophobe, while there was no 
time for her to decide or come to intend or develop a desire to do something other than 
run away, that does not mean that stable elements of her psychology, such as reasons 
receptive mechanisms, stop functioning.  She is aware of all the non-normative facts 
that are necessary to see that there is reason to do something besides run away.  She is, 
let us suppose, aware that those non-normative facts make it the case that there is 
reason to do something other than run way.  The way in which the internal compulsion 
affects her is to prevent her from reacting appropriately to the reasons of which she is 
  228 
aware.
264
  On this revised conditional account of ability, those suffering from internal 
compulsions are not able to do otherwise because in the nearest possible world in 
which they have reason to behave otherwise they do not.
265
 
4.1.2  The Combined View and PAP 
 I said before that the Combined View was committed to an expressive account 
of moral responsibility.  The Quality of Will Account that I defended earlier is an 
expressive account of moral responsibility, and is, as far as I can tell the only plausible 
kind of expressive account.
266
  I argued earlier that the Quality of Will Thesis did not 
rule out incompatibilism, but it seems as though it might rule out a kind of 
incompatibilism, the kind committed to PAP.  According to the Quality of Will 
Thesis a person is morally responsible for her actions when it is legitimate to make a 
judgment about the person’s quality of will on the basis of her actions.  So, according 
to the Quality of Will Thesis responsibility is an actual-sequence concept.  In other 
words what matters to moral responsibility is what actually transpired, not what might 
have occurred.   Does this mean that alternative possibilities play no role in how we 
ought to evaluate a person’s actions and the quality of her will in acting as she did?  It 
certainly matters what alternatives the person took herself to have.  If a person steals 
some bread to feed her family, when she took herself to have only the alternative of 
allowing them to die, her quality of will is better, morally speaking, than someone who 
steals to avoid the alternative of spending money on the bread that she would rather 
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 This awareness would presumably consist in a dispositional belief about what reasons there are. 
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 This might look as though it generates a problem.  Any time we fail to react appropriately to reasons 
we will meet the conditions in the antecedent but not the consequent.  So this sounds like those who 
behave irrationally or unreasonably cannot do otherwise.  In response I think that the conditional 
account should be again revised so that the test is whether in the nearest possible world that is not the 
actual world, in which the antecedent is satisfied, the person satisfies the consequent.  It does not fall 
out of this account that irrational or unreasonable actions are ones for which we have no alternative.  
266
 The Quality of Will Thesis differs from the definition of an expressive account of moral 
responsibility only in adding that the moral judgments involved in praising or blaming someone must be 
fair.  Any expressive account which did not contain this prohibition and any that has it is a version of 
the Quality of Will Account. 
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spend at the tracks.  But the alternatives the person thought she had come up in any 
description of the actual sequence, because they are the objects of beliefs that actually 
played a role in her deliberation. 
 So the Combined View, because it is committed to the Quality of Will 
Account looks as though it implies that PAP is false.  This is not strictly speaking 
true.  Even if moral responsibility is an actual sequence notion, so that what explains 
why people are or are not responsible are facts about what actually happened, PAP 
could be true if the absence of alternative possibilities signified that something had 
gone wrong with the actual sequence.
267
  The absence of alternative possibilities 
would not explain why people are not morally responsible, but it might imply that they 
are not.  If we want to show that PAP is false we have to find counter-examples.  
Luckily counter-examples to PAP are easy to find.  Harry Frankfurt has provided a 
template for counter-examples to PAP.  The following is a counterexample that fits 
the template: 
 
Joseph and the Scientist:  Joseph’s neighbor, Mr. White, is a source of 
constant conflict for everyone he meets.  He is spiteful, cruel and 
inventive in his malice.  Joseph attempts to maintain relations with 
White characterized by politeness, fairness and forgiveness.  White’s 
other neighbor, Marcus is a brilliant neuroscientist, and has had enough 
both of White’s misbehavior and Joseph’s refusal to condemn him.  
Joseph has a lot of power in the homeowners committee and if he 
wished, he could force White to sell his home and leave.  So Marcus 
tricks Joseph into allowing a chip to be placed in his brain which allows 
Marcus special kinds of control over Joseph’s actions.  After the 
procedure Marcus, who is skilled at rhetoric and home surgery, does his 
best to convince Joseph that White needs to go.  Joseph is moved by 
Marcus’ words and decides to make sure that White is forced to leave 
the neighborhood.  Because Marcus knows of Joseph’s forgiving nature 
he keeps close watch on Joseph to make sure he does not lose his nerve.  
The device in Joseph’s brain allows Marcus to closely monitor his 
mental states.  Marcus has identified a particular neural state that 
precedes changing one’s mind.  It also precedes reconsidering one’s 
judgments.  It also precedes slight doubts about what one is doing that 
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 See Della Rocca (1998), Pereboom (2001) 
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are easily brushed aside.  So this neural state is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition of changing one’s mind.  If Joseph exhibits this 
mental state Marcus is going to use the device to force Joseph to go 
through with it.  But the power of Marcus’ reasoning along with the 
long years of abuse from White are such that Joseph never changes his 
mind.  He has White removed from the neighborhood. 
 
Is Joseph responsible for what he did?  I think so.  He had White removed because he 
had been convinced by powerful arguments, that it was the right thing to do.  But he 
had no alternative to doing so, because of Marcus’ ability to intervene should it have 
become possible for Joseph to change his mind.   
 So this is a relatively straightforward counterexample to PAP.  There is a 
significant worry, however.
268
  The worry is that there is actually an alternative of a 
kind available to Joseph, the alternative to realizing the neural state that is a necessary 
condition for changing his mind, and then having Marcus force him to remove White 
anyway.  There is, in other words, a flicker of freedom for Joseph.
269
  What is more, it 
seems like every Frankfurt style counterexample is going to have a flicker of some 
kind, at least all the plausible ones. 
 Does this mean that there are no counterexamples to PAP?  Strictly speaking 
yes.  Does it mean that Frankfurt style counterexamples do not give reason to reject 
PAP?  That depends on issues related to what role alternatives are supposed to play in 
our moral thinking.  I said before that Combined View is committed to an actual 
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 There are two major objections to Frankfurt style counterexamples.  The one I will mention is the 
Flicker of Freedom response.  One I will not mention is the Dilemma response.  The Dilemma response 
says either the causal history of Joseph’s action is indeterministic or it is deterministic.  If deterministic 
then the incompatibilist has no reason to share the intuition, and if indeterministic then the scenario is 
impossible.  Perhaps this response posed problems for some kinds of Frankfurt style counterexamples, 
but not the one I have given.  There is no reason why the story I told in Joseph and the Scientist is 
incompatible with indeterminism because indeterminism is not incompatible with there being necessary 
conditions of action.  See Pereboom (2003) 
269
 The name ‘Flicker of Freedom’ is a bit misleading.  The response was named by John Martin 
Fischer(1995), a compatibilist about moral responsibility and determinism who is content to be an 
incompatibilist about determinism and freedom when freedom is conceived of as the ability to do 
otherwise.  As most would not be willing to abandon the traditional connection between freedom and 
responsibility, taking the title ‘Flicker of Freedom’ literally is not fair to compatibilists. 
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sequence account of moral responsibility, so that the explanation of why someone is 
morally responsible cannot be that things might have gone differently than they did in 
some way.  I said that this meant that PAP could still be true, but only if we treat the 
absence of alternatives as a sign that something has gone wrong with the actual 
sequence such that the agent is not morally responsible.  So according to the 
Combined View, PAP does not serve to explain anything about the nature of moral 
responsibility.  Frankfurt style counterexamples provide evidence for this claim about 
PAP.  If we were to assume that the presence of alternatives is what explains why 
Joseph is morally responsible that would require us to accept that Joseph is morally 
responsible for removing White from the neighborhood because he might have been 
forced to remove White from the neighborhood.  This is not plausible. 
 But what if we abandon the explanatory role for PAP?
270
  Then we are not 
forced to make absurd sounding claims about what explains why Joseph is morally 
responsible, while still denying that he would have been responsible had he lacked any 
alternatives.  On this approach the absence of the alternative is infallible evidence that 
a person is not responsible, without being the fact that makes the person not 
responsible.  This is a perfectly acceptable move to make, but for it to function as 
satisfactory defense of A2 in the Argument from Alternatives we need to know what 
fact actually does make it the case that the person is not responsible.  What is it about 
the actual sequence that the absence of alternatives is infallible evidence for?   
 At this point the incompatibilist is going to have to supply a well worked out 
actual sequence account of moral responsibility on which moral responsibility is 
incompatible with determinism.
271
  Once she has done this she will have defended 
PAP as far as it can be defended.  How is the compatibilist to respond here?  Well the 
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 This strategy is popular among source incompatibilists.  The first person to commit this response to 
Frankfurt to print was Della Rocca (1998) 
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 For an example see Robert Kane (1998) 
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compatibilists certainly can criticize the incompatibilist account of moral 
responsibility, whatever it is, but this is almost bound to be unsatisfying on its own.  
Criticize the incompatibilist account and a new revised version will rush to take its 
place.  For the compatibilist to feel secure in her rejection of PAP the compatibilist 
needs her own actual sequence account of moral responsibility to appeal to, one on 
which the absence of alternatives is compatible with an agent being morally 
responsible.  If such an account is correct then no defense of PAP is possible.  
Essentially, to establish that PAP is true we have to be able to derive it from some 
actual sequence incompatibilist account of moral responsibility, and so the debate over 
PAP should take place on the level of providing accounts like the Combined View or 
comparable incompatibilist accounts.
272
 
4.2  The Combined View and Transfer Arguments 
  
 Transfer arguments are arguments which employ transfer principles like the 
transfer of powerlessness principle or the transfer of non-responsibility principle.  
While there are as many transfer arguments as there are possible transfer principles, I 
will only talk about two transfer arguments here, the Consequence Argument and the 
Direct Argument.
273
  The Consequence Argument says: 
 
 C1.  □(P0 & L → P)    (Determinism) 
 C2.  □(P0 → (L → P))  (From C1) 
 C3.  N(P0 → (L → P)) (From C2 by Rule ά) 
 C4.  NP0   (Fixity of the Past)  
 C5.  N(L → P)  (From C3 and C4 by Rule β) 
 C6.  NL   (Fixity of the Laws) 
 C7.  NP   (From C5 and C6 by Rule β) 
 
The ‘N’ operator here is such that Np means ‘no one has or ever had any choice about 
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 It is not the case that only Combined View can give compatibilists what they need to show that PAP 
is false.  Any actual sequence compatibilist view could.  I do think, for reasons I presented earlier, that 
Combined View is the best of the lot however. 
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 Ginet (1966) and Van Inwagen (1980) respectively, were the first to offer these arguments. 
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p’.  Essentially it is a powerlessness operator.  To say Np is to say that everyone is 
powerless with respect to p.  Rule ά is an inference rule licensing the inference from 
‘□p’ to ‘Np’.  Rule β is an inference rule licensing the inference from ‘Np & N(p→q)’ 
to ‘Nq’.  ‘P0’ stands for ‘the state of the world in the deep past’.  ‘L’ stands for ‘the 
laws of nature.’  ‘P’ stands for ‘the state of the world at present.’  C1 is just an 
uncontroversial statement of determinism, and is beyond reproach.  While 
compatibilists have questioned the Fixity of the Past premise(C4), the Fixity of the 
Laws premise(C6) and Rule ά, I have no interest in doing so.  They all seem obvious 
to me.  What is not obvious is Rule β.  Let us call Rule β the Transfer of 
Powerlessness principle.   
 On the face of it Transfer of Powerlessness looks right.  If someone loses 
one’s savings because the stock market crashed on account of the bursting of the 
housing bubble, she can show that she was powerless with respect to the loss of the 
savings by showing that she was powerless with respect to the housing bubble 
bursting, and powerless with respect to the fact that the housing bubble bursting made 
the stock market crash.  Transfer of Powerlessness models that argument very well.  
The question is not whether we are ever permitted to employ Transfer of 
Powerlessness in making arguments, but whether we are always allowed to, no matter 
what kind of events or facts we are talking about.  Many compatibilists have denied 
that Transfer of Powerlessness is a universally valid inference principle, which it 
would have to be for the Consequence Argument to be a valid argument. 
 A similar dialectic presents itself when we look at the Direct Argument, 
which says: 
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D1.  NP0    (Fixity of the Past) 
D2.  NL    (Fixity of the Laws)  
D3.  N(P0 & L)   (From D1 and D2) 
D4.  N((P0 & L) → P)   (Fixity of Determinism) 
D5.  NP    (From D3 and D4 by Transfer of 
     Non-Responsibility) 
 
In the context of the Direct Argument the ‘N’ operator is such that ‘Np’ stands for 
‘no one is or ever has been morally responsible for p.’ ‘P0’, ‘L’, and ‘P’ mean the 
same thing in this argument that they did in the Consequence Argument. So D1 and 
D2 say, respectively, that no one is or ever has been morally responsible for the state 
of the world in the deep past and that no one is or ever has been morally responsible 
for the laws of nature.  D4 says that no one is or ever has been morally responsible for 
the fact that determinism obtains.  Those three premises, along with the inference to 
D3, I will treat as uncontroversial, though again some compatibilists would object.  
What interests me here is, as with the Consequence Argument the transfer principle.  
The Transfer of Non-Responsibility principle says that (Np & N(p→q)) → Nq.  It is 
formally identical to the Transfer of Powerlessness principle, and is in fact implied 
by that principle along with the assumption that to be morally responsible for 
something one must not be powerless with respect to it.  
 What reasons could compatibilists give to reject both of these transfer 
principles?  The question becomes difficult to answer when we realize that we employ 
something like these transfer principles all the time in thinking about moral 
responsibility.  I already pointed out a case where we make inferences that seem to be 
instances of the employment of Transfer of Powerlessness.  We also seem to commit 
ourselves to the Transfer of Non-Responsibility principle when we think about 
responsibility for consequences.  If we want to know whether a doctor is morally 
responsible for the death of a patient, and that doctor can show that she was not 
morally responsible for the action which led to the death, because she had been 
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misinformed by staff at the hospital let us say, and that she was not responsible for that 
fact that this action led to death, because that is a basic biological fact let us say, then 
we take the doctor to have shown that she was not morally responsible for the death.  
We seem to employ the Transfer of Non-Responsibility principle when it comes to 
responsibility for actions as well.  If we want to know whether someone is responsible 
for knocking over a lamp and she can show that she was not responsible for the event 
which caused the action, because it was a muscle twitch, and that she is not 
responsible for the fact that the muscle twitch led her to knock over the lamp, then we 
know that she is not responsible for knocking over the lamp. 
 What all compatibilists have to deny is that the two transfer principles are valid 
when applied to events in the deep past, or even events in the near past which occurred 
before the agent considered which action to perform.  How can compatibilists justify 
that denial when it looks like they appeal to the transfer principles when thinking 
about responsibility after the moment of decision?  I think that here again it is 
necessary to appeal to an account of what makes people morally responsible against 
which we can test transfer principles and from which we can derive competing 
principles that model the everyday inferences that compatibilists and incompatibilists 
alike are committed to. 
 So, according to the Combined View, are Transfer of Powerlessness or 
Transfer of Non-Responsibility valid inference principles?  No, they are not.  The 
Combined View gives us an account of what makes an action one for which we are 
morally responsible, and none of those conditions imply contain a commitment to 
these two principles.  According to the Combined View, what makes an agent 
responsible for an action is just a certain relationship existing between an action and 
essential features of her psychology.  Because neither failing to be responsible for the 
state of the world in the deep past, nor being powerless with respect to it, implies that 
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we never stand in this expressive relationship to our actions, the Combined View 
implies that both transfer principles are false.  What is more the Combined View 
provides alternative principles which can be used to explain why it is that we make 
inferences that look like we are employing the two transfer principles.   
 Why don’t we consider people morally responsible for consequences of events 
for which they were not responsible?  It is not because non-responsibility transfers 
along lines of causal or logical sufficiency, but rather because consequences of events 
for which we are not responsible do not express anything about the moral quality of 
our will.  Why aren’t they?  Because they lack the proper connection to our will.  
These consequences are caused, by hypothesis, by events which do not express 
anything about our will, i.e. cannot be evidence in favor of the judgment that our will 
has one moral quality rather than another.  So how could something caused by an 
event which expressed nothing about our quality of will come to express something 
about it?  Something similar goes for powerlessness and its role in our moral thinking. 
4.3  The Moral Luck Argument and the Combined View 
 What, finally, does the Combined View have to say about the Moral Luck 
Argument?  Here I do not have much to say.  The previous incompatibilist arguments 
are all well known, and have been subject to years of compatibilist criticism.  All I did 
in criticizing them was to present, very briefly some of what I take the best criticisms 
to be and show how those criticisms can be made stronger by  tying them to an 
account of what makes people morally responsible for their actions.  There is no 
established body of compatibilist literature about the Moral Luck Argument, because 
it is, in this form anyway, a new argument. 
 All I want to do in this section is explore what routes someone with the 
Combined View might take in arguing against the Moral Luck Argument.   I will by 
no means show that the argument is unsound, anymore than I showed that about the 
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more established incompatibilist argument.  All I want to do is make it plausible that 
the Combined View has the theoretical resources to respond to the Moral Luck 
Argument, just as all I wanted to show was that the Combined View had the 
theoretical resources to explain why it was that some popular compatibilist replies to 
traditional incompatibilist arguments work. 
 So how does one attack my Moral Luck Argument?  As I said in presenting 
it, there are two ways to go about it.  One is to claim that moral luck is possible, and 
the other is to claim that determinism does not entail that every morally relevant 
feature of our actions and will are just matters of luck.  I think it is this second claim 
that compatibilists should make, and it is certainly the claim that the defender of the 
Combined View should make.  The reason has as much to do with the inability of the 
Combined View to give reason to reject the claim that moral luck is impossible as it 
does with the ability of the Combined View to show that determinism does not make 
all the morally relevant features of our actions a matter of luck. 
 The Combined View takes no general positions about the nature of fairness or 
desert.  As such it seems to be in a poor position to provide reason to reject the key 
premises in either the Argument from Fairness or the Argument from Desert for 
the claim that moral luck is impossible.  This is not to say that the Combined View is 
committed to those arguments being sound.  If the defender of the Combined View 
were forced to accept that determinism entailed that all the morally relevant features of 
our actions were a matter of luck, then, given that the Combined View implies that it 
can be fair to blame and praise people if determinism is true, she would have to deny 
one of the claims about fairness and desert made in the Argument from Fairness and 
the Argument from Desert.  But it is hard to see how she could provide an argument 
for that on the basis of the commitments of the Combined View. 
 So if the Combined View is going to be of help to the compatibilist here, it 
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will have to be by showing that determinism does not entail that all the morally 
relevant features of our actions are just matters of luck.  How to go about that?  The 
Combined View does not mention luck any more than it mentions fairness or desert.  
As I said I am not going to give anything but a brief case against the Moral Luck 
Argument, so my comments here might be unsatisfying, but the Combined View, 
when conjoined with two plausible principles about luck, shows that some morally 
relevant features of our actions are not matters of luck, even if determinism is true. 
4.3.1  Two Luck Principles 
 The two principles I have in mind are the following: 
 
Luck as Accidental:  Y can be lucky in having the property X, only if X 
is not an essential property of Y’s274 
Transfer of Lack of Luck:  If Y’s having some property, Z, is 
explained by Y’s having some property, X, and X does not hold of Y by 
luck, then Z does not hold of Y by luck.  
 
It should be pretty obvious how these two principles interact with the Combined 
View to show that not every morally relevant property of our actions is a matter of 
luck.  Luck as Accidental and the Combined View together imply that every person 
has some psychological features that are not a matter of luck, those psychological 
features which constitute the reasons-receptive mechanisms which are essential 
properties of the person who has them.  The relationship that holds between those 
mechanisms and our actions when we are responsible, according to the Combined 
View, is one of expression.  As I have said at many points, the expression relation can 
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 Neil Levy (online manuscript) has criticized this principle, saying that “essentialism about 
the traits and dispositions at issue is false.  Even if identity is fixed, across all possible worlds, 
by the genome, such that any person who did not result from the union of sperm and egg which 
features in my causal history would not have been me, it is false that there is any psychological 
trait that I had to have.  Psychological traits are not fixed by genes.  Indeed, it is not even true 
that all across all environments, genes or gene-complexes even have a tendency towards 
particular traits.”  Very simply I am not offering an account on which the genome is the only 
essential property a person has.  I am not offering a theory on which the genome is an essential 
property at all.  I am offering a theory on which the essential properties are those properties 
which, in accounts of personal identity, make a person the person they are.  
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be, and maybe always is, constituted by causal relations.  So action A expresses 
quality of will Q  when it is the case that Q caused A.  But then Q explains A, and so 
the relation called for by the Combined View to guarantee moral responsibility is just 
the same relation as the one that guarantees that the action is not just a matter of luck. 
 The real question is whether these two luck principles are true.  And here the 
Combined View does not provide any help.  These principles are, if true, conceptual 
truths about luck, and since the Combined View does not contain an account of luck, 
it is not going to tell us whether the principles are correct. But as long as they are 
plausible, then the Combined View has done a great deal in the defense of 
compatibilism.  Without an account of what makes people morally responsible which, 
like the Combined View, made claims about the essential properties a person has and 
how they are related to the moral qualities of our actions, the two luck principles 
would be impotent.  When conjoined with the Combined View they undermine the 
Moral Luck Argument. 
 But are these two luck principles plausible?  I cannot say much here.  What I 
will say is that Luck as Accidental strikes me as intuitively obvious.  How could we 
be lucky to have those properties which make us who we are?  Doesn’t something, to 
count as luck, have to be something that might not have befallen you?  How can it be 
luck that you have a certain property when you would not be who you are without it?  
If the luck is bad, who suffered it?  If the luck is good, who benefited?  It doesn’t seem 
like it could be the agent.  Here again I shall appeal to an example: 
 
Patrick and Popular Music:  Patrick was born in 1980.  He was too 
young to appreciate New Wave.  He was lucky enough to miss the hair 
metal phase of popular music, but was not listening to the radio much 
in the early 1990’s when the alternative music movement put very good 
rock and roll on the air regularly.  He started listening to popular music, 
like most people, in high school when it became socially important to 
know what was going on in pop music.  Unfortunately by the time he 
entered high school alternative music was already becoming boring and 
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repetitive.  So Patrick was stuck listening to whiny faux-punk music 
and bubble gum pop stars. 
 
The question here is not whether it is a matter of bad luck for Patrick that he was stuck 
listening to pop music on the radio.  I am quite certain he was.  But there is another 
question that the example brings up, at least to me, and that is whether Patrick was 
unlucky to be born when he was.  It is a reasonable question to ask.  If Patrick had 
been born a few years earlier he would have caught alternative rock at its height.  If he 
had been born a few years later he would have been in high school just as the New 
York garage-punk bands replaced pop stars and emo-punk on the airwaves.  If Patrick 
caught himself saying, ‘It was just bad luck that I was born in 1980’ could he have 
been correct? 
 Let us assume, along with the origin essentialists that it is an essential property 
of a person that they were conceived from the particular sperm and egg that they were 
in fact conceived from.  And so, given some elementary facts about biology, it is and 
essential property of each person that she was born around the time she was in fact 
born.  If origin essentialism is correct then it was impossible for Patrick to have been 
born three to four years earlier or later than he was.
275
  Someone could have been born 
to his parents and been named ‘Patrick’, but it would not have been the same person.  
And this fact seems obviously relevant to evaluating whether it would have been good 
luck for Patrick to have been born a few years earlier or later than he in fact was.  
There is no such thing as Patrick being born in 1977 or 1983, so how could it be bad 
luck for him that this impossible state of affairs did not come to pass?   The absurdity 
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 I said earlier in Chapter Three that I do not accept origin essentialism when it comes to figuring out 
the essential properties of persons.  But on almost any plausible account of what is essential to a person 
it is going to turn out that she could not have been born at some time distant from her actual date of 
birth.  She would have had very different experiences and a different set of genetic dispositions.  It is 
extremely unlikely on a psychological account of identity, for example, that if Patrick had been born in 
1977 he would have been the same person that he turned out to be.  There is no reason to think his 
psychological traits would be at all similar. 
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becomes more evident the farther forward or back one goes from the date of a person’s 
actual birth.  Was it bad luck for everyone in the early middle ages that there were not 
born in the 20
th
 century, so as to take advantage of the polio vaccine?  This is the 
thought behind Luck as Accidental.  
To see the intuitive case for the Transfer of Lack of Luck principle, imagine 
that we were wondering whether an athlete’s abilities were a matter of luck or not.  
Typically we look to the causal history of the development of those abilities to see 
whether or not they are a matter of luck.  If we find that the athlete spent no significant 
time practicing, and that she excelled in every athletic event she dabbled in, we would 
likely conclude that those abilities are just a matter of luck.  But if we find out that she 
spent hours in the gym practicing and honing her abilities rather than engaging in 
more immediately enjoyable activities, that would satisfy most of us that her abilities 
were, at least in part, not a matter of luck.
276
  I think the explanation is that putting in 
the time to practice is, bracketing concerns about determinism, not a matter of luck, 
but that being born with significant athletic gifts is.  Upon finding out that the 
explanation of the athletic abilities is some non-lucky event, that of deciding to work 
hard, we treat the presence of athletic abilities as also not a matter of luck. 
As a further example, suppose a student were to say that the grade he received 
on a paper was unfair because both he and a fellow student he knows spent the same 
amount of time on the paper and exerted the same amount of effort in writing it.  
When questioned a little further, he reveals that he had worked much less hard earlier 
in the semester, because of a general laziness or perhaps overconfidence in his 
academic abilities, than his friend, and so despite the fact that they spent the same 
amount of time on this paper, one student did worse than another because of how 
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 Only ‘in part’ because it is not clear from the little story I told that the gym rat was not also blessed 
with impressive natural athleticism. 
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much more work he had left himself to do.  Finding out that his doing poorly was 
explained by something that is not a matter of luck, again bracketing issues relating to 
determinism, is sufficient to show that it is not a matter of luck that he did poorly.  To 
go back to the animal case again, it sounds almost as odd, to me, to say ‘It’s good luck 
that dog has four legs’ as it is to say ‘It is good luck that dog is a mammal.’  This is so 
despite the fact that having four legs is not an essential feature of dogs.  Some dogs are 
born without four legs, and of course some dogs lose a leg or more going through life, 
while remaining dogs.  But when they do have four legs, because the explanation for 
this will be to cite essential features the dog does have, like the fact that dogs in 
normal circumstances will have four legs, it is not a matter of luck that the dog has 
four legs.
277
 
I have already presented, in presenting the Moral Luck Argument, some 
reason to think that the two luck principles are false.  So I have to say how it is that I 
think the Moral Luck Argument goes wrong.  The Moral Luck Argument 
essentially says that starting from an uncontroversial case of luck, a series of small 
changes that change nothing of moral significance gets us to a case similar in all 
respects to determinism.  Given the nature of the argument there are three ways it 
could fail.  The first is for one or more of the cases mentioned in the argument to be 
inconceivable or not make sense.  The second is for one of the transitions from one 
case to another to actually mask a significant difference.  The third is for the initial 
case to not actually be an uncontroversial case of luck. 
That the Moral Luck Argument fails in the third way is implausible.  What 
could be more clearly a matter of luck than someone playing a game like poker against 
equally skilled players?  Certainly people do not deserve praise for winning a poker 
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 Contrast ‘having four legs’ with ‘having three legs’.  The first property is explained by an essential 
features of the dogs, while the second is not.  Also, at least to my ears, ‘It was back luck for that dog 
that he was born with three legs’ sounds perfectly sensible. 
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game,
278
 and the most natural explanation of why this is true is that victory is just a 
matter of luck. 
I also don’t think there is anything incoherent in the cases I have presented.  
Certainly some of the events described go beyond what we currently know to be 
physically possible, but there doesn’t seem to be any problem with our conceiving of 
these events taking place.  There is a legitimate question as to whether our intuitions 
about bizarre cases ought to be trusted.  Whether this is so depends on why it is that 
we ought to trust intuitions about normal cases, and that is not an easy thing to 
explain.  Luckily I need not explain it.  The only intuitions I appeal to are intuitions 
about normal cases.  I appeal to the intuition that the initial case is one in which 
victory is a matter of luck, and this is a perfectly normal situation of equally skilled 
poker players seated around a table.  I also appeal to intuitions about what kind of 
changes can make a difference to how we ought to evaluate whether something is a 
matter of luck.  I claim that change in the stakes ought not make a difference to 
whether something is a matter of luck, and changes in the stakes of contests is a 
perfectly normal occurrence.  I also claim that changes in one’s opponents, as long as 
equality of skill is maintained should not make a difference to whether something is a 
matter of luck.  What I have not done is pump the reader for intuitions about games of 
poker played entirely by computers, or games of poker played entirely in one 
computer.  I have not asked the reader what she thinks of these cases, I have told the 
reader what she ought to think of these cases, given the intuitions I assume we share 
about the initial case and the significance of the changes between cases.  So the 
metaphysical peculiarity of the last few cases in the Moral Luck Argument ought to 
trouble no one. 
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 Though someone might deserve praise for winning many poker games.  But that would just show 
that the player had higher than average skill at poker, and since equality of skill is being assumed 
between the players in this case, this issue can be put aside. 
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Where I think the Moral Luck Argument has to go wrong, if it goes wrong, is 
in one the changes between cases.  The first transition is between: 
 
Equal Poker:  Jack plays poker for a $1,000 pot.  There is nothing odd 
about the deal, it is a standard poker dealer doing his job as he ought to.  
The only odd thing about the players is that, while they all know only 
their cards, they are all equally skilled at calculating the likelihoods of 
other hands being present in the game given their knowledge of their 
own hands, at knowing how and when to bluff, etc..  Jack wins $1,000. 
 
And: 
High Stakes Equal Poker:  In this situation the same factors obtain as in 
Equal Poker except that the pot has changed.  Instead of being a game 
for money, the pot determines which opportunities for careers, social 
standing, and living environment the children of those at the table will 
have.  Jack wins, earning for his daughter the chance for a great job, 
high social standing, and great material conditions throughout her life. 
 
Here there is little to worry about.  I am tempted to say that High Stakes Equal Poker 
is just as obviously a case of luck as Equal Poker.
279
 
 The objectionable transition is from High Stakes Equal Poker to: 
 
Absurdly High Stakes Equal Poker:  The situation here is the same as in 
High Stakes Equal Poker except that here every aspect of the lives of 
the children of the players is determined by who wins, who comes in 
second, etc.  Every hard fact concerning the children of the players is 
set by who wins the pot.  Jack wins, wining for his daughter the same 
great life, but with every last detail set completely. 
 
Of this transition I said that it represented merely another change in stakes and so 
should be unobjectionable if the transition from Equal Poker to High Stakes Equal 
Poker was.  If Luck as Accidental is true, however, this transition is objectionable, 
because for the game to decide every fact about Jack’s daughter would be for it to 
decide what essential properties she has.  According to Luck as Accidental, for some 
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 I don’t think doing so would involve me running afoul of the naturalist’s worry about confidence in 
intuitions about peculiar cases.  High Stakes Equal Poker could very easily describe something that has 
happened in the actual world.  Imagine some friends playing, for their children, for the final spot at a 
prestigious educational institution. 
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property X to hold of some person Y by luck, X must be an accidental property of Y’s.  
So in the transition from High Stakes Equal Poker to Absurdly High Stakes Equal 
Poker, some of the things decided by the game stop being matters of luck for Jack’s 
daughter, according to Luck as Accidental.   
 It is still the case that Jack’s daughter, lets call her Jane, has all the properties 
she has because of the game going as it did.  It is also still the case that the game going 
as it did was a matter of luck for both Jack and Jane.
280
  The difference between them 
is it is a matter of luck for Jack that his daughter has the properties she does, but it is 
not a matter of luck for Jane that she has those properties.
281
  This might seem 
problematic.  To make this distinction intuitive, think about a more typical case, this 
time involving Tom and his daughter Wendy.  As before, let us suppose, along with 
origin essentialists, that it is an essential property of Wendy’s that she was conceived 
from the particular sperm and egg that she was conceived from.  Let us also suppose 
that, given the particular history of that sperm and egg, it follows from this essential 
property of Wendy’s that she was conceived on the day she was conceived.  Luck as 
Accidental says that because of this it cannot be a matter of luck for Wendy that she 
was conceived when she was, and along with Transfer of Lack of Luck says that it 
cannot be a matter of luck for Wendy that she was born around the time she was born.  
But clearly it is a matter of luck for parents when their children are born.  Parents try, 
sometimes for a week and sometimes for a year, to have children and are thinking 
perfectly sensibly when they think to themselves that they were lucky to conceive. 
4.3.2 Luck in Explanatory Connections? 
 Transfer of Lack of Luck brings with it both significant indeterminacy and 
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 As I argued before, luck doesn’t transfer along lines of causal sufficiency, though I think that lack of 
luck does. 
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 That one and the same thing could be a matter of luck for one and not the other is not surprising.  In 
football when a player fails to protect the ball and as a result fumbles, it is not a matter of luck for the 
fumbler.  The very same event is a matter of luck for the other team though, as nothing they did led to 
their good fortune. 
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significant risk.  The indeterminacy comes from the claim that it is sufficient for some 
action, psychological state or event of X’s to not be a matter of luck for X that it be 
explained by X’s essential values.  I have not said what is necessary and sufficient for 
an essential value to explain some action or psychological state or event.  I do not 
intend to give an account of what is necessary and sufficient for explanation.  To do 
would require a work longer than the present one and is not necessary anyway.  I am 
content to rely on the standard kinds of explanations relied on in those fields which 
seek to explain human action and psychology.  Such a reliance is not informative but 
will do the trick, because any account of explanation I presented which was more or 
less restrictive than relying on the standard kinds of explanation available in the social 
sciences would be a controversial account of explanation to start with. 
 Transfer of Lack of Luck raises another more pressing problem, however.  
Take some essential value, V, and some non-essential feature of the agent, N.  Even if 
V explains N, given that N is not an essential feature of the agent in question, it is 
possible for N not to be a feature of that agent at all.  So even if V explains N, it was 
possible for V not to have stood in that relation with N.  V could have very well stood 
in the explanatory relation with some other feature, Q, that is incompatible with N.  So 
the explanatory connection between V and N itself is accidental for the agent.  So even 
if Luck as Accidental is true, that the explanatory connection holds could itself be a 
matter of luck. 
 There are two questions to consider.  One is whether this matters and the other 
is how, should the compatibilist feel compelled, to argue that it is not a matter of luck 
that the explanatory connection holds.  First to whether it matters.  Suppose we are in 
a position where an agent performed an action, S, that is explained by N, and N is in 
fact explained by V, a value the agent has essentially.  Suppose also that we know that 
V might have explained Q, and that Q could have in turn explained some other action 
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T.  If we accept that the explanatory relations between V and N, and N and S are 
matters of luck, and that V might have explained Q which in turn might have 
explained T, what follows?  Well if the argument that Moral Luck is impossible is 
sound, then the agent cannot deserve credit for performing S rather than T or for being 
in psychological state N rather than Q. 
 If Transfer of Lack of Luck is a valid principle, however, the fact that the 
explanatory connections are themselves a matter of luck does not imply that N or S are 
matters of luck.  N is actually explained by V and S is actually explained by N, so it 
would only be the contrastive claims that have to be denied.  How serious a problem is 
this?  It does rule out many judgments we are inclined to make.  Consider the 
following example: 
 
Jack the Pacifist:  Jack, a single father of four, is a pacifist.  Because of 
his pacifism he has stopped paying taxes to the United States 
government so that he does not contribute to war-mongering.  The IRS 
contacts Jack and says that if he does not pay his back taxes that he will 
be thrown in prison and his children will be split up and go into foster 
care.  Jack faces the prospect of either failing to live up to his duties as 
a father, or of both failing to live up to his own principles and 
contributing to the US war machine.   
 
Whether Jack decides to pay his taxes or not he will be guilty of doing something 
wrong.  When people act in such cases we typically temper our judgments of their 
wrongdoing by making a contrastive claim like ‘Yes he abandoned his principles, but 
he did so rather than keep his family together.’  But if determinism is true, then 
contrastive facts like this are just matters of luck, and so contrastive judgments are 
inappropriate.  Are we stuck blaming Jack for abandoning his principles, without 
being able to note that he did that rather than abandoning his children?  Not in all 
cases.  Suppose that Jack did pay his taxes and that the reason he did was that on this 
occasion he valued his children more than his cause.  Let us also suppose that his 
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valuing his children either is an essential value of his, or is explained by some other 
essential value of his.  There is a description of his action, that of keeping his family 
together, under which that action is explained by an essential value of his.  So why 
can’t the compatibilist officially eschew all contrastive claims but end up with the 
ability to praise and blame people in all the cases where contrastive judgments would 
recommend such praise and blame, simply by shifting the description of the action?  If 
the compatibilist can do this then the loss of contrastive judgments is no serious loss.  
It requires only a change in the way we speak. 
 In many cases I think the compatibilist can do this, but not in all.  In explaining 
Jack’s action I appealed to the fact that he valued his children more than his cause.  
This is just another contrastive claim, this time contrasting Jack’s commitment to 
some value rather than contrasting two ways that Jack might have acted.  Is this 
contrastive claim ruled out?  It depends.  Suppose that Jack’s valuing his children is an 
essential value of his and that his valuing pacifism is not.  Then I think the contrastive 
claim is acceptable.  Jack’s valuing his children more consists in his valuing his 
children being an essential value while his valuing pacifism not being one.  And it is 
not an accidental fact that one of those values is essential and the other is not.  It is not 
accidental that Jack is Jack.  So contrastive claims about values where one value is 
essentially held and the other is not seem unobjectionable to me.   
 A contrastive claim between values that are both essential is problematic.  Here 
we cannot appeal to role these values play in the agent’s identity to explain why it is 
that the agent values one more strongly.  If we must appeal to something else, what is 
it?  It is not immediately obvious how to make sense of claims like ‘He wants X more 
than Y’.  It does no good to appeal to a pattern of choosing X over Y.  That might be 
good evidence for the claim that ‘He wants X more than Y’ but it does not tell us what 
his wanting X more than Y consists in.  We might want to talk about the desire for X 
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having more force than the desire for Y, but absent some account of what such forces 
are this is just to re-describe the claim, not to explain it.  Whatever the answer to this 
question is, it will simply bring up another question, which is whether the fact or facts 
which makes it the case that a person valued one thing  more than another is just a 
matter of luck.  If it isn’t a matter of luck, is it because the agent’s valuing X to exactly 
that extent is an essential feature of her’s?  Because that is implausible.  If it isn’t then 
it seems that we once again lose the contrastive claims. 
 So if determinism is true then the Combined View cannot accommodate 
contrastive moral judgments in cases where the contrast is between actions or 
psychological states or events which could both be explained by reference to essential 
values of the agent.  This is not an insignificant failure on the Combined View’s part.  
Is there a way to avoid it?  I am uncertain, though one way holds some promise.  
Recall that Identity Claim was a substitute for ‘taking responsibility’ in Fischer and 
Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility.  While ‘taking responsibility’ is insufficient 
on its own to explain why it is that a mechanism belongs to an agent, there is no 
reason, once that has been explained by appeal to Identity Claim that we cannot make 
use of the notion of taking responsibility to solve a problem like the one that is before 
us.  Suppose that in Jack’s case both values, taking care of his children and pacifism 
are or are explained by values that Jack has essentially, so that no contrastive claim is 
appropriate simply on the basis of Luck as Accidental and Transfer of Lack of 
Luck.  Why can’t Jack be responsible for the action because he takes responsibility for 
the action?   
If his taking responsibility for this action were itself an action he was 
responsible on the Combined View then it seems as though there is no obstacle.  His 
deserving to be praised or blamed for the contrastive fact would be something like a 
case of derived desert.  In taking responsibility Jack performed an action something 
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like a promise.  In this case he opened himself up to others to praise or blame for his 
action, thereby making it fair for others to do so.  Why couldn’t such an account save 
contrastive judgments from the threat of determinism?  To defend such a claim fully 
would require taking a much closer look at the ways in which derived desert can arise.  
This would involve giving an account of promising, among other things, and the 
giving of such an account would again involve writing a longer essay than the present 
one.  I offer this suggestion as a way compatibilists might hope to save contrastive 
judgments, though for my part I am comfortable letting them go for the sake of the 
Combined View. 
4.4  The Combined View and Manipulation Arguments 
 Recently the most popular kind of argument for incompatibilism has not been a 
transfer argument, and has not relied on PAP.  The most popular kind of argument for 
incompatibilism is the Manipulation Argument.
282
  Essentially all Manipulation 
Arguments are committed to two claims.  The first is that if some person X, 
performed some action Y because they were manipulated into doing so, then X is not 
responsible for doing Y.  The second is that if determinism obtains then X’s relation to 
Y is morally indistinguishable from what it would be if X were manipulated.  Together 
these claims imply that if determinism obtains then X is not responsible for doing Y. 
 To deny the first claim, that manipulation rules out moral responsibility, is to 
pursue a hard-line defense of compatibilism, while to deny the second, that 
manipulation is morally indistinguishable from determinism, is to pursue a soft-line 
response.  The Combined View provides some reason to pursue both defenses.  
Which  defense it recommends is going to depend on the kind of manipulation in 
question.   
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 For some central discussions of the Manipulation Argument see Fischer(2004), Kane (1996), Mele 
(1995, 2005, 2006), McKenna (2004, 2008) and Pereboom (2001, 2008) 
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 Consider a relatively straightforward story about manipulation: 
 
Mad Confectioner:  William is a confectioner who was very worried 
about the popularity of low-carb, low-sugar diets and what these new 
healthy habits would do to his business.  You see William used to be a 
unscrupulous neurobiologist and invested all the ill-gotten gains of his 
profession into a confectionery shop, so he stand to lose everything.  So 
William concocted and released into the water a chemical compound 
which produces in people an overpowering and almost insatiable desire 
to consume sweets.  Everyone in the area then broke their diets and 
started frequenting his shops.  The power of the implanted desire is so 
strong however that the locals spent all their money on sweets and, 
once the money ran out they began to steal from William, who quickly 
went out of business. 
 
In this case William manipulated his neighbors by implanting a desire in them.  And it 
seems clear that William’s neighbors are not responsible for their thieving, or for 
putting William out of business by thieving.  The Combined View agrees with the 
intuitive result.  The explanation for why William’s neighbors stole from him does not 
involve their values.  In this story a very strong desire was simply added to their 
existing set of psychological states and dispositions.  The desire was strong enough 
that none of the pre-existing values held by William’s neighbors could have led them 
to do anything other than buy or steal sweets.  Given the insensitivity of their thieving 
to their values, those values do not explain their behavior in any significant way. 
 So for any Manipulation Argument that starts with examples of manipulation 
like Mad Confectioner a defender of the Combined View will have to take a soft-line 
approach..  To see how a soft-line response works we need an example of a 
Manipulation Argument.  Just as with the Moral Luck Argument we start with an 
uncontroversial case, like Mad Confectioner, and move through a series of cases 
which are supposed to differ only in morally irrelevant ways.  The next case is: 
 
Grand Mad Confectioner:  Just as before William is a confectioner with 
a past in neurobiology.  In this case, however, he has far greater 
resources at his disposal and instead of setting up shop in a town and 
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then drugging its inhabitants, he decides to create his own customers.  
So William uses his expertise in biology and neurobiology to create 
human beings in such a way that he can guarantee that they will have 
certain beliefs, desires and dispositions by the time they are old enough 
to make their own decisions about how to spend their money.  They are 
created so as to have stable, reliable and extreme desires to consume 
sweets.  These desires cohere perfectly with all their other mental states 
and dispositions, or at least as well as a normal person’s ends cohere 
with those states and dispositions.  As before these desires lead to 
bankruptcy of William’s creations and then to their stealing from  him. 
 
Here the transition just involves the manipulation becoming more distant.  Instead of 
taking already formed human beings and implanting a single desire, William creates 
the human beings whose behavior he wishes to guarantee much earlier.  But they are 
still guaranteed to end up stealing from William.  The next transition is to: 
 
Capitalist Confectioner: William is again a maker of sweets, but this 
time what makes his neighbors have their voracious appetites for 
sweets is consumer culture more generally.  They have the desires they 
have, the character they have, and the beliefs they have (all of which fit 
together nicely) because of the effects of corporate advertising, an 
education system hostage to corporate interests, and low wage/long 
hour jobs that prevent their parents from correcting for these influences.  
These desires are just as strong as in the earlier examples, and they also 
lead to bankruptcy and theft.  
 
Here no one in particular is responsible for guaranteeing the behavior of William’s 
neighbors, but their behavior is nonetheless guaranteed, and just as completely as in 
the Grand Mad Confectioner case.  The final transition is from Capitalist Confectioner 
to what would be the case if determinism obtained.  If general social causes present a 
problem for moral responsibility it is hard to see why general physical causes could 
fail to. 
 With this sequence of Confectioner cases you could pursue a soft-line response 
in objecting to the transition from Mad Confectioner to Grand Mad Confectioner, 
Grand Mad Confectioner to Capitalist Confectioner or from Capitalist Confectioner 
to the ordinary case of determinism.  The best place for the defender of the Combined 
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View to object is in the first transition.  What made William’s neighbors not 
responsible for their thieving in Mad Confectioner was the fact that their actions did 
not express their true values.  But in Grand Mad Confectioner their actions do express 
their values.  In that case William gave his neighbors values that cohered perfectly 
with the overwhelming desire for sweets.  What is going on in Grand Mad 
Confectioner is that William lives with a bunch of people who have made the pursuit 
of sweets their dominant practical end.  Their actions express the value they place on 
eating sweets, and without any more information about their psychological state, there 
is no reason to think either that they fail to properly appreciate the relevant non-
normative facts or that they fail to appreciate the reasons which supervene on those 
non-normative facts.  If it were the case that they were normatively incapacitated in 
this way, then the Combined View would recommend resisting the next transition, 
because corporate advertising does not render us incapable of appreciating reasons or 
acting on them, though it might make it less likely that we will. 
 Things would be different if the initial case of manipulation were, like Grand 
Mad Confectioner, a case of global manipulation of the agents involved.  If that were 
the case then the Combined View would recommend the hard-line approach, and say 
that in that case manipulation was not incompatible with moral responsibility.  In fact, 
on one way of looking at it, the Combined View is already committed to a hard-line 
response, in that it implies that manipulated agents can be responsible for what they 
do.
283
  Simply asserting that manipulation is not necessarily incompatible with moral 
responsibility is easy enough, but what a view like the Combined View does is give 
an explanation of why that is the case. 
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 The possibility here is broad metaphysical possibility, as it is not clear that any of the cases of global 
manipulation in the literature are nomically possible. 
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